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WELCOME NOTE

Dear reader,

After the first issue of the International Journal of Armenian Genocide Studies (IJAGS) was printed we understood the whole seriousness of this undertaking. High quality academic articles and strict timetable of release of each new volume was the main tasks we expected to face with. The current issue comes to confirm the statement that we are on the right way.

When the Armenians worldwide launched their preparations for 2015 none could even imagine that in the very year of the centennial of the Armenian Genocide the attention of the whole world would be focused exactly on the same areas, were hundreds of thousands of Armenians were perished between 1915 and 1916.

Deir el-Zor, Rakka, Hama... Those were the names creating pain and sorrow for every Armenian. Exactly hundred years later the very same names come back to symbolize new genocidal crimes of ISIS and countries supporting this terrorist network. Although many prefer to say that Turkey unmask herself openly as one of the sponsors of ISIS, in fact it will be correct to say that from the very beginning there were no masks to cover intentions and far reaching realpolitik calculations. Again many thousands of Christian and Muslim victims and causalities, hundreds of thousands of displaced from their native lands creating disastrous humanitarian crisis in the Middle East.

Remembrance and dealing with the consequences of the Armenian Genocide is not and must not be a pure Armenian-Turkish issue. This is a problem of global justice and security. Unfortunately past and modern political calculations and interests live no place for humanitarian approaches and honest discussions of the topic.

The centennial of the Armenian Genocide is not the end of the chapter. On the contrary, it is a new beginning and starting point for everyone caring about the history, memory and justice. The task of academicians is twofold: to continue fight against state-sponsored denial and further the research and analysis of the Armenian Genocide in order to understand the subsequent crimes of the XX century as well as crimes in our days.

From this standpoint IJAGS has an important mission to complete having many of our colleagues involved in Genocide studies as brothers in arm in these crucial battles.

HAYK DEMOYAN
Director of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute
Secretary of the Committee for Coordinating Events Dedicated to the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide

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THE EXTERMINATION OF THE ARMENIANS AND THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIAS

Arman Kirakossian

The Armenian Genocide is an approved fact of history, a public knowledge which is recognized not only by specialists but also by the international community. For more than forty years, the government of the Ottoman Empire succeeded in the cleaning out of the native-born Armenian population from not only the Armenian highland but also from the entire territory of the Empire by carrying out a genocidal policy of massacres and deportations, the culmination of which was the Genocide of the Armenians during the First World War. The crime committed by the Ottoman authorities towards the Armenian nation fully corresponds to the definition of the special convention of UN General Assembly in 1948 "On Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" according to which "genocide means the acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."

As a recognized public knowledge the Armenian Genocide is adequately and in a worthy manner represented in contemporary specialized encyclopedias, dictionaries, resource guides and handbooks published in the United States during the last fifteen years. The authors of the entries are leading specialists in the field of genocide studies. The analysis of this issues shows that the Armenian Genocide strengthened its position as a public knowledge and recognized fact of history.

According to Alan Whitehorn[1] "The Armenian Genocide is a reminder of the risks of not learning the lessons of history, the dangers of genocide denial, and the long-term negative consequences of allowing perpetrators to go unpunished. These were contributing factors to subsequent genocides. The knowledge of past genocides, such as the Armenian case, is a key to understanding and preventing future genocide. The mass slaughter of the Armenians was, however, instrumental in the birth of two important human rights concepts: 'crimes against humanity' and 'genocide'."[2]

Genocide is a twentieth-century concept for an age-old phenomenon, the killing of a defined population group. The word was coined during the Second World War by Raphael Lemkin,[3] who "was looking for a word that would convey the full dimension of

1. Alan Whitehorn is a Professor at Royal Military College of Canada.

2. Alan Whitehorn, "Armenian Genocide." *Genocide Awareness and Prevention Month 2013, ABC-CLIO.* Cf. http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1797707&currentSection=1797513&productid=61.

3. Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959) was a Polish lawyer of Jewish descent, who lived in the United States from 1941. He is best known for his work against genocide, a word he coined in 1943. He first used the word genocide in print in *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – Proposals for Redress* (1944), and defined it as "the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group."

the Nazi murder of Jews, though he also was deeply conscious of precedents, especially the killing of Armenians in 1915 and 1916 by the Young Turk government of the Ottoman Empire. Lemkin joined the Greek word for a group, '*genus*', with the Latin suffix for murder, '*-cide*', to create the word genocide. He launched a one-man diplomatic campaign to convince the newly formed United Nations that it should develop a treaty that would outlaw genocide."[4] Lemkin insisted upon the relationship between genocide and the growing interest in the protection of peoples and minorities that was manifested in several treaties and declarations adopted following World War I. He said there was a need to revisit international legal instruments, pointing out particularly the inadequacies of the Hague Convention of 1907, which he noted was "silent regarding the preservation of the integrity of a people."[5] The General Assembly passed an initial resolution in favor of such a treaty in 1946, and the final Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was approved on 9 December 1948. It came into effect in January 1951 with the ratification by the requisite number of states. Since then, more than 140 states have signed the Genocide Convention.

The massacres and deportations of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire are qualified by the authors of the conceptual entries in the encyclopedias of *Genocide, Death and Human Experience, Global Justice, Human Rights Issues Since 1945, Ethics, World's Minorities, Social Science, War Crimes and Genocide, Community, Human Rights, and The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* as a Genocide. In the Editor's Introduction of the *Encyclopedia of Genocide* one of the leading specialists in genocide studies Dr. Israel W. Charny[6] listed the "the Armenian Genocide at the hands of the Turks" at the first place of the "past genocides in the twentieth century."[7] In the Foreword to the same encyclopedia, the Most Reverend Archbishop Emeritus Desmond M. Tutu[8] wrote: "And yet it is possible that if the world had been conscious of the genocide that was committed by the Ottoman Turks against the Armenians, the first genocide of the twentieth century, then perhaps humanity might have been more alert to the warning signs that were being given before Hitler's madness was unleashed on an unbelieving world."[9] According to *Encyclopedia of War Crimes*

4. Eric D. Weitz, "Genocide." in *The Social Science Encyclopedia,* ed. Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper (New York: Routledge, 2004, 2009), 409.

5. William A. Schabas, "Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of Human Rights,* vol. 2, ed. David P. Forsythe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 295-296.

6. Dr. Israel W. Charny (born 1931, Brooklyn, New York) is an Israeli psychologist and genocide scholar, executive director of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem, professor of Psychology and Family Therapy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, co-founder of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, editor-in-chief and executive director of GPN – Genocide Prevention Now.

7. Israel W. Charny, "Editor's Introduction to the Encyclopedia: The Dawning of a New Age of Opposition to Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of Genocide*, vol. 1, ed. Israel W. Charny (Santa Barbara, CA; ABC-CLIO, 1999), LXI.

8. Tutu, Desmond Mpilo (born 1931, Klerksdorp, Transvaal) is a South African social rights activist and retired Anglican bishop, world known opponent of apartheid, was the first black Archbishop of Cape Town, received Nobel Peace Prize in 1984.

9. Desmond M. Tutu, "Foreword: Why is it Important to Learn about the Holocaust and the Genocides of All Peoples," in *Encyclopedia of Genocide*, vol. 1, ed. Israel W. Charny (Santa Barbara, CA; ABC-CLIO, 1999), LVII.

and Genocide "the campaign to exterminate the Armenian population and expel them from Ottoman Empire (which was superseded by Turkey) was so organized and systematic that it became a model for the prosecution of even more devastating genocidal programs later in the 20th century."[10]

Professors Donald Bloxham[11] and A. Dirk Moses[12] advocate in the Introduction of *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* that "…there is the tendency in university syllabi, textbooks, and the mantras of public commemoration of genocide to focus upon a few instances of genocide that, for a variety of reasons, have qualified for the canon of general acceptance: alongside the Holocaust, Armenia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, and now Darfur tend to be included, but virtually no other cases."[13]

According to Michael R. Taylor (*Encyclopedia of Death and Human Experience*), "Genocide is the attempt to eradicate a people due to their race, religion, ethnicity, or nationality, usually by means of mass slaughter. The Holocaust, in which the Nazis murdered about 6 million Jews along with millions of others, is probably the most widely known genocide of the 20th century. Although the Holocaust may be unique in other respects, it is not unique in its being genocide. Over the 20th century and into the 21st century, genocide has occurred in Cambodia, Germany, Iraq, Turkey, and Rwanda, and intervention has been rare. Some of these acts of genocide were probably preventable, and great harm might have been averted had the international community taken swift, decisive action."[14]

The author continues that "there is no known single motive or reason for genocide. The Nazis were motivated primarily by concerns for racial purity. The Khmer Rouge, responsible for the genocide in Cambodia in the latter half of the 1970s, were intent on creating what they took to be an ideal communist society, and they eliminated anyone they believed might obstruct this project. The genocide perpetrated by the government of Turkey in 1915 against its Armenian population was apparently motivated by concerns for national security, as was Saddam Hussein's genocide directed against the Kurds of Iraq. …The government of Turkey, allied with Germany during World War I, suspected that some of Turkey's Armenians were aiding opposing powers. The Armenians were taken to pose a threat to national security, and their elimination was a way of resolving this issue."[15]

10. "Armenian Genocide," in Leslie Alan Horvitz and Christopher Catherwood, *Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide* (New York: Facts on File, 2006), 25.

11. Donald Bloxham is a Professor of Modern History at Edinburgh University, editor of the *Journal of Holocaust Education*.

12. A. Dirk Moses is the Chair of Global and Colonial History at the European University Institute, Floence, and the editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Genocide Research*.

13. Donald Bloxham and Dirk A Moses, "Editors' Introduction. Changing Themes in the Study of Genocide," in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studie*s, ed. Donald Bloxham and Dirk A Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 4.

14. Michael R. Taylor, "Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of Death & the Human Experience*, vol. 1, ed. Clifton D. Bryant and Dennis L. Peck (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2009), 508.

15. Ibid, 509.

According to Yves Ternon[16] (*Encyclopedia of Genocide*) "Coined in the twentieth century, the word *genocide* denotes a crime of exceptional gravity, the most extreme violation of the rights of man: denial of the right to live to many people. In order to understand this complex phenomenon, a comparative and multidisciplinary approach is mandatory. Though such a crime can be ancient, new characteristics in the recent century have given it its specificity. Perpetrated by the state, the crime consists in the destruction of a community of its own citizens or of those of a country it occupies. Implementation foes unhindered when the state exerts unlimited control over decisions and means of action while wielding exclusive authority in all branches of government, in other words when the state has reached a higher degree of totalitarianism. The motive for genocide is based on a creed which, however absurd, holds sufficient sway to convince and waive any moral inhibitions of those called upon to perpetrate the crime. The creed thus propagated rests on the presumption that one's very existence is menaced. A fictitious menace is serves nonetheless as a pretext to genocide, the ultimate means of getting rid of the targeted victims. Contrary to war conditions wherein belligerents have, more or less, the means of reciprocal destruction, the implementation of genocide imposes an overpowering state on a powerless community devoid of the means of self-defense and much less still of inflicting harm, literally speaking an 'innocent' community.

The twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of the most basically criminal regime in contemporary history: national-socialism (Nazism), build upon hatred, scorn and brutal force, rooted in an absurd ideology, the ingredients of which are racism, social-Darwinism and anti-Semitism. Such 'negative dialectics' through a natural though devious process brought about the annihilation of the Jews in Europe during the Second World War, the unsurpassed crime of the twentieth century. Related to it stands the genocide of the Gypsies, less thorough and perhaps based on a less pervasively blind hatred-here the Nazis claimed they sought the elimination of the 'drop-outs' of society.

The uniqueness of the genocide of the Jews, with its specific and exclusive characteristics in this century doesn't, however, preclude the use of the term *genocide* in qualifying other crimes. One notes perhaps in particular the annihilation by the Union and Progress Party, at the head of the Ottoman government in the years 1915-1916, of the Armenian communities then living in Ottoman Empire. This genocide was also perpetrates as a 'final solution' to a problem which had gone unsolved for 40 years."[17]

"Regarded as the ultimate crime and the gravest possible violation of human rights, -written in the entry *Genocide* of the *Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945*, -genocide occupies a prominent place in human history, including twentieth-century history. In 1915, for example, the Ottoman Turks conducted the systematic extermination of over an estimated 1 million Armenians. During World War II, through forced labor, sterilization, starvation, gassings and muss murder in concentration camps, some six million Jews, along with an uncertain number of homosexuals, Roma people (Gypsies), and others were killed

16. Yves Ternon (born in 1932, France) is a French physician and medical historian, an author of historical books about the Jewish Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide, Professor of the History of Medicine at University Paris IV Sorbonne.

17. Yves Ternon, "The Twentieth Century: A Century of Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of Genocide*, vol. 2, ed. Israel W. Charny (Santa Barbara, CA; ABC-CLIO, 1999), 562-563.

by Nazi Germany. In the case of the Jews, the effort was designed to effect the Final Solution (from the standpoint of Nazis) to their undesirable and undeserved presence in Europe. It was the reaction of the global community to the killing of the Jews that prompted the United Nations to adopt the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948.

Since 1945, there have been repeated examples of genocide: the killing of Cambodians during the Pol Pot regime; the Indonesian slaughter of the people of East Timor; and most recently, the occurrences in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia."[18]

According to Javaid Rehman[19] (*Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities*), "the term *genocide* means the killing of a race, a tribe, or a religious or ethnic group. Genocide as an unfortunate phenomenon of physical extermination of a minority group has remained part and parcel of human history. However, it was only after the genocidal acts committed by the Nazis during World War II that genocide was condemned as an international crime. In 1948 the United Nations adopted the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which condemns genocide and prohibits its exercise in times of war and peace. The condemnation of genocide has recently been reaffirmed by the Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). Although genocide is now universally condemned as an international crime, there are substantial concerns about the continuing exercises of genocidal activities within contemporary societies. Many minorities and groups live under the shadow of extinction; some continue to suffer from physical destruction, partially if not completely…

…Genocide has been practiced since the beginning of human history. Many tragic instances of genocide could be recounted. These would include the horrifying massacres resulting from Assyrian warfare during the seventh and eighth centuries BCE and the Roman obliteration of the city of Carthage and all its inhabitants. Religion has been used as a weapon for generating intolerance and for the ultimate destruction and genocide of religious minorities. Within the texts of religious scriptures, various forms of genocide of religious minorities are sanctioned. The tragic wars of the medieval period and the Middle Ages, the crusades, and the *Jihads* (Islamic holy wars) translated these religious ordinances to complete and thorough use. Many of the contemporary genocidal conflicts are based around religious supremacy. The process of colonization resulted in the extermination and genocide of indigenous and colonized peoples. More recently, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the mechanism of genocide has been practiced on a very wide scale. Thus, the Armenian genocide conducted by the Ottoman Turks between 1895 and 1896 in the massacres of nearly 200,000 Armenians. The Turks repeated this practice of genocide of the Armenian people during World War I. The rise of nationalism and totalitarian ideologies such as Nazism and Stalinism and the upsurge of racial, religious, and linguistic extremism in the twentieth century generated wholesale extermination of minorities. The crimes of physical extermination conducted by the Nazis against the Jewish population in Europe were of unparalleled gravity."[20]

18. *"Genocide,"* in *Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues Since 1945,* ed. Winston E. Langley (London, Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1999), 133.

19. Javaid Rehman is a Professor of Law at the Brunei University, London.

20. Javaid Rehman, "Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities*, ed. Carl Skutsch (New York:

Each genocidal act is based on ideology, an important part of the process in society that leads to the tragedy of the victim nation. These ideologies vary in form or content but usually have certain structures in common with others that support genocide, and they all serve certain common functions for the dominant race, group and its members. The entry of Ervin Staub[21] in the *Encyclopedia of Genocide* is dedicated to the ideology of genocide: "An ideology is a conception of social arrangements in a society or in the world that for the creators of the ideology are the desirable, ideal forms of life. There are *nationalist ideologies*, which focus on the wealth, power, influence and frequently also the purity of a group or nation; and *"better world" ideologies,* like communism, which offer a version of ideal social arrangements for all humanity.

Many ideologies are destructive, potentially genocidal, in that they identify enemies who supposedly stand in the way of the ideology's fulfillment. These enemies must be 'dealt with' if the ideology is to be fulfilled. Sometimes the intention to kill them is present from the start. More often, there is no intention or fully formed intention to kill them, but discrimination and limited violence against the opponents, nonbelievers and outsiders lead to changes in perpetrators and to an evolution of increasing violence that ends in genocide.

Genocidal ideologies can have both nationalist and bitter-world elements. For example, the Nazi ideology included the concept of 'lebensraum' or living space, the right of Germans to more territory, clearly nationalist in nature. It also included the concept of the purity of race. While its focus was the protection of Germans from Jews, Gypsies, and others, even genetically inferior Germans, it implied that by eliminating the contamination of higher races by lower ones all the higher races would be improved. The 'auto genocide' in Cambodia was based on a vision of total social equality derived in part from communism, but had nationalistic building blocks and elements. The genocide of the Armenians in Turkey was shaped by a 'pan-Turkish,' nationalistic ideology. The violence in Bosnia was based on a combination of fear, hate and ambition that manifested itself in a primarily nationalistic form.

Why do people turn to such destructive ideologies? They often do so in response to difficult social conditions and the frustration of basic human needs, fear and confusion. Having a positive vision of the future provides a comprehension of reality and hope in place of the chaos and confusion of the present. It helps people unite, at a time they feel alone and isolated. It provides them with purpose and meaning, at a time they feel helpless and not in control of their lives. People do need visions of a hopeful future in such difficult times. Unfortunately, the culture, past history and the conditions of life generate forces for the creation of visions that identify enemies. Scapegoating some group, identifying it as responsible for life problems, provides an explanation for the difficult conditions of life, and makes people feel better about themselves. Pointing to enemies also brings people together, help them unite. The group's culture often includes a history of devaluation of the group that becomes the scapegoat and ideological enemy (the Jews, the Armenians), or a historical rift (between the people in the cities and in the countryside in Cambodia). At

Routledge, 2005), 493.

21. Ervin Staub has taught at Harvard University and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

times the difficult conditions themselves arise from conflict and enmity with another group, or there is a history of mutual antagonism between the two groups (like Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi). Long-standing traditions of dehumanization and antagonism can be greatly and seedily intensified and catapulted into frenzied extremes relatively easily and in amazingly short periods of time by propaganda campaigns, for example, Hitler's repeated documentations of the Jews in contexts of majestic public events accompanied by stirring pageantry and marital spirit. There was an extensive state-run radio campaign against the Tutsi preceding the Rwanda Genocide in 1994.

As the dehumanization effect escalates, another mechanism of attribution of evil intention and demonic powers to the intended victim people also comes into stronger play. In the end, the implicit or explicit message becomes that the other people must be killed first in order to saves one's own people from destruction. The combination of dehumanization-they are not human beings like us and are outside of our moral universe of obligation to protect human life- and attribution of dangerous demonic intent and strength provides a powerful basis for an ideology of genocide: they deserve to be and must be eliminated."[22]

Continuing the ideological aspect of genocide Eric D. Weitz[23] notes (*The Social Science Encyclopedia*): "…Genocides take on truly massive proportions when racism or extreme nationalism becomes the guiding principles of the state (though not all racial states engage in genocide: witness South Africa and the Jim Crow USA). The infamous, though not exclusive, examples are the late Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks, Nazy Germany, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In all of these instances, the state promised its followers a future of unbounded happiness and prosperity once the supposed enemy group – Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Jews in Third Reich, Croats and Muslims in Yugoslavia, Tutsis under a radical Hutu government – was eliminated. At the same time, moderate members of the dominant group who opposed the genocides were also killed. No genocide occurs divorced from other human rights violations."[24]

There are many examples of genocides in the world history. We read about them in the *Social Science Encyclopedia*: "Some of the earliest cases occur in the Bible. The Book of Joshua records numerous instances in which the Israelites completely destroy the populations they encounter. The Roman destruction of Carthage is often cited as another case. But in the modern period, genocides became more systematic, more widespread and more deadly. In the twentieth century, genocides were produced mostly by states that sought to create homogeneous populations of one sort or another. They are part of revolutionary drives to remake the social order, to 'purify' the population of groups, conceived in racial, national or religious terms, which hold on to different ways of life and are demonized as the enemies that threaten the well-being of the dominant group. Genocides are terribly violent acts that entail high levels of face-to-face brutality. They are never antiseptic, factory-like processes of death, not even in the Holocaust. While modern genocides are typically initiated by

22. Ervin Staub and Israel W. Charny, "Ideology of Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of Genocide*, vol. 2, ed. Israel W. Charny (Santa Barbara, CA; ABC-CLIO, 1999), 347-349.

23. Eric D. Weitz is the Dean of Humanities and Arts and Professor of History at City College, City University of New York.

24. Eric D. Weitz, "Genocide," 410-411.

states, they require the mobilization of substantial segments of the population to carry out the work of killing…

…Most modern genocides have occurred in the context of war or vast domestic upheaval, when old rules no longer apply and conditions of instability both heighten the sense of insecurity and open up visions of great transformations, of finally laying to rest internal social divisions and creating a prosperous, harmonious future. The First World War was the landmark event because it created a culture of killing and revealed what highly organized states could accomplish. It is no surprise that the first modern genocide, that of the Armenians, occurred in context of total war when the Young Turk rulers were threatened by the Allied powers and demonized the Armenian population as traitors. At the same time, the Young Turks imagined a vast, homogeneous pan-Turkic empire, which could only be accomplished, they believed, through the deportation and massacres of Armenians. Similarly, Jews in Nazi Germany were subject to the most severe discrimination in the 1930s, but it was only in the context of total war that the Nazis unleashed the Holocaust.

Three kinds of genocides emerged in the modern period: (1) colonial genocides, (2) genocides as by-products of more general and massive violations of political and social rights, and (3) genocides in which mass killings based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or race move to the very core of state policies…"[25]

According to William A. Schabas[26] "The paradigm of modern genocides is of course the Nazi Holocaust or Shoah, the partially successful attempt to exterminate the Jews of Europe. In the twentieth century three other manifestations of genocide stand out: the attack on the Herero people by German colonialists in German Southwest Africa (now Namibia) in 1904, the massacres of the Armenians by the Ottoman Turkish regime in 1915, and the attempted extermination of Rwanda`s Tutsi population by racist extremists in 1994."[27]

As it was mentioned before, the term "genocide" was created by Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin as a term to define the mass killing of Jews by the Nazis in the Second World War and the mass killing of the Armenians by the Ottoman authorities during the First World War. In both cases, the mass killing took place within the context of a more general war, and Lemkin thought of genocide as a type of warfare. According to Jerry Fowler (*Encyclopedia of Community, From the Village to the Virtual World*) "Already familiar with the Ottoman campaign of murder and deportation against the Armenians that began in 1915, he [Lemkin] understood the murderous implications of Nazi ideology much sooner than most of his contemporaries."[28]

Although the term was introduced by Lemkin "…most immediately in reaction to the Nazi 'Final Solution' directed against the Jews, but it was also meant to identify that crime more generally as the annihilation or attempted annihilation of the members of the group

25. Ibid, 409-410.

26. William A. Schabas (born 1950) is a Canadian academic in the field of international criminal and human rights law, Professor of International Law at Middlesex University, Professor of International Human Law and Human Rights at Leiden University, an internationally recognized expert on human rights law, genocide, and the death penalty, President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars from 2009-2011.

27. William A. Schabas, "Genocide," 294.

28. Jerry Fowler, "Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the Virtual World*, vol. 1, ed. Karen Christensen and David Levinson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 540-541.

(*genos*) solely because of group association. Lemkin, a lawyer and himself a Polish-Jewish refugee, had previously (at the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, Madrid, 1933) unsuccessfully proposed international recognition of the crime of 'barbarity' – 'oppressive and destructive actions directed against individuals as members of a national, religious, or racial group.' …Lemkin expanded the concept of genocide to include attacks on political, economic, and cultural groups; in addition to the Nazi campaign of annihilation, he cites among earlier instances of such attacks the Roman destruction of Carthage (146 B.C.E.), the conquest of Jerusalem by Titus (C.E. 72), and the Turkish massacre of the Armenians (1915-1917). The crime of genocide, he claims, extends beyond the attacks on civilian populations in 'occupied' territory that had been addressed and in some measure guarded against in international law by the Hague Conventions. The designation of *groups* as targets for destruction, in Lemkin`s view, expands the possible rationale (and thus the threat) of systematic killing."[29]

According to Sally J. Scholz[30] "In his 1944 work *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, Raphael Lemkin coined the word "genocide" in order to designate the scale of atrocities that he had spent much of his adult life fighting. Lemkin combined the Greek word for people, race, or tribe with a word derived from Latin meaning "to kill". His aim was to identify the mass scale atrocity that targets a people. He recognized that planned and coordinated destruction of a people or a nation aims not solely or even primarily at outright killing but also at the destruction of culture, language, traditions, and social and political infrastructures.

…The genocide that inspired Lemkin to fight for international laws barring acts that intend to destroy a nation or people, is the Armenian genocide during World War I. On April 24, 1915, the Turks of the Ottoman Empire began rounding up thousands of Armenians and forcibly exiling them in a campaign that has come to be recognized as the first major genocide of the modern era. It is estimated that one and a half million Armenians were systematically killed by the military or starved while on the forced marches out of the Ottoman Empire…"[31]

The editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Genocide Research* A. Dirk Moses writes in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* that "The genocide concept is also the culmination of a long tradition of European legal and political critique of imperialism and warfare against civilians. All of the instances about which he [Lemkin] wrote for his projected world history of genocide occurred in imperial contexts or involved warfare against civilian populations. Most of his [Lemkin] case studies from the Eurasian land mass were taken from continental empires: the Roman Empire, the Mongols, the Ottoman Empire, Charlemagne and the spread of German peoples eastwards since the Middle Ages. Here is a typical statement from an article in the *Christian Science Monitor* in 1948: `The destruction of Carthage, the destruction

29. Berel Lang, "Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Routledge, 2011) 607.

30. Sally J. Scholz (born 1968) is a Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University and editor of *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*. Her research focuses on social and political philosophy, feminist theory, violence against women in conflict settings, war rape and war theory.

31. Sally J. Scholz, "Genocide," in *Encyclopedia of Global Justice*, vol. 1, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee (New York: Springer, 2011), 387.

of the Albigenses and Waldenses, the Crusades, the march of Teutonic Knights, the destruction of the Christians under the Ottoman Empire, the massacres of the Herero in Africa, the extermination of the Armenians, the slaughter of the Christian Assyrians in Iraq in 1933, the destruction of the Maronites, the pogroms of Jews in Tsarist Russia and Romania – all these are classical genocide cases (Lemkin, Raphael. *War against Genocide*. In: *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 January 1948)."[32] The author continues further that "'Barbarity' and 'Vandalism' are of relevance for genocide because of their focus on group protection. He [Lemkin] had been indignant that the Turkish perpetrators of the Armenian deportations and massacres were able largely to escape prosecution, and appalled by the massacres of the Assyrian Christians in Iraq."[33]

Prior to 1945 there had been other recognitions of crimes against humanity or *crimen contra omnes*. In 1915 the governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia condemned massacres of Armenians by Turks as "crimes against humanity and civilization."[34]William A. Schabas writes in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*: "Even prior to Lemkin`s time, international law recognized a limited number of so-called international crimes. As a general rule, they were so designated not because of their shocking scale and extent but for more mundane reasons, namely, because they escaped the territorial jurisdiction of states; piracy is the classic example, a crime committed on the high seas. Other examples include trafficking in women, damaging submarine cables, and offenses relating to drugs, counterfeit currency, and pornography. In the early twenty-first century these would be more likely described as transnational crimes. Lemkin and others argued from a different perspective, proposing the recognition of international crimes where these represented serious human rights violations. The emphasis was not so much on the international dimension of their perpetration as on the scale or horror of the acts. Such crimes tended to escape prosecution not because of international difficulties in enforcement but because the state where the crime took place was unwilling to prosecute, generally because its government was complicit in the acts.

The beginnings of this new vision of criminal justice were already apparent at the time of World War I, when Britain, France, and Russia warned that they would hold perpetrators to account for 'these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization.' But the idea that a state and its leaders could be held accountable for atrocities committed against their own nationals remained extremely controversial, and it was this lacuna in the law that Lemkin worked to fill."[35]

According to Michael J. Bazyler[36] (*Encyclopedia of Genocide*)"The term 'crimes against humanity' was first utilized in international law in the 1915 joint declaration of Great Britain, France and Russia in response to the massacres of the Armenian population

32. A. Dirk Moses, "Lemkin, Culture, and Concept of Genocide," in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 25-26.

33. Ibid, 30-31.

34. Jordan J. Paust, "Crimes Agaist Humanity," in *Encyclopedia of Human Rights*, ed. David P. Forsythe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 421.

35. William A. Schabas, "The Law and Genocide," in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham, and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 124.

36. Michael J. Bazyler is a Professor of Law at Whittier Law School in Costa Mesa, California.

in Ottoman Empire. The term was formally defined by the Nuremberg Charter, during the prosecution of the Nazi war criminals. Article 6(c) of the Charter defines crimes against humanity as 'murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated'."[37]

The *Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide* notes: "The earliest use of the term is found in the Hague Convention of 1907, although it is based in CUSTOMARY LAW during armed conflict. That is to say, the codified law pertaining to crimes against humanity evolved from principles and values that have gained almost universal acceptance throughout history. Even though most international agreements in the early years of the 20th century covered the conduct of armed parties to a conflict, there were exceptions, notably the forced deportations and massacres of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915, which involved the use of military force against an unarmed civilian population. A commission established in 1919 found that Turkish officers had in fact been culpable of 'crimes against the laws of humanity' for their treatment of the Armenians, yet both the United States and Japan opposed the criminalizing of these acts because they were violations of moral law."[38]

Benjamin Lieberman[39] believes that "the persecution of Armenians during the First World War incorporated many of the chief features of ethnic cleansing. …In this case ethnic cleansing led to genocide."[40]

Summarizing the abovementioned, we conclude that in their entries the leading specialists in genocide studies not only qualify the massacres and deportations of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War as genocide but also consider this historical fact as a crime which became a precedent for the creation and development of the genocide concept.

37. Michael J. Bazyler, "*Crimes Against Humanity*," in *Encyclopedia of Genocide*, vol. 1, ed. Israel W. Charny (Santa Barbara, CA; ABC-CLIO, 1999), 153-154.

38. "*Crimes against Humanity*," in *Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide*, ed. Leslie Alan Horvitz and Christopher Catherwood (New York: Facts on File, 2006), 110.

39. Benjamin Lieberman is a Professor of History at Fitchburg State College (MA, USA). His research focuses mainly on the concept of ethnic cleansing.

40. Benjamin Lieberman, "*'Ethnic Cleansing' Versus Genocide?,"* in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 50.

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"Only Those Who Look Back, Move Forward": Four Literary Responses to Genocidal Trauma in Greek and Transnational Prose

Tessa Hofmann

In my contribution, I introduce four authors of different generations and languages, but all of Greek origin: Elias Venezis, Dido Sotiriou, Jeffrey Eugenides and Aris Fioretos. Both the works of expelled authors from Asia Minor and of their transnational, postmodern descendants are remarkably free of revanchist clichés or the stereotypical 'othering' of Turks or Muslims. While Venezis points to the irritating 'genocidal corruption' and dehumanization within the victim group, Sotiriou puts the political responsibility for the 'Catastrophe' on Germany and the Entente, depicting Asia Minor as the homeland of Greeks and Turks. Eugenides chooses intersexuality as a metaphor of modernity and hybridity of (Greek and other) immigrant communities, whereas Fioretos is interested in flowing, flexible identities and the intersection of past and present that expresses itself in a non-linear narrative, where everybody and everything is related to others.

In my native German language, fiction is called 'Dichtung', a noun that means 'closely compacted in substance'. In historically based prose, fiction can be defined as condensed reality. The literary ways of condensing reality depend on many factors, but mainly on the talent and intent of the author, on the time of publication and, of course, on the object depicted as well as on the intended functions of a literary work. If genocide as the ultimate crime becomes a literary object, the intentions are multiple, oscillating between documentation, accusation, interpretation and reflection. Literature on genocide may even substitute public discourse. When genocide survivors write about their experiences, literature serves as a 'means of survival' ('Überlebensmittel'), as the German Jewish author and Holocaust survivor Edgar Hilsenrath accurately named this particular type of prose. For survivors, it seems easier to write about genocide as the unspeakable than to discuss it.

Event close[1] non-fictional memoirs

The history of the genocide against the Ottoman Greek population that identifies itself traditionally as Romiosyni, or Romans (Turkish: rumlar), coincides with the last decade of Ottoman rule (1912-1922) and can tentatively be divided into three phases[2]: The first

1. The terms 'event close' or 'event-closeness' are neologisms. They refer to the short time interval between an event and its transcript or oral report. In criminology and brain research event-closeness is an important criterion for reliability because personal memories are less influenced by collective memories/narratives or the recollections of any third party.

2. For the periodization of the Ottoman genocide against indigenous Greeks cf. Tessa Hofmann, "Γενοκτονία έν Ροή – Cumulative Genocide: The Massacres and Deportations of the Greek Population of the Ottoman Empire (1912-1923)," in *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath:*

phase starts during the Balkan Wars 1912/3, when two types of deportation were tested in Eastern Thrace: a) trans-boundary expulsion of Greek-Orthodox Ottomans into Greece, b) deportation of Greek Orthodox Christians from Eastern Thrace to Anatolia. Whereas the expulsed Greek Eastern Thracians would return after the war, the fatality rate among those deported into the interior was nearly 50 percent and the number of returnees remained low respectively. This kind of fatal deportation, or death march that prevented return was then repeated in Western Anatolia (Ionia) before the First World War, and in Pontos and other regions of Asia Minor during the Great War; however, these deportations never reached a nation-wide scale, as it was the case with the Ottoman Armenians. After WW1, deportations, forced labor and in particular massacres continued in all areas under the influence or control of irregular Kemalist or Nationalist fighters.

The destruction of the Ottoman Greeks has caught the attention of many authors not only of Greek descent or language. Most focus on the final of the three phases of this genocide, the period of 1919-1922, which ended with the 'Great Fire of Smyrna' and the enslavement of surviving Christian men in the age range of 18 to 45 years.

Prose about genocide shows remarkable amplitude of narrative techniques, varying from non-fictional ('factional') novels or stories to fictional narratives. The preference for a certain genre seems to be influenced by the fact whether the author is a survivor or immediate witness of genocide or belongs to second and third post-genocidal generations. Survivors and witnesses of genocide, i.e. first generation authors often choose (auto) biographical testimonies to depict real world events, but blend them to various degrees with fictitious conversations and may also use the storytelling techniques of fiction. These creative techniques of narration set the individual tone and mood; they also convey the narrator's judgments about the events. The authors of such non-fictional testimonies write with the claim and authority of telling the truth, and they influence their readers 'only' by their creative choice of narrative techniques. On average, this kind of factional prose tends to be event-related rather than focused on characters. Authors of the second or third generations usually interpret the events in fictional genres.[3] In this contribution I tentatively suggest a typology that includes two prominent authors of the first generation as examples of a realist, (auto)biographic response to genocidal events in Asia Minor in the early 20th century, in particular during the year 1922; a major difference lies in the 'event-closeness' of these two representatives. The two other authors, belonging to the third post-genocidal generation, represent transnational fiction which is, among other specifics, characterized by its reflection on the permanent flow, transfer or circulation of people, cultures and ideas; in addition, the two authors under scrutiny here have transnational family backgrounds and personal experience with transnational migration[4]; they are bi- or multilingual, and their literary work occurs outside of national contexts and borders.

History, Law, Memory, ed. Tessa Hofmann, Matthias Björnlund, Vasileios Meichanetsidis, (New York, Athens: Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011), 100f.

3. For the debate on 'factional', 'non-fictive' or 'documentary fiction' in the context of Holocaust fiction cf. Sue Vice, Holocaust Fiction (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 93-94.

4. Transnational migration is characterized as repeated transboundary migration between two or more countries.

The first author to be introduced in this comparative context is Elias Venezis (born Mellos; 1904-1973). Born in 1904 in the predominantly Greek town of Ayvalık, or Kidonia in Greek, Venezis was just 18 years old when he was conscripted into a forced labor unit in the fall 1922. Out of the originally 3,000 conscripts from his native Ayvalık, only 23 men survived the premeditated cruel treatment, the deliberate shootings at the beginning of their death march into the interior and the subsequent concentration camps and forced labor. Shortly after his release from 14 months of Turkish imprisonment, Venezis published his haunting memoirs in the local weekly 'Kambana', or 'Bell', on the island of Lesvos, from where his family originated. In 1923 and 1924, 'Kambana' was run by the author Stratis Myrivilis (born Efstratios Stamatopoulos, 1890-1969), who became a mentor and literary model for Venezis. In 1931, a first book version with 20 brief chapters appeared under the title "The number 31,328: The Book of Slavery" ("To noumero 31,328: To vivlio tes sklavias"). Venezis called his book "written with blood" and largely waived on literary methods and fictionalization, trying to let facts speak for themselves. His photographically precise representation reflects a world in which the supreme goal of life is to be registered as a number, because only after 1923 Ottoman Greeks were registered as prisoners and subsequently got a chance to be protected by the International Red Cross and eventually to depart to Greece. Until their registration, they possessed no rights whatsoever.

Due to the author's documentary approach, 'The Book of Slavery' reads as an illustrative history of the destruction of the Greeks of Asia Minor, including scenes of humiliation, gang rape, and massive killings, in which even Turkish children took part. Venezis recalled a group of thirty Greek Orthodox priests who were detached to his labour convoy; among them was an old man, who soon broke down and could no longer walk:

> The soldiers dragged him to the side of the road and they released him face down and then began to beat him with their rifle butts. He did not even give a groan, only his tongue began to lick the earth to see if it were dry or bitter.
>
> From the heights of Attalus, a few meters from where we were, the Turkish children were playing, and they ran downhill to the scene. The soldiers withdrew in order to continue our march and the children began at once to stone the body which was in its death throes. For some time we could hear the dull thud of the stones as they began to accumulate atop the priest.[5]

In the 18th chapter Venezis tells how he and his comrades were given the task to hide the corpses of approximately 40,000 Christian men, women and children from Smyrna and Magnesia (Greek: Μαγνησία ἡ ὑπὸ Σιπύλῳ; today: Manisa) before the arrival of a commission from the League of Nations. This commission is expected to monitor, for the first time ever, the conditions of the 'labor battalions'.

5. Quoted from: Speros Vryonis, "Greek Labour Battalions in Asia Minor," in *The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies,* ed. Richard Hovannisian (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 282.

Corrupted by genocide: loss of emphaty

One of the outstanding features of Venezis' narration is the precise exploration of gradual corruption by the infliction of genocide: Long before physical death itself, the victims' dignity, humanity and integrity is destroyed; exhausted and tired, as the deportees are, they become indifferent to co-sufferers. This loss of empathy and compassion is illustrated, among many other examples, with the refusal of the first person narrator and his comrades to intervene when a Greek woman is brutally gang-raped in the presence of her husband and their three-year-old infant in a church where the deportees have to spend the night. On the next day, the husband, a watchmaker, collapses during the death march, while his wife is struggling to carry their infant alone. The other male deportees realize her difficulties, but are too weak to help (chapters 4 and 5):

> *The herd halted. The soldiers tried to bring him back into a trot. They pushed at him. It did not help. They beat him with whips, afterwards with rifle butts. The baby began to cry.*
>
> You will kill him! Do you not see that? *Called his wife, who lunged at the soldier.* I will carry the child! *Her lips trembled. Her eyes were cold and hard. She held out her weak arms and sat the crying child on her shoulders. She did not caress it. None of us moved to help her.*
>
> She will not stand it. She is a woman, *told one of us.*
>
> No, she will not endure.
>
> *(...) The watchmaker rose, and we moved on. Before long, sank the hard gaze of the woman. It softened. Finally, it was filled, silently, with tears. A little further on she fell. Beside herself, she took the child in her arms and burst into tears.*
>
> Let us! ... Let us die here! *She cried, sobbing.*
>
> Now*, the leader of the escort said angrily,* then another will carry that child.
>
> *We all made an unconscious movement, as to escape a threat. The soldiers seized one of the last in the column and put the child on his shoulders. A bit farther he cried they should give it to somebody else. Then it was my turn. It was real martyrdom - because we had to walk, were naked and starving, were so exhausted that we ourselves were to fall on the ground at any moment. I went tumbling there, then I called, another should take the child. Everyone rushed to the front to escape in the first rows. (...) A little child had become a nightmare. The anger hardened more and more in our tormented heart.* Why it does not want to die? *Suddenly someone uttered wildly. (...) No one said that this would be a pity. Was that hatred of a little child? Yes, it was hatred.*[6]

6. Elias Venesis [i.e. Venezis], *Nr. 31328; Leidensweg in Anatolien* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1969), 60-62; translated from German by Tessa Hofmann. – On online edition of the Greek original is available on this site: https://1oholargou.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/13078091-31328.pdf

In this world of merciless self-interest of the victims and perpetrators, rape and even killings of co-sufferers represent welcome interludes, for they provide the other deportees with an opportunity to rest longer or to stretch out more comfortably in their cramped accommodation, once some of their comrades are shackled and led away to be killed (chapter 9):

> *The two girls that we had with us since Pergamon gave us a lot of relaxation. They were still unploughed soil and over again there were stays. The soldiers shared them, retreated with them, came back; then we marched further. These border decorations of the march did us good.*[7]

Being the only two young male deportees in this convoy, the narrator and his friend Argyris, who is also among the deportees, have an additional reason to be thankful that women and girls are raped instead of them (chapter 7).

With his focus on the overall loss of humanity and civilization, including critical self-exploration, and in particular with his sarcasm, Venezis resembles the master of literature on dehumanization, the Polish author and survivor of Auschwitz and Dachau, Tadeusz Borowski (1922-1951)[8], who after the Second Word War literally explored the 'Auschwitz system' as the complete corruption of human empathy and compassion. In Borowski's stories, the differences between the victims and perpetrators blur, because the 'Auschwitz System' destroys in numerous ways the humanity of all those who come into closer contact with this system, voluntarily or not. Among other examples, Venezis and Borowski exemplify genocidal corruption by the system of overseers, or kapos[9], who belong to the same groups as the other inmates of the Turkish and German concentration camps, but are given certain privileges and powers over their fellows:

> *The battalion was divided into companies, the companies into trains. The management by the Turkish officers could not easily be done in direct ways. Therefore from the beginning a non-commissioned officer or çavuş, who had a command of Turkish, was determined for each train. Mikhál çavuş, Vasil çavuş, Yován çavuş. These sergeants did not work. They led only supervision. In these positions came, as it always happens, the most devious. Greeks and Armenians. (...) To gain the favor with the battalion, they sucked us out at work. They feared neither God nor devil. (...)*[10]

7. Venezis, *Nr. 31328,* 75.

8. Cf. the collection of stories in Tadeusz Borowski, *U nas w Auschwitzu* (Here in Auschwitz), 1946; *Pożegnanie z Marią* (Farewell to Maria), 1947; *Kamienny świat* (A World of Stone), 1948; *Proszę Państwa do gazu* (This way for the gas, Ladies and Gentlemen), 1949.

9. In the Greek original, the Ottoman Turkish term 'çavuş' ('sergeant') is used which was a military rank in the army and the police (gendarmes). The German translation of 1969, however, uses 'Kapo' instead. The origin of 'Kapo' is uncertain: German (abbreviation from 'Kameradschaftspolizei'), French (caporal) or Italian (il capo). The 'Kapo system' was established in German concentration camps during Nazi reign.

10. Venezis, *Nr. 31328,* 157 f.

Mikhál *çavuş* embodies the worst characteristics of Greek overseers. Without any scruples, he sells an entire train of Greek labor soldiers to be butchered by revenge-seeking Turks, sharing the profit with a Turkish officer.[11] He also torments Venezis' narrator Elias for the refusal to serve Mikhál as a cook and presumably also as a sex slave. The narrator points out the profound polarization between those 'slaves, who gave orders and pocketed the bribes, and on the other side, us, the people that shed the sweat and blemished the air with its moans".[12]

Such a polarization does not exist in Borowski's depiction of Auschwitz. In his startling short story "Proszę państwa do gazu" (1946; "This way for the gas, Ladies and Gentlemen", 1967), Borowski recounts a typical workday of the 'Canada' squad in the Auschwitz camp, where the 'Canada' members collaborate in the daily extermination of 10,000 and more Jewish deportees from all of Europe. The squad members have the task to meet the incoming deportees, to drive them hurriedly out of the railway waggons to the selection by SS men and to rush the designated victims to the gas chambers. The 'Canadians' enjoy this 'work' as an opportunity to amply steal and rob from the victims, and they are largely immune to the massive human suffering that they witness daily.

The monstrosity of the events, depicted by Venezis and Borowski, contrasts with the simplicity of their narrative styles. In particular Borowski limits his narration to the description of the behavior and outward reactions of his characters; unlike Venezis, whose narrator articulates clear moral judgements, Borowski entirely excludes the description of inner emotions, motivations or moral positions. The first person narrators both of Venezis and Borowski bear autobiographical characteristics of their authors, but the differences between Tadeusz Borowski and his 'survivalist' narrator Tadek seem to be larger than those between Venezis and his young narrator Elias. In his conclusive reflections, Borowski's narrator cynically lists the material benefits of mass murder for the overseers and other privileged inmates of Auschwitz, suggesting a system in which nearly everyone benefits from the Holocaust, albeit to various degrees:

> *The Kapo is busily engaged with a large kettle. He stuffs in silk, gold and coffee. That's for the guards at the gate. In return they will let the squad pass uncontrolled. For a few days, the camp will live by this transport, will eat its ham and sausages, it will drink its booze and liqueur, wearing its clothes and trade with its money and jewelry. The civilians carry a whole lot of things out of the camp. To Silesia, to Kraków, maybe even further. In return, they bring cigarettes, eggs, booze and letters from home ... For a few days the camp will talk about the transport "Bendzin-Sosnowiec". A good, rich transport it has been.*[13]

Like Venezis before him, Borowski published his memoirs promptly after the crimes that he

11. Ibid, 160-162.

12. Ibid, 187.

13. The English translation of Borowski's "*Proszę Państwa do gazu"* (New York: Penguin Group, 1967; 1976) contains too many deletions and other arbitrary changes to the text; I therefore translated from the German edition; cf. Tadeusz Borowski, *Die steinerne Welt. Erzählungen* (München: R. Piper, 1963), 132.

survived and depicted. In difference to Venezis, however, Borowski did not live to (relatively) old age, but committed suicide after a few restless years in post-War Poland and Germany.

Later non-fictional memoirs

This promptness of the literary response is one of the main differences between Venezis and the journalist and writer Dido Sotiriou, who captured inter-communal life during the last decade of Ottoman rule from the distance of 30 years after the destruction of Smyrna. Her biographical non-fictional novel "Ματωμένα Χώματα" ("Bloodied Soil", 1962; English title: "Farewell, Anatolia!") is based on the testimony of 360 handwritten pages, which the witness and survivor Manolis Axiotis had handed over to her.[14] Born into a poor Ionian peasant family of the village of Kirkica (today: Şirince)[15] above the ancient city of Ephesos, where the indigenous Greek population had to assimilate linguistically to their Turkish neighbors, Axiotis experienced conscription into labor battalions twice, in 1915 and in 1922; at both occasions, he survived daily workloads of up to 18 hours and numerous fatal hardships to which the Greek conscripts were deliberately exposed. He deserted the units each time, until he was eventually saved by fishermen from the Greek island of Samos and became a dockworker in Piraeus. Three years after the publication of Sotiriou`s transcript of his account, Axiotis came out with his own book 'The Tangled Ball' ("Το μπερδέμενο κουβάρι"), which was "heavily influenced by the author's experience of decolonization, international socialism and the peace movement of the 1960s"[16]. Axiotis subsequently criticized Sotiriou for having 'nationalized' his account.[17]

In contrast to Axiotis, Dido Sotiriou was the daughter of a wealthy Ionian entrepreneur, who went bankrupt due to the Young Turks' boycott measures against the Greek financial and industrial elite of the Ottoman Empire. However, being communist, Sotiriou largely shared Axiotis' political views. Repeatedly, her narrator in the first person, and in particular her Cretan protagonist Nikitas Drosakis, emphasize that it is not the people, but the profiteers of war and conflict who bear the responsibility for the destruction of the Greeks and Armenians of Asia Minor. Therefore, and despite her numerous examples of anti-Greek atrocities, Sotiriou's narrative contains several examples of good, just and likable Turks, be it Ismail Agha, the benevolent military doctor, Şükrü Efendi, who saved 700 labor conscripts, the farmer Ali Dayi, who tries to treat Manolis like his own son, or Ali Dayi's daughter Adviye, who fell for Manolis. "The same earth nurtured our two people", reflects the literary Axiotis on the relationship of Turks with Greeks. "Deep down we neither hated them, nor they us."[18] According to Sotiriou, the real competitors of the Greeks of Asia Minor are not the Turks, but the Christian Levantines who enjoyed an extraterritorial status; one

14. Vangelis Calotychos, *The Balkan Prospect. Identity, Culture, and Politics in Greece after 1989* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 154.

15. After the Lausanne Treaty (1923), the village has been populated with Muslim settlers from Kavala (Greece).

16. Calotychos, *The Balkan Prospect*, 154.

17. Ibid.

18. Dido Sotiriou, *Farewell, Anatolia*, trans. by Fred. A. Reed (Athens: Kedros, 1991), 61.

of Sotiriou's Greek peasant protagonists calls them "European leeches, sucking Turkey's blood straight from the vein."[19]

In the novels of Sotiriou and other Greek authors from Asia Minor, such as Venezis, Myrivilis[20] or Kosmas Politis (born Paraskevas Taveloudis, 1888-1974)[21], we find, "maybe for the first time in Greek literature, 'the ordinary Turk', (…) who is not a conqueror, a person in the service of the 'state'"; if a literary Turk (or a Greek) behaves cruelly, it is because of war and conflict.[22] Venezis articulates criticism and disdain for those Greeks who work as overseers of their compatriots (chapter 15), but simultaneously understanding for the poor soldiers from Anatolia who have to watch the Greek prisoners and are mistreated by their superiors: *"How did they differ? We were infidels, were prisoners. And those, who were free?"* (p. 202)

Both Venezis and Sotiriou describe the same fatal Turkish-Greek dialectic of atrocities, retribution and revenge killings, but Sotiriou projects the political and ethical responsibilities for the 'catastrophe of Asia Minor' largely on external, 'imperialistic' factors, and less on the military occupation and civic administration in Ionia during 1919-1922, as established by Greece with Allied and in particular British consent.[23] According to her, a million Armenians and about 500,000 Greeks fall victim to the imperialist plans first of the Germans, then of the victorious Entente: *"The deeply rooted Christian population who held in their hands the wealth and the keys to Anatolia had to be eliminated."*[24] Here we must remember that Sotiriou's accusation occurred against the more recent background of starvation, massacres and dispossession, suffered in Greece during the German occupation in the Second World War, thus perhaps representing a constructed continuity of German war crimes against the Greek nation throughout two world wars.

In this vein, Yakovos, the godfather of the narrator Manolis, quotes the martyred and

19. Sotiriou, *Farewell, Anatolia,* 57.

20. St. Myrivilis was born on the Aegean island of Lesbos that until 1912 belonged to the Ottoman Empire. In the literary context of Asia Minor, he is mostly known for his autobiographical novel *Η ζωή εν τάφω* (The Life in the Tomb, 1924), in which he depicts his experience as a volunteer soldier against the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1922.

21. Born in Athens, K. Politis lived in Smyrna from his early childhood until 1922. In his popular novel *Eroica* (1937-1938) which combines elements of autobiography and a novel of education (*Bildungsroman*), Politis tells about a group of boys, growing up in Smyrna.

22. Iraklis Millas, "Tourkokratia: History and Image of the Turk in Greek Literature," in *When Greeks Think About Turks: A View from Anthropology, ed.* Dimitrios Theodossopoulos (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), 54.

23. For Lloyd George's foreign policy towards Turkey and Greece and Greece's policy towards Asia Minor see: Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision. Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1973; with extensive bibliography: Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998); about the Greek occupation and administration of Ionia see the unpublished doctoral dissertation of Victoria Solomonides, *The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin 1919-1922* (London: King's College, University of London, 1984); Giles Milton, Paradise Lost. Smyrna 1922 (New York: Basic Books, 2008); Edward Hale Bierstadt, *The Great Betrayal. Economic Imperialism & and the Destruction of Christian Communities in Asia Minor* (New York: Robert M. McBride & Co., 1924; Reprint: Bloomingdale: The Pontian Greek Society of Chicago, 2008)

24. Sotiriou, *Farewell, Anatolia*, 138.

canonized Metropolitan Chrysostomos Kalafatis of Smyrna (1867-1922), warning his flock of the Germans and the 'conqueror' General Liman von Sanders[25] in particular: *"He had been sent to our land with the cruel intention of eradicating us, to tear the Golden Fleece from our hands. In fact, Turkey had become little more than a German colony. (...) In a word, the Greeks and the Armenians were a serious obstacle to German interests; they had to be pushed aside."*[26]

When a controversy around history school textbooks in Greece emerged during the years 2007-2009, the government suggested replacing a debated textbook with Sotiriou's popular novel. As the debate of those years revealed, 'Farewell, Anatolia!' is usually perceived according to ideological and political proclivities; for leftists, her narrative about 'national betrayal' is sometimes perceived as too nationalistic, whereas rightists cannot agree with the communist author's antiimperialist interpretation of 'national betrayal'.[27]

The literary works of most 'μικρασιάτες' [mikrasiates] – as the refugees from Asia Minor are called in Greece – do not contain revanchist appeals and perhaps therefore were

25. The case of Liman von Sanders illustrates the discrepancies between political or literary myth and historic reality: In reality, the intervention of the German General of Cavalry, Otto Liman von Sanders, supported by the German Foreign Office, saved the Greeks of Ionia from wholesale deportation in 1916 and the Greeks of Smyrna in late 1917, although in April 1917 Liman had ordered the 'evacuation' of the Greek population of Ayvalik (Aivali, Kydonies) and its surroundings, which at that time was estimated to be 12,000 to 20,000. The reason given for Liman's order was 'persistent treason and espionage communication' of the Ayvalik residents with the Entente military. In 1915, Liman von Sanders successfully stopped the deportation of Armenians from Smyrna, against the will of the Ottoman governor Rahmi. In his memoirs Liman von Sanders did not mention the Ayvalik deportation of 1917, but wrote in the context of his inspection tour to Ayvalik in summer 1915 that Germans in Turkey were exposed to "truly unfounded attacks": "During summer of the same year, at the time of the Dardanelles fights, I received a letter of the German Ambassador, by which King Constantine of Greece inquired whether I really had said to the mayor of Edremid that 'all Greeks deserved to be thrown into the sea.' But during my brief stay in that town I had neither met, nor talked to the mayor of Edremid, nor to a similar personality, and of course I did not make any remarks about Greeks, with whom I had nothing to do there. I was able to reject with few words this shameless invention. (…) Being a Turkish general, I was a stumbling block to several fanatic Greeks." Otto Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre in der Türkei [Five years in Turkey]* (Berlin 1920), 70.

False accusations led to the detention of Liman von Sanders on 3 February 1919 and his arrest on Malta until his release on 21 August 1919. He was one of the only three high ranking officers of Jewish descent in the German forces during the First World War and suffered from the anti-Jewish atmosphere; in Turkey, he was in conflict with the pro-German War Minister Enver, whom Liman despised. – See also: Jürgen Gottschlich, *Beihilfe zum Völkermord. Deutschlands Rolle bei der Vernichtung der Armenier* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2015), 104f., 107-110, 120-123

26. Sotiriou, *Farewell, Anatolia*, 73f.

27. Lydia Papadimitriou, "Book Review: The Balkan Prospect: Identity, Culture and Politics in Greece after 1989, Vangelis Calotychos (2013), New York: Palgrave Macmillan", *Journal of Greek Media & Culture*, 2014, 1:1, 167. More recently, the socialist-nationalist coalition under Alexis Tsipras has changed official memory and history politics: The destruction of Pontian Greeks is no longer qualified as a genocide, but minimized to 'persecutions' (diogmoi), whereas more generally the genocide of the Greeks of Asia Minor seems to have completely disappeared from official wordings and announcements. In summer 2015, the ministry of education enacted a policy as a result of which the 'Pontian persecutions' would not be included in the examination content.

acceptable for Turkish readers, too. Both Venezis' and Sotiriou's novels saw Turkish translations, in the case of 'Matomena Homata' 16 editions in all.[28]

The loss of the Anatolian homeland is nevertheless deeply mourned by Greek authors. In the first sentence of his 'Book of Slavery', Venezis expresses the nostalgia for a gentle and abundant land in contrast to the horrors to come: "1922. Anatolia was so sweet - as a sonnet or something of the kind. Everything in nature was gentle and mild this fall." The comparison of the desired country with a sophisticated classical poem underlines the cultural dimension of the loss.

In the end of his tale Sotiriou's narrator Manolis Axiotis directly addresses a personalized Anatolia, asking for her forgiveness; for him, Anatolia is a country where the Greeks were deeply rooted, but had to abandon everything, after, under Hellenic administration and for less than three years, they had enjoyed the liberty that they were denied for centuries under Ottoman rule:

> *There, across the water, we abandoned our homes, our bolted storerooms, our wedding wreath laid atop the iconostase, our ancestors in their graveyards. We abandoned our children and parents and brothers, left our dead unburied, the living without a roof over their heads. Haunted dreams. There. Over there, until just yesterday, it had been our home.*
>
> *(...) So much suffering, so much tragedy. Now my mind wanted only to return to the past. If it could only all be lie, if we could only go back to our land, to our gardens, to our forests with their songbirds, sparrows and tiny owls, to our orchards with their tangerine trees and flowering cherries, to our beautiful festivals... (...) Farewell Anatolia! Hold it not against us that we drenched you with blood. (...) A curse on the guilty ones![29]*

Desiring the other: Eros and sex in times of conflict and genocide

Passionate, but socially unaccepted and therefore not lasting erotic encounters between Greek and Turkish protagonists are part of the plots not only in Sotiriou's novel, but also in Aris Fioretos' transnational novel[30] 'Den Siste Greken' (2009; 'Der letzte Grieche', 2011). In Venezis' early published memoirs, the narrator meets the deportee and slave laborer Jacques, who is a 23 years old Armenian musician posing as a Greek. When Jacques' real profession is revealed, he is detached to become the piano teacher of the Turkish colonel's young daughter; this tremendously improves his living standards, but at the same time causes a profound dilemma:

28. However, in 2015 a publication of "To noumero 31,328: To vivlio tes sklavias" by the Istanbul Belge Publishing House was banned; the case is now under trial. According to publisher Ragip Zarakolu, in Turkey there are since 1996 five cases of banned and trialed books on Greek issues. A new edition of the 1970 Turkish edition of "Farewell, Anatolia" was banned and put on trial in 1982, with the accusation of "insulting Turkishness".

29. Sotiriou, *Farewell, Anatolia*, 297f.

30. Transnational novels (and perhaps transnationalism in general) are characterized by the three topics of immigration, cultural clash and cultural diffusion, which cause the figures and the readers to search for identity.

> *Since one or two days, she began to look at him with other eyes. In the beginning her behavior towards him was neutral – she touched him, teased him, did not look at him as a male being. She treated him as on object, let's say, like the piano. They told her: He is yours. But due to the better food Jacques transformed into the Jacques he had once been. And this old Jacques was a sweet boy with huge eyes.[31]*

Instructed by his Greek friend, the narrator Elias, not to give in to the girl's persistent attempts to seduce him, Jacques eventually becomes the victim of her revenge. "Angry, as a wild animal", the repulsed girl whips the young man's face bloody, dismisses him as a teacher and returns him mercilessly to his miserable life as a slave laborer.

In Sotiriou's novel the main protagonist and narrator Manolis Axiotis finds himself in a similar conflict, but with some remarkable distinctions: Given to the farmer Ali Dayi as a slave laborer, Manolis submits for once to the seduction by his beautiful daughter Adviye. But when she understands that they have no chance as a couple, the generous Adviye is far from taking revenge and from egoist claims: "*I do not regret a thing, and I'm not worried for myself. You are all I care about, Manolis. I don't want you to be hurt. Love blinded me; I did not know what I was doing. You are Christian, I am Turkish. The laws are strict. It would be hard for us to marry. How could you ever live in a place like this, what with your land down Smyrna way?" (...)*

> *I could not sleep that night; what was I to do about Adviye? I had become entangled; badly. I was afraid that we might be found out, that I might be forced to turn Turk, to marry her. I had to make a decision, fast, no matter how hard. It was time to leave![32]*

When Adviye learns about Manolis' secret plan to desert, she even offers self-denial, i.e. her conversion to Christianity:

> *Don't do it, Manolis. Stay with us until the war is over, and then, if you wish, I will come with you to your land. You can tell your family I am Christian, does it really matter? Whatever you love I will love, and whatever you believe, I will believe. Here in Ankara all the Christian women speak Turkish, and I cannot tell the difference between us. Don't tell them my name is Adviye, tell them it's Maria.*
>
> *My poor little Adviye! You spoke the language of true love, but how could I have ever hoped to understand in the whirlwind of hatred whipped up by the war?[33]*

Sotiriou's treatment of this conflict follows traditional gender clichés: Although Manolis is a prisoner and Adviye a free woman of the ruling Turkish majority, it is the nevertheless the constrained man who takes the decision. Lacking imagination and trust in their common future and perhaps also lacking true love for his Turkish lover, Manolis decides to leave Adviye.

31. Venezis, *Nr.* 31328,114.

32. Sotiriou, *Farewell, Anatolia*, 126.

33. Ibid, 139f.

In Fioretos' 'The Last Greek' it is again the Greek partner, who takes the decision about a seemingly unacceptable bi-religious and bi-ethnic love story: The deaf, but educated and beautifully green-eyed Turk Erol Bulut, a mechanic of bicycles and a scribe, has set eyes on Despina Bakirikas, the 17 years old daughter of a Greek baker in Smyrna. In her environment, Despina is reputed to have an "adventurous heart" and to be a girl "that did what Turkish boys were doing". Although Despina's illiterate mother Sofia intercepts the perfumed love letters of the young Turk, Despina, who likes cycling, agrees to join Erol for a bike tour and to be seduced behind a mosque at the periphery of the city. When she realizes her pregnancy, Despina arranges a meeting with Erol in a cafe, trying to metaphorically explain her situation to her deaf lover:

> *Well, it is like this: Even the moon that shines above your quarter of the city is growing. Today it may be a crescent, but tomorrow we shall have a half-moon and after-tomorrow the full moon. And then, my friend, it will not be bread that is coming out of the oven. If you know what I mean. (...) I mean, if you do not understand what can happen behind a mosque, it is Good Night. Please try to understand that, for God's sake. Or the sake of Allah, if you prefer. Soon new stars will be born.*[34]

In contrast to the humble Adviye of Manolis Axiotis/Sotiriou, Despina dares to confide in her mother who then convinces her husband Lefteris to hurriedly arrange a marriage with his compatriot Yannis Georgiadis, who soon develops a preference for young boys in the capital city Constantinople. Although many in Despina's environment sense a possible 'illegitimacy' in Despina's son Yannis, who is born only seven months after marriage, the climate of overall tolerance and tacit acceptance of 'adventurous passions' across communal borders prevent dramatic twists, for Fioretos' protagonists are convinced that collective identities are constructed rather than inherited: *The priest, who had seen more strange baptisms than this one, also preferred to keep silence. But when he anointed the fore-head, chest, back, hands and feet of the infant with olive-oil, he whispered, for safety's sake: "Wherever you may have come from, little friend, from now on you will be a genuine Greek. Don't ever forget that! And make your mother proud!"*[35]

Although not officially accepted, the friendship and love between Erol and Despina proves to be lasting and even lifesaving. When Erol reads the wedding announcement of Despina and Georgiadis, he decides not to belong to anyone except "Allah, the Almighty" and becomes a muezzin. But from afar he follows the destiny of his erstwhile lover and their son Yannis. 27 years later, in mid-September 1922, when Kemalist troops set fire on the Christian quarters of Smyrna, Erol suddenly and just in time appears at Despina's house: *"Y-you were right", he explained tonelessly, but comprehensively, as if their last conversation of two decades ago had never end-*

34. Aris Fioretos, *Der letzte Grieche; Roman* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2011), 70. The novel first appeared in Swedish (2009), than in Dutch and German translation (2011), followed by a translation into French (2012). The quotations in this contribution were translated from German into English by Tessa Hofmann.

35. Fioretos, *Der letzte Grieche*, 80.

ed. (...) "It is f-full moon, I mean. At present your God hides in a r-rabbit hole."[36]

Erol gives his garment of a muezzin to his son, helping him to disguise and to escape, together with Despina and her bike. Despite the hardships that mother and son endure during the subsequent death march, Despina recalls Erol with gratefulness, once they reach their new homeland:

> *Together they marched in one of those kilometers long columns, consisting mainly of Greek families and their animals that left Smyrna in September 1922. Many perished, others fell to the ground and refused to walk any further. (...) Two weeks later the refugees arrived in a homeland that none of them had ever set foot on. "Beloved Erol, Allah ismarladik", murmured Despina, when they crossed the border.*[37]

Comparing the literary treatment of sexual encounters between members of conflicting ethno-religious communities under genocidal circumstances, the two authors from Asia Minor, Venezis and Sotiriou, depict them as socially impossible, painful and tormenting, regardless of whether Greeks and Turks afflicted by desire gave in to their passion or resisted. With a time difference of more than 85 years, Aris Fioretos treats the same constellation in a more relaxed and even humorous, tongue-in-cheek way: Although he does not lead his Turkish and Greek lovers into marriage, he describes their profound love as unshaken by times of complete disaster and catastrophe.

Transnational fiction

In some postmodern[38] novels of the 21th century, authors of the Greek Diasporas[39] expanded the narrative of the Asia Minor 'catastrophe' into intergenerational tales of flight, migration and integration into the societies of receiving countries. The most prominent examples, published by such 'global Greeks', are Jeffry Eugenides' Pulitzer awarded 'Middlesex' (2002), written in English, and Aris Fioretos' novel 'The Last Greek' (2009), written in Swedish. Eugenides' narrator and main protagonist is the hermaphrodite Cal Stephanides (born as Calliope Helen, or Callie), who embodies physical and social hybridity. The cultural concept of intersexuality, or hermaphrodism, derives from Asia Minor, where according to Greek mythology the intimate embrace of the goddess Aphrodite and the god Hermes generates the hybrid Hermaphroditos.[40] Being positioned 'in-between' their country of origin and the receiving country, immigrant communities can similarly be

36. Ibid., 86.

37. Ibid., 89.

38. In this contribution, the term 'postmodern fiction/novel' is used in its rather formal connotation, relating to fiction after the Second World War. While there is little consensus on the precise characteristics of postmodern literature, the term seems stylistically applicable to Aris Fioretos' 'The Last Greek' and the use of historiographic metafiction, fragmentation and temporal distortion in that novel.

39. Cf. Dimitris Tsiovas (ed.), *Greek Diaspora and Migration since 1700: Society, Politics and Culture* (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington: Ashgate, 2009).

40. Anika Götje, "*Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity in Jeffrey Eugenides' 'Middlesex'*." (MA Thesis, Universität Hannover, 2005), 4ff.

defined as hybrid. According to one of the protagonists in Eugenides' immigrant novel, the hermaphrodite represents "what is to come next", i.e. the New Man with changing and highly individual identities. For the author, androgyny serves as a metaphor to question identities, based on difference[41]; Eugenides suggests a concept of bridging or crossing the differences, be it gender, ethnic/communal or social difference. The scholar S. Caovoux concluded: "(…) *Middlesex* show(s) the erosion of the traditional understanding of both ethnic identity and gender identity. Describing the limits of multiculturalism, the (…) author (…) seem(s) to reject any given identity category, unable to fit to individual subjectivities."[42]

Callie or Cal Stephanides' particular sex is the genetic result of an incestuous romance between his grandparents Desdemona and Eleftherios ('Lefty'). Typical for the social-economic situation of rural Christians in the Ottoman Empire, the orphaned siblings are producers (Desdemona) and traders (Eleftherios) of silk cocoons. Grown up in the remote village of Bithynios[43] at the slope of Mount Olympus[44] (Asia Minor), they are confronted with a declining population of less than one hundred and few chances to meet agreeable Greek marriage partners. Instead, the two young people, who grew up together, discover their attraction to each other. In a milieu where the Orthodox prohibition of intermarriage between cousins of first and second grade has been violated for generations, such a step does not appear all too unexpected. However, the night when brother and sister first realize their mutual attraction to each other coincides with the retreat of the Hellenic administration from nearby Bursa (Prusa in Greek) on 31 August 1922 and the defeat of the Hellenic army in Asia Minor. The siblings decide to leave for Greece via Smyrna:

> *By the morning (...) Desdemona's forebodings had been borne out. The Megale idea had come to an end. The Turks had captured Afyon. The Greek army, beaten, was fleeing toward the sea. In retreat, it was setting fire to everything on its path. Desdemona and Lefty, in dawn's light, stood at the mountainside and surveyed the devastation. Black smoke rose for miles across the valley. Every village, every tree, every field was aflame.*
>
> *"We can't stay here," Lefty said. "The Turks will take revenge."*
>
> *"Since when did they need a reason?"* [45]

Desdemona and Lefty disagree on the interpretation of the sequence of events and revenge-

41. Arne De Boever, *States of Exception in the Contemporary Novel: Martel, Eugenides, Coetzee, Sebald* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 54.

42. Sophie Coavoux, *Greek Diaspora and Hybrid Identities: Transnational and Transgender Perspectives in Two novels: Loaded, by Christos Tsiolkas (Australia) and Middlesex, by Jeffrey Eugenides (USA)* "Transtext(e)s Transcultures: Journal of Global Transcultural Studies", 7, 2012, http://transtexts.revues.org/451

43. A fictitious toponym, after the ancient region of Bithynia

44. Mount Olympus (Olympos in Greek) is one of 20 mountains of same name on the territory of recent Turkey. It can be identified as the highest mountain in the Marmara region, Uludağ, or Keşiş Dağı, "Mountain of Monks in Turkish (2,543 m), which is located at the southern edge of the ancient region of Bithynia.

45. Jeffrey Eugenides, *Middlesex* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002), 42.

taking on both sides, and so does the narrator/author, leaving it to the reader to decide whether the massacres and crimes, committed in mid-September 1922 in Asia Minor, were intentional destruction or rather retaliation.

With changed passport identities the siblings succeed to embark from Smyrna and marry on board a ship to the United States. The story of their family develops according to the experience of immigrant communities from Asia Minor in the United States during the first half of the 20th century, where Greeks and Armenians find themselves sandwiched 'in-between' the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant upper class and the African Americans. Although Eugenides always refused to have his novel categorized as autobiographic, he nevertheless drew on his own family story, in particular on his father's Greek ancestry and also on his childhood and adolescence in Eugenides' native city Detroit and his time in Berlin.[46]

Flowing, flexible identity is also a major theme for Aris Fioretos, who is of Greek-Austrian descent, grew up in Sweden and has found an adopted home in Berlin.[47] His third novel 'The Last Greek' tells the story of Yannis Georgiadis, who was born in a Macedonian village as a child of refugees from Smyrna. This postmodern 'picaresque novel'[48] unfolds over four generations starting in the mid-19th century, and develops a story of repeated catastrophe and losses, which is followed by emigration, migration and alienation each time: first from Asia Minor to Greece and from there to North and Central Europe. Fioretos' narrator Kostas Kezdoglu is a friend of the main hero Yannis and author of his biography, which comes as a supplement to the 'Encyclopedia of Diasporic Greeks'. The twelve volumes of the 'Encyclopedia' form a collective memory, established and written by Smyrniote survivor Eleni Vembas and her friends, who took it upon themselves to write the history of all those Greeks who had to leave their homeland during the 20th century. Yannis Georgiadis, the protagonist of the supplement, is the last of three generations of the same name, and he is also the last member in his family born in Greece. His biographer and friend Kostas documents the life of the last Yannis Georgiadis not in a linear, chronological way, but fragmented and thematically modularized according to the network structure of this novel. Interlinking past and present, Fioretos emphasizes the interconnection of all places and times: "People consist of other people. The only way to do them justice is to not be limited to the bare facts and a sheath of skin, bones and some internal organs."[49] At the same time the novels of Eugenides and in particular Fioretos illustrate that the literary topic of Asia Minor, which originally had been embedded into Greek national literature, moved not only into European literatures, but has been globalized, due to English or other European

46. *Encyclopedia of Contemporary Writers and Their Work, ed.* Jeff Hamilton and Brian Jones, (New York: Facts On File, 2010), 125.

47. Ursula März, "Provinzler und Weltreisender," *Deutschlandfunk*, November 20, 2011, http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/provinzler-und-weltreisender.700.de.html?dram:article_id=84957

48. A reviewer classified 'The Last Greek' as 'picaresque novel'. The genre emerged in Spain in the 16th century as a variety of baroque romance, and became popular also in other European literatures since the 17th century. The term derives from the protagonist ('picaro'), who retrospectively narrates or justifies his life in the first person. Although the classification as picaresque novel could be challenged, A. Fioretos' 'The Last Greek' contains at least some traditional features of the genre, in particular the preference for comical or satirical elements, or the linking of individual biographies with general history.

49. Fioretos, *Der letzte Grieche*, 10.

interlanguages. Meanwhile, the Great Fire of Smyrna and impossible romance between Turks and indigenous Christians caught also the attention of the Izmir born resident of Toronto, Loren Edizel, who published her English written historical novel "The Ghosts of Smyrna" (2013) first in her homeland and in Turkish translation ("İzmir Hayaletleri"[50]; 2008; translated by Roza Hakmen).

In this sense the destruction of a pluralist city that has been praised as the 'Paris of the Orient', acquires universal significance, as Eugenides' narrator comments: *"I want to mention these things, because they all happened in that city that was no place exactly, that was part of no country because it was all countries (...)".*[51] The irreversible loss of Smyrna therefore denotes a loss for humankind.

The Smyrna Holocaust as an episode of transnational prose

In the novels 'Middlesex' and 'The Last Greek' the destruction of Smyrna and the subsequent expulsion of surviving Greeks by Mustafa Kemal and his troops in September 1922 is a linchpin of the story. This final episode of the genocide against Ottoman Greeks has been documented and analyzed in non-fictional literature, starting with the event close recollections 'The Blight of Asia' (1926) by the US consul to Smyrna, George Horton (1859-1942) and Marjorie Housepian Dobkin's (1922-2013)[52] book 'The Smyrna Affair' (1966). Born as a daughter of a Smyrniote Armenian who did not survive the 'Great Fire', or 'Holocaust' of the Ionian capital, Housepian based her work on extensive eyewitness testimonies from survivors[53], Allied troops sent to Smyrna during the evacuation, foreign diplomats, relief workers, and Turkish eyewitnesses. Later studies, in particular by Giles Milton ('Paradise Lost: Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of Islam's City of Tolerance', 2008), confirmed the accusation of contemporary witnesses that Kemalist forces set fire to the Christian quarters intentionally.

Fioretos refers to the 'Great Fire' and the subsequent expulsion and flight of Christian communities twice: in the fictitious editor's prologue, which sets the novel's frame story, and in the paragraph of the love-story of Erol Bulut and Despina Bakirikas, which results in her successful flight with the initial help of Erol. In his prologue, a fictitious editor introduces Kostas Kezdoglou as author of the supplement to the 'Encyclopedia of Diasporic

50. Literally „The Ghosts of Izmir"; the Turkish edition avoided the original Greek toponym.

51. Eugenides, *Middlesex*, 54.

52. For a biography of Housepian see Huberta von Voss, *Portrait of Hope: Armenians in the Contemporary World* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 88-92, (Chapter 10: The Ashes of Smyrna: Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, Writer (New York)).

53. A late publication of a handwritten testimony is the diary of the Armenian physician Garabed Hatcherian, published by his granddaughter Dora Sakayan in Armenian original (1995) and in English translation under the title "An Armenian Doctor in Turkey: Garabed Hatcherian: My Smyrna Ordeal of 1922" (Montreal: Arod Books, 1997). More recently, Lou Ureneck published the story of the American Methodist Minister Asa Jennings and the naval officer Lt. Commander Halsey Powell, who organized the rescue of Christians from Smyrna; the author drew largely on previously known primary sources and research by Michael Llewellyn-Smith, Richard Hovannisian, Daniel Yergin and Andrew Mango. Cf. Lou Ureneck, The Great Fire: One American's Mission to Rescue Victims of the 20th Century's First Genocide (Ecco, 2015; new edition under the title: *Smyrna, September 1922: The American Mission to Rescue Victims of the 20th Century's First Genocide* (2016).

Greeks', which has been established by Kostas' grandmother Eleni Vembas. Already on the second page of the book the events of Smyrna in Fall 1922 are mentioned, thus becoming a major reference point in the novel:

> *We write the year 1922. In Smyrna they hear screams and shattering glass, bolting horses and something that could have been theater thunder, but wasn't. (...) In that fall Eleni became 38 years of age and marched with the Greeks and the animals that left the mad city in convoys. Many perished, many disappeared.*

In the same summarizing style, Fioretos catches the events in the chapter 'Homeland and Homeland', which starts with the death of Despina's mother Sofia Bakirikas, who at that time suffers already from dementia ("Incapable to rise from her couch, Sofia died in the flames"), in order to return to the general picture:

> *On a warm day in September with unfavorable winds – we write the year 1922 – Turkish forces cordoned the Armenian quarters. They invaded in stiff uniforms with flashing sabers – gaunt, dark, determined. For nearly a week they did with the residents as they wished. When the wind eventually turned into the direction of the Christian quarters, they set the houses on fire. Because the soldiers had spilled petrol on the streets, the fire spread rapidly and greedily.*[54]

The following events are described mainly from the perspective of Yannis Georgiadis, who, in his disguise as a muezzin, arrives at the destroyed house of Despina's friend Eleni, where he discovers the youngest son, Pavlos Vembas. Swimming, he evacuates the child to an Italian vessel in the gulf of Smyrna: *"Around them all kind of things swayed on the water: bundles of cloth, mashed water melons, charred branches, a horse... And of course human beings. In whole or parts of them, living or less living."* At her old age of 94 and sick from mercury pollution and perhaps also dementia, Despina is still tormented by flashbacks from her Ottoman past: She takes her daughter-in-law for an intruding Turkish soldier ("Out of my land!") and warns of a "hill, back there, for there the tongues of the Armenians are cut off".

The devastation of Smyrna is described even more extensively in the third chapter ('An Immodest Proposal') of Eugenides' 'Middlesex', where the illegitimate love-story of Callie/Cal's grandparents unfolds against the background of the final chapter in the Ottoman Greek's destruction. The events are reflected upon from the divergent perspectives of the narrator Cal Stephanides, adding his comments in brackets, of Despina and Lefty, Dr Nishan Philobosian, a Smyrniote physician of Armenian descent, General Hajienestis[55] and the British Major Arthur Maxwell: While the siblings find themselves among hundreds of thousands of desperate, starving Greek refugees, Hajienestis is described as insane and incapable: *"On September 6, 1922, General Hajienestis, Commander in Chief of the Greek Forces in Asia Minor, awoke with the impression that his legs were made of glass. Afraid to*

54. Fioretos, *Der letzte Grieche*, 85f.

55. The historical model for this character was the Hellenic General Georgios Hatsianestis (1863-1922), who largely led the war against the Turkish nationalist forces from his bed, for fear that his alleged 'glass bones' might break.

get out of bed, he sent the barber away, forgoing his morning shave" (p. 43). On September 8, he gives his first and only command for weeks ("Up anchors! Reverse engines. Full steam ahead!" p. 54), leaving the city of Smyrna entirely undefended:

> *On shore, Lefty and Desdemona watched the Greek fleet leaving. The crowd surged toward the water, raised its four hundred thousand hands, and shouted. And then it fell silent. Not one mouth uttered a sound as the realization came home that their own country had deserted them, that Smyrna had now no government, and that there was nothing between them and the advancing Turks.*[56]

To this betrayal the next one is added: The refugees and Christian residents of Smyrna hope for Greek ships to evacuate them, but no vessel appears. The conversations between Maxwell and his subordinate Phillips reveal that the commanders of Allied ships in the Gulf of Smyrna have neither any intention nor any order to evacuate Christians from Asia Minor for whom Maxwell has nothing but racist contempt:

> *But surely, sir, if the Turks arrive and there's a massacre...*
>
> *There is nothing we can do about it, Phillips. I've spent years in the Near East. The one lesson I've learned is that there is nothing one can do with these people. Nothing at all! The Turks are the best of the lot. The Armenian I liken to the Jew. Deficient moral and intellectual character. As for the Greeks, well, look at them. They have burned down the whole country and now they swarm in here crying for help. Nice cigar, what?* [57]

Dr. Philobosian hopes in vain that he and his family will be protected by a letter of recommendation written by Mustafa Kemal, whose diverticulitis the Armenian physician has successfully treated. But the Turkish soldiers, who raid his house in Philobosian's absence, are illiterate; returning home, Philobosian finds his entire family wiped out:

> *It didn't occur to Dr. Philobosian that the twisted body he stepped over in the street belonged to his younger son. He noticed only that his front door was open. In the foyer, he stopped to listen. There was only silence. Slowly, still holding his doctor's bag, he climbed the stairs. All the lamps were on now. The living room was bright. Toukhie was sitting on the sofa, waiting for him. Her head had fallen backward as though in hilarity, the angle opening the wound, so that a section of windpipe gleamed. Stepan sat slumped at the dining table, his right hand, which held the letter of protection, nailed down with a steak knife. Dr. Philobosian took a step and slipped, then noticed a trail of blood leading down the hallway. He followed the trail into the master bedroom, where he found his two daughters. They were both naked, lying on their backs. Three of their four breasts had been cut off.*[58]

56. Eugenides, *Middlesex*, 54.
57. Ibid, 52.
58. Ibid, 60f.

In Smyrna, the destiny of the Armenian physician and the Greek siblings intertwine: First, Philobosian saves the wounded and starving Lefty by providing free medical care and supporting the young refugee with some money, then in return Lefty saves the completely shaken doctor from suicide. After Lefty has succeeded to gain a French visa for himself and his alleged wife Desdemona, he helps Philobosian to leave Smyrna, declaring the Armenian to be his cousin. In the United States, Philobosian remains the family doctor of the Stephanides and is responsible for not realizing the sexual anomaly of the newborn Cal, whom he mistakes for a "beautiful, healthy girl". Metaphorically spoken, Cal Stephanides, the hybrid New Man, emerges from the destruction of the global city of Smyrna, for the anonymity and chaos in the devastated city help Lefty and Desdemona to achieve new identities for their marriage and escape.

But as in Fioretos' novel, the female survivor Desdemona suffers from lifelong trauma. The 1967 Detroit riots remind her of Smyrna and the looting, arsonist Turks. No less traumatized, Dr. Philobosian, on the other hand, never mentions Smyrna again and leaves the room, if somebody else does. He never mentions his first wife or murdered sons and daughters. "Perhaps for that reason he was still alive", comments the narrator.

Complex symbols of creative continuity between the lost world in Asia Minor and the new homeland in North America are the silkworms and Desdemona's knowledge about them that she brought with her from Bithynia. In 'Middlesex', the silk worms are described as highly sensitive, almost mythical creatures, reacting immediately to their keepers' well-being and psychic state; in the crisis of fall 1922, they stopped spinning their cocoons. In 1932, when Desdemona is looking for ways of earning money to sustain her family, she therefore eventually accepts an offer to train young Black Muslim women to produce silk, despite her initial hesitation. Ancient Greek belief from Asia Minor meets with new African American religious convictions:

> *"*Listen, Des, before I became Supreme Captain, I did hair and nails. Not no farmer's daughter, understand? This thumb look green to you? Help me out. What do these silkworm fellas like? How we get them to, you know, silkify?"
>
> "It hard work."
>
> "We don't mind."
>
> "It take money."
>
> "We got plenty."
>
> *Desdemona picked up a shriveled worm, barely alive. She cooed to it in Greek. (...)*
>
> *Twenty-three pairs of eyes fell on Desdemona. She gathered courage. She translated what she wanted to say in English and went over it twice before she spoke.* "To make good silk," *she then pronounced, beginning her lessons to the Muslim Girls Training and General Civilization Class, "*you have to be pure."
>
> "We trying, Des. Praise Allah. We trying."[59]

59. Ibid, 147f.

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GENOCIDE DESCENDING: HALF-JEWS IN POLAND AND HALF-ARMENIANS IN TURKEY

Serafim Seppälä

All the consequences of Armenian genocide and Jewish *Shoah* are still not fully realised or comprehended. In addition to the systematic annihilation of populations and cultures, the fates of the survivors continue to be a tragic reverberation of the genocidal events. In both cases, most of the survivors escaped to other countries and later became subjects and objects of a number of biographies and studies. However, not every survivor fled. In both genocides, there were also a remarkable number of victimised individuals who survived the massacres through negligence of the murderers, or by being taken to families, and continued to live in the country of the atrocities, changing or hiding their religious and cultural identity or becoming victims of forced change of identity.

The existence of these peoples in Poland and Turkey remained a curious unrecognized subject that extremely little was known of until recently. In this article, the present situation of both of these groups is discussed in comparative terms in order to outline the character of their identity problems. The comparison is all the more interesting due to the fact that obvious differences between the two social contexts underline the significance of the common factors in the post-genocidal experience.

The setting: similar paradigm, dissimilar situations

Armenians in post-genocide Turkey disappeared from the public scene, and the same can be said of Jews in post-war Poland. In both cases, there was an active and tolerated community in the capital,[1] in addition to an unknown number of survivors scattered in various places.

In both groups, the survivors represent typical cases of persons who may be survivors in the biological sense yet thoroughly victimized in cultural, religious and psychological terms. Having lost their traditional relations, religions, feasts, dances, songs and the whole cultural context, and in most cases marrying from the other religion, they went through an instant assimilation, at least in terms of social interaction. In other words, they were left alone with their nightmares – on the character of which we know something through the studies on the survivors in the diaspora.[2]

In Turkey, the (ex-)Armenians had to prove they were Muslims and thus good Turkish citizens, but even this did not prevent them being seriously harassed. In a similar way, the (ex-) Jews in Poland had to prove they were good Poles, which in the era of cold war meant

1. In Istanbul, the number of Armenians has been in tens of thousands; In Warsaw, there were 5 000 Jews in the late 1940's yet the number was in considerable decline until 1990's.

2. *E.g.,* Aida Alayarian, *Consequences of Denial: The Armenian Genocide* (London: Karnac Books, 2008); Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, *Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

being good communists, and this did not prevent them from becoming victims of the purges of 1968, resulting in most cases in the survivors' emigration to Israel.

Armenian survivors in Turkey had to carry the additional burden of being a constructive part of the society that generated the destruction of one's own culture. Yet some managed to marry Armenians of similar backgrounds and thereby managed to keep some layers of memory and fragments of identity and traditions inside the family, resulting in curious *underground identity*. Even in their cases the lack of proper communities, religious institutions and schools resulted in thorough assimilation into the main stream of society, and due to the all-embracing fear, silence fell on the topic even inside the family.

In Turkey, most Armenian survivors were young girls abducted into families with no possibility whatsoever to lead an Armenian life, not to mention delivering the lost identity to their children. Memoirs of those survivors who later managed to emigrate sometimes contain detailed descriptions of life as an abducted child in Muslim families.[3] In Poland the danger was less immediate; nevertheless it was typical that Jews wanted to prove their Polishness by distancing themselves from any sign of Judaism.

As a result, the assimilated ones in both instances were considered as lost cases by all sides. This was evident not only for practical reasons but also for the theoretical framework of identities on all sides. That is to say, even though Armenian and Turkish histories and literatures diverge completely on the portrayal and interpretation of the history, both narratives firmly agree on the existence and importance of a decisive line between being an Armenian and being a Turk. In a parallel way, Jewish and Catholic/Polish world views continued to view each other as radically different categories. Jews viewed Poles as Anti-Semites, often with good reason, lately with less reason.[4]

For all sides the narratives functioned according to the paradigm of either-or identities. Roughly speaking, American Jews and American Armenians treated the lost cases in parallel terms in their memoirs and studies, seeing the Polish and Turkish identities categorically and self-evidently as non-Jewish and non-Armenian respectively. In a telling testimony, an Armenian from Ankara became interested in his Armenian identity after Hrant Dink's murder, and on his trip to Israel he went to the Armenian quarter of Jerusalem, entering an Armenian shop: "The shopkeeper gave me the cold shoulder when I said I was an Armenian from Turkey. They probably see us as people who take side with Turkey."[5]

Several decades after the genocide, it was known that there were a big number of people with Armenian genes in Turkey, and an unknown number of Jewish genes in Poland, but identities, communities and peoples were considered as lost forever.[6] In the prevailing

3. Rapes seem to have been common, and the children could be given dirtiest jobs – even cleaning the buttocks of the master, like in document 170 in Svazlian Verjine, *The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewitness Survivors* (Yerevan: NASRA, 2011), 345.

4. For an illustrative discussion on the absurd measures taken and surreal fears sensed by Jewish heritage traveller groups in Poland, see Erica T. Lehrer, *Jewish Poland Revisited. Heritage Tourism in Unquiet Places* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 63–74.

5. Ferda Balancar (ed.), *The Sounds of Silence III: Ankara's Armenians Speak* (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publ., 2012), 42.

6. This applies to the last Jews themselves, like in the pessimistic encounters recorded by Niezabitowska

traditional *either–or* identity paradigm this was unavoidable.

In fact, one can say that both of these two genocides were enabled and to some extent caused by the historical contrast of identities, and the new post-genocide identities of the survivor communities in Armenian and Jewish Diasporas were defined by the same dividing lines. This in turn created the sense that any attempt to diminish the dividing lines would endanger the memory of destruction.

The problem as such is of course inescapable because of the traditions of religious self-definition: one cannot be Christian and Muslim at the same time, and one cannot be Christian Catholic and Jewish in the religious (Halakhic) sense. And moreover, according to all traditional interpretations of Islam, a Muslim cannot even become Christian (without facing a death penalty).

Ironically, long after the destruction and annihilation of communities, traditions and identities, there were Turkish conspiracy theorists afraid of the re-emergence of hidden Armenians in Eastern Turkey, and in the same way the Polish anti-Semites were worried about Jewish conspiracies when there were no longer Jewish communities in existence.

Change of spirit: from destruction and negligence to protection and restoration

When everything was already considered lost, something happened. One could say that the spirit has changed strikingly in Poland, and to considerable extent even in Turkey, especially in Kurdish areas.[7] "A process of de-assimilation has begun", states a Polish-Jewish professor of philosophy Stanislaw Krajewski, adding that it is "a novelty in the history of Jews in Poland". The latter remark indicates that something is in fact better today than during most of the history. Rather similar voices have emerged from certain parts of Turkey. "Until 10 years ago, we used to conceal our identity from everybody, but being an Armenian is no longer dangerous",[8] says Mehmet Arkan, a Muslim of Armenian origin in Diyarbakir.

In Poland, there has been an unprecedented rise of interest towards Judaism. This applies to Polish intellectuals attracted by the extensive amount of Jewish influence on the cultural history of Poland, as well as to many ordinary Poles reminiscing about their lost Jewish neighbours and neighbourhoods.[9] In places like Chmielnik, city planners have faced the fact that the problem of a ruined synagogue in a beautiful old city must be solved somehow, and fortunately destruction is not a serious option. During the last five years, a respectable number of synagogues and cemeteries have been renovated and Jewish museums opened. The renewed synagogues function either as Jewish museums (Zamosc, Chmielnik,

& Tomaszewski . See Malgorzata Niezabitowska and Tomasz Tomaszewski, *Remnants: The Last Jews of Poland* (New York: Friendly Press, 1986).

7. There is a growing number of intellectuals and Kurdish politicians (e.g. candidate for presidency, Selahattin Demirtas) who openly speak for the Armenian cause, or at least actively show tolerance.

8. "Turkey's Secret Armenians," *Al-Monitor*, February 19, 2013.

9. *e.g.* Elzbieta Skromak, *Żyd, mój sąsiad; dialog kultur w przedwojennym Rozwadowie* [The Jew, My Neighbor: The Dialogue of Cultures in Pre-War Rozwadów] (Stalowa Wola: Muzeum Regionalne w Stalowej Woli, 2013).

Dabrowa Tarnowska), communal cultural centers (Szczebrzeszyn, Zarki, Modliborzyce) or, in the most fortunate cases, as synagogues (Krakow, Chachmei Lublin Yeshiva).

It is well-known that in Turkey there are thousands of Armenian churches and monastery buildings in decay, some dating to the earliest Christian times. However, Aghtamar[10] and Surb Kirakos in Diyarbakir have been renovated,[11] and other projects of renovation are more or less under consideration. There have been preliminary talks even about restoring the famous yet totally ruined Surb Karapet in Mush region. So far the endeavours have not been much more than political manoeuvres for the protection of the image of Turkey, with no serious concern on the cultural legacy the destruction of which still continues.[12] Nevertheless, even this suffices to give an impression that the bottom may have been reached and the second post-genocide century might be better than the first one for the last landmarks of West Armenian civilization.

As regards to the buildings, Poland is certainly far ahead. It is true that many of the renovation projects have been more or less funded by Jewish organisations in the diaspora, but remarkably, such projects may be initiated and carried out by Polish Christians as well, and there does exist true interest for the Jewish cause. In Turkey, a successful restoration implies difficult legal processes, yet some cases (Surb Kirakos, Aghtamar) are similar enough so that certain parallelism may be seen in emergence. It must be admitted, however, that what is a painful exception in Poland (e.g. the cross and church in Auschwitz-Birkenau) is an overwhelming rule in Turkey (mosques in the places of churches and monasteries). What is happening to the buildings is a good indicator of the situation of people, to which we now turn.

Sparks of souls re-emerging?

The concept of *gilgul,* transmigration of souls, became popular in medieval Jewish mysticism. According to this peculiar doctrine, each human soul is a sum of sparks from the souls of people of former ages – spiritual genetics, so to say. The idea of *gilgul* has often occurred to me when dealing with the stories of half-Jews of Poland or half-Armenians of Turkey, whose genetic ancestry seems to call them back to where they have come from. Perhaps even more mystically, there are also cases of authentic Poles in process of converting to

10. Aghtamar is officially a museum, and liturgy may be held there only once year, but the matter is currently under discussion. At the moment it seems possible to have additional ceremonies with a special permission. See Siranoush Ghazanchyan, "Akhtamar Church to be allowed to celebrate Mass more often," *Public Radio of Armenia*, 18 Jan 2016, http://www.armradio.am/en/2016/01/18/akhtamar-church-to-be-allowed-to-celebrate-mass-more-often/; "Armenian Acting Patriarch comments on the permission to hold Masses in Akhtamar Church more often," *Public Radio of Armenia*, 21 Jan 2016, https://www.armradio.am/en/2016/01/21/armenian-acting-patriarch-comments-on-the-permission-to-hold-masses-in-akhtamar-church-more-often/

11. The currently renovated Surb Kirakos church was recently awarded with a Grand Prix of the European Union Prize for Cultural Heritage/Europa Nostra Awards. Nevertheless, the Turkish government had no role in the actual project: most of the funding was raised by the Armenian diaspora and the rest by the local Kurdish municipality.

12. Cf. "1,600-Year-Old Armenian Cemetery Ruined In Mush," *Asbarez*, June 29, 2015, http://asbarez.com/137317/1600-year-old-armenian-cemetery-ruined-in-mush/ (accessed 30 June 2015).

Judaism, oftentimes as a result of serious reflections on the legacy of genocide. This unusual phenomenon could be well interpreted with the help of another key concept from Jewish spirituality – *tiqqun olam,* healing of the world.

Attempts to define general principles in these processes easily fail to do justice to the cases, so unique the stories of returning souls are. Many instances sound unbelievable, like the famous case of Polish skinhead and anti-Semitic Pawel Bramson who at the age of 24 discovered that his parents were Jews who had converted to Catholicism – and the same case with his wife![13] In Turkey, there seems to be more and more half-Armenians bubbling up from different layers of the society. To name one, Mehmet Ali Arslan, a brand new Member of Parliament of Turkey, is of Armenian origin.[14] Moreover, there have also been anti-Armenians with Armenian ancestry, just as there have been anti-Jewish activists arising from Jewish backgrounds. Sometimes this is a conscious attempt to prove the authenticity of one's non-Jewishness or non-Armenianness. However, the most interesting cases are those who are unaware of their background, like Bramson, but who somehow are deeply disturbed by Jewishness or Armenianness and channel this sense of insecurity into open hatred.

The chief rabbi of Poland, Michael Schudrich defines his mission as an enterprise "to revive the Jewish identity of individuals",[15] arguing that there are "thousands of stories about men and women of all ages and backgrounds" who are "returning to Judaism".[16] But are they really? Schudrich himself estimates that in one year there were "more than a hundred people" who came to him to *discuss* their Jewish roots, in addition to perhaps dozens who went to other rabbis. It means less than one per cent, and how many of these shall in reality return?

Media coverage and public interest focus on those few who really adopt the Jewish – or Armenian – religion and become converts. It is rather obvious, however, that most of those who are "returning" never fully reach the terminus by converting in the actual sense of the word. Remaining somewhere in-between, they may start to identify and even define themselves as Jews and adopt a wide selection of Jewish customs and activities. This does not automatically make anyone a Jew in the traditional (Halakhic) sense of the word, especially if one's mother was a non-Jew. There are thousands of such people who fall somewhere between the poles: they are not Jews, but also it would be misleading to describe them as non-Jews.

The situation of the Jews of Poland, and the development of recent decades, has been summarised illustratively by Schudrich:

13. Adam Easton, "Jewish life slowly returns to Poland," *BBC News*, April 20, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-radio-and-tv-17741185 (accessed 1 July 2015); Katarzyna Markusz, "Sneak peek at a hard-hitter in the upcoming S.F. Jewish Film Festival," *JWeekly,* June 14, 2012, http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/65535/from-neo-nazi-skinhead-to-a-black-hatted-jew/ (accessed 1 July 201; "Polish man journeys from skinhead to Orthodox Jew," *CTV*, March 28, 2012, http://www.ctvnews.ca/polish-man-journeys-from-skinhead-to-orthodox-jew-1.788440 (accessed 1 July 2015).

14. Arslan represents People's Democratic Party (HDP).

15. Michael Schudrich, "Giving Back to the Jewish People," in *Poland: A Jewish Matter*, ed. Kate Craddy, Mike Levy, and Jakub Nowakowski, (Warszawa: Adam Mickiewicz Institute, 2010), 62.

16. Ibid, 57.

> Back then, in 1973, it was believed that there were no Jews left in Poland except a few thousand elderly. By 1990, there was some thought that maybe there were some younger Jews, by the mid-1990s we knew there were many more Jews than were previously believed but it was not clear if they wanted to express their Jewish identity. Today we know that some are expressing their Jewish identity and the challenge is to give them ways to express their identity in a meaningful way to themselves.[17]

The estimation can be verified by the interviews made in the 1980's. "We are definitely the last", the interviewers heard in many occasions. "Jews as a community, or even a mini-community, will no longer exist in Poland. We are on the way out."[18] Contrary to all expectations, the situation started to change just a few years after these words were documented. Consequently, during the post-Soviet decades, "thousands of Poles have discovered that they have Jewish roots and nobody knows how many thousands they are", as Jessica Zwaiman Lerner states.[19]

Something parallel has happened in Turkey, especially after Fethiye Cetin's book *Anneannem* (2004) that brought the fate of Armenian grandmothers into discussion. Furthermore, Hrant Dink's murder in 2007 made many to take sides in the matter. The situation gave rise to a sense that the Armenian issue should be encountered either openly like in Dink's journalism, or destructively, like in the national ideology behind the murder, and many consciously chose the former option.[20]

As a result of the increase of interest and courage on Armenian heritage, we know today much more than ten years ago. Interviews, articles and books about the descendants of Turkey's Armenians have started to appear. The stories contain obvious parallels with the instances of Jews in Poland. In both cases, one's origin is oftentimes realized just by chance; there are also cases of dramatic deathbed confessions.[21] Reactions of the descendants vary considerably. An ideal example of this is found in an article discussing the situation of people who have discovered their Jewish ancestry in Poland. The author is pondering upon the reasons why a grandchild would like to become Jewish:

> Rabbi Schudrich says they have a number of deathbed confessions. He tells the story of this girl who found out she was Jewish after a deathbed confession by her grandmother. At 16 years of age she was curious and attended

17. [Rabbinical Council of America], "Rabbi Michael Schudrich. Chief Rabbi of Poland," March 18, 2014, http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=105571 (accessed 8 Oct, 2015).

18. Malgorzata Niezabitowska and Tomasz Tomaszewski, *Remnants*, 15.

19. Jessica Zwaiman Lerner, "Rabbi Michael Schudrich on the opportunity for renewed Jewish life in Poland," *Jewish Times Asia*, December 2010/January 2011, http://www.jewishtimesasia.org/one-to-one-topmenu-45/rabbi-michael-issue-december (accessed 2 July 2015).

20. "The fact that he spoke out about those things was a turning point for Turkey." Ferda Balancar (ed.), *The Sounds of Silence. Turkey's Armenians Speak* (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation Publ., 2012), 43.

21. e.g. Ayse Gül Altinay and Fethiye Cetin, *The Grandchildren. The Hidden Legacy of "Lost" Armenians in Turkey* (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, 2014), 99.

> a session the rabbi offered. "She told me at the end of the session she felt something come alive in her that she had never felt before. This *Pintele Yid* – the spark of the Jewish soul." That is "the most logical and simplistic answer."[22]

Something parallel is described by a leftist non-religious descendant of Armenians in Diyarbakir, who after having entered the church was surprised by a certain feeling of lightness. He tried to explain this by pondering whether there could have been some kind of spiritual energy of the ancestors present: "This may not be scientific, but that's my explanation."[23]

It is also striking that even when there was no explicit talk whatsoever on the matter, evidently *something* had been delivered to the next generations. An Alevi woman from East Turkey (aged 30) came to know that her father's side was of Armenian origin. After consideration, she concluded that something had been transmitted between the lines: "Both my mother and my father carried with them the oppression of the past and they passed it on to me, and it defined my childhood."[24] It is telling that this heritage was defined in negative terms:

> For me, having Armenian roots means this: you know that there were people in your family who were continuously oppressed on account of their identity. And you grow up carrying that sense of oppression with you.[25]

Problems of recovering identity

Even for those who manage to go through an actual conversion, it is not easy to become an Armenian. A recent publication describes the setting in a church in Boyaciköy during the Sunday service. Some twenty new converts are vehemently crossing themselves, but "when the notes of the hymns rise to the brick roof, they hesitate, stumbling over the words". In addition to the usual problematics in adopting a new religion and a new way of thinking, there are linguistic difficulties and social barriers, not to mention the obvious dangers from Islamists and nationalists alike. Even the Armenian bishop, stressing that they are not actively converting in the manner of the evangelical missionaries, remains cautious of the new phenomenon:

> More and more people are breaking the silence and knocking on our doors. The atmosphere of democratization is favourable here, but the fear is still present: the subject is still politically sensitive. We're not quite sure how to handle it. [26]

For those who do not convert, the setting is even more obscure. The Islamized Armenians of Turkey are a curious sub-group that officially does not exist. Their identity is constructed in

22. Jessica Zwaiman Lerner, "Rabbi Michael Schudrich."

23. Ferda Balancar (ed.), *The Sounds of Silence II. Diyarbakir's Armenians Speak* (Istanbul: International Hrant Dink Foundation, 2013), 199–200.

24. Ayse Gül Altinay and Fethiye Cetin, *The Grandchildren*, 156.

25. Ibid, 153.

26. Laure Marchand and Guillaume Perrier, *Turkey and the Armenian Ghost: On the Trail of the Genocide* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 57.

negative terms: not a real Turk, but also not a true Armenian. There is even no appropriate name for the group. Armenians oftentimes speak of "Islamized Armenians", which in many cases is anachronistic, since the term refers accurately only to the situation during the first generation. It is misleading to call "Islamized" someone who has one non-Islamic (grand-) grandparent. In most cases, there is only 1/4 or 1/8 of Armenian genes involved, due to the big number of abducted young girls in 1915. And as one might expect, things get much more obscure when we turn to the non-genetic factors of Armenian identity.

How to call them, then? Who are they? It is characteristic for this new phenomenon that the classical clear-cut divisions between Turks and Armenians, or Poles and Jews, are no longer enough to define identities in a functional way. This creates a paradoxical situation due to the fact that the religious definitions remain clear as ever: one either is a Jew or Catholic, Muslim or Christian. To adopt one religion means to deny the other. But what should then be done to the growing number of cases who define themselves somewhere between the categories, or who feel at home in both of them?

In Diyarbakir, Mehmet Arkan became aware of his family's Armenian identity at the age of seven and affirms that he does not feel less Armenian for being a Sunni Muslim and performing Islamic prayers![27] According to traditional either-or paradigm, this would be impossible – and such a statement would not have made any sense in pre-genocide Armenian culture, for which Arkan undoubtedly feels genuine affinity. However, if one becomes acquainted with the pre-genocide Armenian culture, its thoroughly Christian nature becomes obvious.

A 34-year old Muslim woman in Turkey ponders her self-definition after finding out (as a teenager) that she, as a matter of fact, is a descendant of an Armenian priest and music teacher from Mush, father Yeghiše:

> I know that I have Armenian origins. A part of me is Armenian. I am totally at peace with this. I don't define myself as Armenian or as a Turk but I have to admit that the answer to my question, "Who am I?" took some time to mature.[28]

What, then, is this answer of hers? She admits that she was brought up as a Turk, her family is Turkish, her name is Turkish, and that she is "a Turk anyway", and everything about her is "Turkish in fact". Yet there is the other half in her, too, and oftentimes these two sides function in contradictory terms: "While my Turkish part feels embarrassed, my Armenian part feels terrible anger." The anger and hatred is so strong that one has to actively learn to deal with it in order to be able to carry on ordinary life.

Neither Turkish or Armenian history, nor academic scholarship, has valid categories for such "half-cases", not to mention religions. Tragically enough, such cases usually have no possibility to experience or even obtain genuine knowledge about the traditional way of life that their ancestors led. Due to the nonexistence of Armenian (or Jewish) life in quarters and villages that used to be Armenian (or Jewish), there is a curious and tragic sense of

27. "Turkey's Secret Armenians," *Al-Monitor*, February 19, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/02/turkey-secret-armenians.html# (accessed 1 July 2015).

28. Ferda Balancar (ed.), *The Sounds of Silence. Turkey's Armenians Speak*, 86.

emptiness and absence all around. For that very reason, however, the annihilated culture in a paradoxical way remains constantly present through its absence. In Turkey this applies to both sides: the topic is an untreated wound for Turks, too.

The situation results in *broken identities*, in which some fragmentary aspects of the lost Armenianness – or Judaism – are cherished and respected by the descendants of survivors, but the traditional way of life as a whole remains unknown. This means that the definitive constituents of Armenianness and Jewishness are basically alien and replaced by aspects that are more or less random and even post-genocide.[29] In the traditional paradigm, national and religious identity was a harmonious whole, even though consisting of various ingredients; in the half-cases, identity is rather a composition of miscellaneous elements that are incompatible according to the standards of the traditional identities and the paradigm behind them.

In the cases of broken identities, the Armenian half is undoubtedly real, but extremely fragmentary. After the historical continuity is broken, there is no longer a way to know what it was like to be Armenian in the original cultural setting that used to be exceptionally rich and colourful, flavoured with dozens of peculiar communal feasts and fasts annually, in addition to an endless number of local songs, dances, rituals and customs. This in turn results in what could be labelled as *imagined identities*: one may think that he is Armenian even though there are only tiny and fragmentary random parallels with Armenianness as it was before the genocide, or what it would be now without the genocide.[30]

In a society like Turkey, this may lead into situation in which a half-Armenian possesses only the negative aspects of Armenian identity: the sense of being oppressed and endangered. Or, in a more open society like Poland – and perhaps Istanbul – one may try to pick up some of the best parts of the ancestral identity: a half-Jew may have Judaism as a kind of hobby, enjoying Jewish literature and concerts in Jewish festivals (the number of which is increasing in Poland).

Nonetheless, such pursuits are not an insignificant phenomenon. The famous festival of Jewish culture in Cracow has been scorned – oftentimes by the diaspora Jewry – as being Jewish culture performed by non-Jews to non-Jews.[31] Such a blame is in fact an outcome of the traditional paradigm of "either–or" identities and fails to take into consideration the fact that many of the "non-Jews" actually come from the half-Jewish background, and such open festivals are the easiest and sometimes the only way to achieve at least some taste of the lost ancestral life, as well as of modern Judaism.

The public interest, especially the articles based on interviews of the most interesting cases, typically concentrate on those few who managed to convert to the religion of their

29. E.g. one may know, say, Easter eggs but not the totality of *paregentan,* Great lent, Great week and Easter night with its hymns, songs and games, to which the eggs belonged.

30. How much better the situation is in the Post-Soviet Armenia, or in the diaspora, is another question. Correspondingly, the religious, communal and social life of the Jews in London or Boston cannot be the same as it was – or would be – in Bukowsko or Frampol.

31. See the discussion in Janusz Makuch, "I Was Neither a Jew Nor a Catholic," in *The Fall of the Wall and the Rebirth of Jewish Life in Poland: 1989–2009*, ed. Shana Penn, Konstanty Gebert, and Anna Golstein, (Warsaw: Taube Foundation for Jewish Life and Culture, 2009), 62.

ancestors. This is to create narratives of partisans who went to other side and returned victorious, in accordance with the traditional either-or identity paradigm. The reality is that most of the people who find themselves from somewhere in-between do remain somewhere in-between. They may react to their genetic background either by underlining aggressively their present Islamic [or Catholic] religious identity, or by becoming friendly towards Armenians [or Jews], as is the case with many Kurds [and Poles] today.

In Poland – and elsewhere – more and more people with some Jewish ancestry seem to end up into a curious loose category of something like "hang-around members" of the Jewish community. They are unable or unwilling to go through the actual conversion (for males, with circumcision) to become Jewish in the Halakhic sense, yet they feel deeply sympathetic for the Jewish cause, and may be more committed to the Jewish activities than those who are officially Jewish. It can also be that they are unable to leave Christianity, the Catholic side of their identity, even though they also genuinely "feel like Jews".

Some say that it is simply too late for conversion. If one recovers his/her Jewish ancestry at the age of, say, 45, and then one is to spend at least five years to gradually remodel the identity, at that point it may be no longer possible to raise a Jewish family, and conversion as a private exercise would feel like a half-way enterprise in any case.[32] This is one variety of post-genocidal tragedies resulting from dealing with the absence.

In practice, however, the actual Halakhic non-Jewishness may be of little importance, since such cases may be considered as "Jews enough" by the so-called real Jews – especially in a country like Poland, where the broken identities are common among the Jewish flock and the community is secularised in any case. As a matter of fact, the exceptions have become the rule among the Jews of Poland.

Common features

After these somewhat general considerations I now turn to discuss certain more detailed and more concrete aspects in the material published in the interviews and articles on these two (loose) groups. It is to be noted that the groups in question are in many ways so dissimilar that their very comparability may well be questioned. For that very reason, however, it is all the more striking that the deliberations of central European intelligentsia and those of Anatolian peasants may appear amazingly similar. In spite of the divergence in situations, the second or third generation experiences and attitudes, at times even their verbal depictions, appear largely equivalent.

Representatives of both groups describe a sense, or perhaps rather a *state*, of deep loneliness. In practical terms this could imply a concrete lack of relatives. Konstantiny Gebert reminiscences how when reading novels, "cousins" or "uncles" felt like imaginative characters, until he went to school and realized that the others really had such big families.[33] Similarly, a woman (aged 48) in Turkey was pondering why her father had no relatives, and

32. These observations are based not only on literature but also on my own discussions with such cases in Poland and other European countries.

33. Konstanty Gebert, *Living in the Land of Ashes* (Krakow, Budapest: Austeria, 2008), 14.

her story was even entitled "Why did my father have no aunts, uncles or cousins?"[34]

The problem, however, is significantly deeper than mere lack of relatives or ordinary loneliness in the every-day sense. Among both groups, there prevails a profound sense of being detached from the mainstream. This is often indicated between the lines, and at times depicted explicitly, depending on one's psychological talent and ability to reflect and analyse oneself. The following description by a woman in Turkey, 53 years old, is illustrative of the situation:

> The thing that seems to have bothered us the most is not to have a place we can call ours, not to know where we are from. […] Wherever we went, we had to work very hard to make friends; we were very generous but still, when the door closed, we were alone. We were alone on holidays. We had nowhere to go. We had no relatives, no land, no trees.[35]

In Poland, Gebert summarizes an equivalent situation even more compactly: "We had no Christmas, only a tree".[36]

From the psychological point of view, one of the most interesting aspects is the combination of bizarre tensions and deep insecurity concerning the identity described in both groups. This in turn is connected with an evident lack of discussion on the matter even inside the family – an extreme indicator of the *presence of absence*. The internal silence also partly explains why people in so many cases are shocked when finding out their own family history. Tragicomically, in many cases in Turkey the truth had been known all the time by others, such as neighbours and colleagues, yet silenced inside the family! It is striking how similar moods the following quotes express. The first one is again by Gebert, second by a half-Armenian woman in Turkey (aged 53):

> Some of us knew, some of us suspected, and some denied strenuously that we were…Jewish. What that term actually meant, nobody seemed to know for sure.[37]

> I can't say exactly when I noticed it. There have been fragments of this story at the back of my mind for as long as I can remember. There's something different about us, but what is it?[38]

It is remarkable that in both cases the weight of the lost identities and legacies was present even when there was no clear awareness of one's Armenian or Jewish roots.

In Turkey, many Armenian grandmothers lived their lives without saying a word about their Armenian background or Armenian culture in general. They did not only keep their secret but could even remain silent when the secret was no longer a secret: some remained

34. Ayse Gül Altinay and Fethiye Cetin, *The Grandchildren*, 46.

35. Ibid, 184.

36. Konstanty Gebert, *Living in the Land of Ashes*, 14.

37. Ibid

38. Ayse Gül Altinay and Fethiye Cetin, *The Grandchildren*, 183.

quiet even when their descendants already knew and tried to pose questions.[39] This cannot be due to fear alone but rather to the exceptionally deep-rooted frustration and bitterness because of the denied way of life they never could have among their own.[40] In a similar fashion in Poland, Agnieska Markowska tells about her grandmother after finding about her Jewish background: "When I showed her what I discovered, she still denied she knew anything." Likewise, mother of Olga Danek (28) is said to have "known the family secret but felt it was too dangerous to acknowledge".[41] Such descriptions are to be found from both groups.

Many of these symptoms can be labelled under the concept of problem of *dealing with the absence* of the annihilated life and culture. Brilliant descriptions of the sense of presence of absence are given by Peroomian in her analysis of the Post-Genocide artistic literature by Armenians in Turkey. This is all the more revealing, considering the fact that in Turkey the references to the disappearance of Armenian culture had to be as implicit as possible. Consequently, the most powerful message is the one between the lines. One could write about pomegranate trees no longer casting their shadow, or about one's mother begging for "bread, bread, bread" – but the actual cause of this state of affairs remains unsaid.[42]

Yet also in Poland, where one could reflect on Auschwitz more openly, the presence of absence is literally behind any corner. The post-genocide experience is characterised by a deep sense of bitterness that operates in many levels. "Auschwitz still has the power of poisoning human souls,"[43] as Gebert has it. The ways how this poisonous bitterness have been experienced in the diaspora are well-known and much studied, but in fact the present groups represent even more painful situations, given that they have lived as detached individuals in the authentic setting of the once-flourishing culture, yet unable to gain a proper comprehension of the character of the life annihilated from the immediate surroundings. They have a curious feeling of *being unable to be what one should be*, due to fact that without a community there is no way to lead traditional Jewish or Armenian way of life.

In short, the identities of half-Armenians and half-Jews contain rather similar characteristics and are constituted by largely parallel experiences. The problems and the human reactions to them appear essentially similar, in spite of the variation in situations.

Some diverging trends

There are also several aspects that can be considered as dissimilarities, even though the phenomena are based on somewhat similar dispositions. Basically, a sense of *fear* is an

39. See Ayse Gül Altinay and Fethiye Cetin, *The Grandchildren,* 46, 72–73.

40. For a compact analysis of the reasons for silence in both diaspora and Turkey, see Rubina Peroomian, *And Those Who Continued Living in Turkey after 1915: The Metamorphosis of the Post-Genocide Armenian Identity as Reflected in Artistic Literature* (Yerevan: Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2008), 110–112.

41. Graham-Harrison, "The third-generation Polish Jews rediscovering long-buried roots," *The Guardian,* January 25, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/third-generation-polish-jews-rediscovering-roots (accessed 19 June 2015).

42. For discussion and examples, see Peroomian Rubina, *And Those Who Continued Living in Turkey after* 1915, 22–24, 113–118.

43. Konstanty Gebert, *Living in the Land of Ashes*, 154.

important common factor. Polish Jews are still cautious about showing their Jewishness, even though the present situation would admit remarkable openness. Indeed, there are cases of Jews who do show their Judaism openly without encountering any kind of problems. Yet somewhere in the background the fear still remains, and the Jews are used to be quiet about their identity. The chief rabbi admits that he cannot say for sure that "it won't happen again".[44] The remark is characteristic for the post-genocide existence in which the reality is thoroughly stained by ethical pessimism and certain distrust in the everyday reality, shadowed by the unrelenting possibility of new atrocities.

Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between the two cases. In Turkey, fear still dominates vehemently. Disinformation on Armenians is everywhere present, and threat of harassment, even persecution, is still in the air. Even in 2010's, the most of those who were interviewed in a project by Hrant Dink foundation did not allow their cases to be published at all, and those who did, wanted their names to be changed or omitted. In Poland the identity discussions are open and provoke no danger.

Therefore, it is no surprise that every Armenian who was interviewed in another recent project had sensed deeply depressive moods due to the fear, sorrow and silence. To be an Armenian is a painful secret and depressive burden, sensed even by third or fourth generation Muslims.[45] It is telling that one young Muslim "cried for days" after having heard that he is Armenian.[46] There is no excitement whatsoever of absorbing oneself to the medieval literature, art and other forms of cultural richness, as it may be the case for many in Poland. The pre-genocide Armenian culture is non-accessible for the half-Armenians in Turkey (outside Istanbul), and its qualitative and quantitative richness remain in darkness.

Even today, one century after the genocide, those who stand out as too Armenian may encounter problems and may be oppressed so that they have to change their home-place. (Diyarbakir seems to be a happy exception.[47]) Armenianness has meant apparent physical danger till 2000's. This being the case, it is no wonder that the converted Armenians traditionally have had a strong need to show one is a "real Muslim". In Poland the situation was parallel but the content almost the opposite: a Jew had to prove he is a good Pole by being a good communist.

A significant outcome of the fear and threatening atmosphere is that the awakenings are taking place one or two generations later than in Poland. It is not unusual that, like in the case of Cetin, the stories of Armenian grandmothers emerge when they themselves are no longer present.

Consequently, it is clear that the half-Armenians in Turkey know much less of Armenian culture and genocide than their fate-mates in Poland. This is an evident outcome of

44. Michael Schudrich, "Giving Back to the Jewish People," in *Poland: A Jewish Matter*, ed. Kate Craddy, Mike Levy, and Jakub Nowakowski, (Warszawa: Adam Mickiewicz Institute, 2010), 58.

45. See Ayse Gül Altinay and Fethiye Cetin, *The Grandchildren*, xi–xiii.

46. Ferda Balancar (ed.), *The Sounds of Silence II*, 54.

47. See Vicken Cheterian, "Armenian Life Returns to Diyarbakir," *Al-Monitor*, October 16, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/10/turkish-armenians-rediscover-roots.html# (accessed 1 July 2015); "Islamized Armenians are baptized and learning the language – diaspora minister", December 25, 2014, http://news.am/eng/news/245835.html (accessed 1 July 2015).

the continuation of oppressive anti-Armenian policy in Turkey. In Poland, there is a huge amount of intellectual literature on Polish Jewry, their history and cultural contributions, and the number of new publications is still increasing. Moreover, in Poland the archives have served to reveal Jewish ancestry for some, while in Turkey there is hardly any documented information available on Armenians' roots in public archives.

The half-Armenians of Turkey may know about their immediate family background but they are almost totally unaware on the historical truths concerning the genocide, or Armenian culture and history in general. Up to our times, it has been very difficult to gain even basic information about Armenian history and culture in Turkey. Interestingly, the internet is changing the setting somewhat: to have some taste of Armenian village life in Ottoman times one needs just to find and click *houshamadyan.org*. Whether the descriptions of *paregentan* festivities relieve the sense of loss or make it worse, however, is another question.

The question of numbers

One concrete result of the undefined and uncertain identity situation is the fact that it is still impossible to give any reasonable or even rough numbers for these groups. In Poland, there are tens of thousands of Catholic, or atheist, people with Jewish ancestry. However, one could say that most of those who are Jews do not really know whether they are Jews or not. Schudrich commented on the question of numbers in June 2015 in a most rabbinic manner:

> When asked how many Jews there are in Poland today, he answers, "Pick a number; double it. It is too small." Then he adds, "I don't know, but tomorrow there will be more." Estimations say there are somewhere between 30 and 50 thousand people who have Jewish roots, "Of which the majority know it and want to do something about it, although there can be many more than could be discovering their Jewish identity."[48]

What the rabbi does not like to say, however, is that there is an essential difference between "wanting to do something about it" and becoming a Jew in the actual sense of the word. One individual can perhaps move somewhat between two religions and identities, but the ultimate choice is inescapable in the case of his/her children: baptism or circumcision? Or could it be both? There is an evident parallelism here with the fourth century Jewish-Christian demarcation problematics on which St. Jerome sharply commented that those who try to be both Jews and Christians are neither Jews nor Christians.[49] It seems that there is a need of new categories, but any new category would be unable to do any justice for any of the religions involved.

However, the latest estimation of the actual number of "declared Jews" in Poland is set at seven thousand.[50] This seems to be from three to six times less than the number of what we have called "half-Jews", which alone shows how relevant the latter category is.

48. Jessica Zwaiman Lerner, "Rabbi Michael Schudrich."

49. Jerome: *Epistle* 75 (*Letter to St. Augustine*), 4:13. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 1. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887).

50. Elżbieta Mostowska, "The Question All Tourists Ask: How Many Jews Are There in Poland?" August, 2015, http://www.sztetl.org.pl/en/cms/news/4799,the-question-all-tourists-ask-how-many-jews-are-there-in-poland-/ html (accessed 1 Sep 2015).

In Turkey, due to the large number of kidnapped Armenian girls and the exponential population growth, the numbers are at minimum in the hundreds of thousands, to say the least. One recent estimation set the number around three million, another to 4–6 million.[51] Even though such numbers may have a considerable genetic truth imbedded in them, they are of little practical relevance. Most of these people have only 12.5% or 25% of Armenian genes, and their identity is completely Islamic (Turkish or Kurdish), so there is in fact not any lost Armenianness whatsoever left that they could or should return into, regardless of the amount of information they may have about the background of their grand(-grand) mother. At best, many of them may be able to develop some true sympathy for the Armenians and Armenian cause.

The news concerning hidden crypto-Armenians who take baptism and truly return to the Armenian faith are fascinating, and in their own way they serve as historical healing process after a century of genocide and silence – but they deal with individuals or extremely tiny groups (mostly crypto-Armenians who managed to retain some of their Armenianness by marrying with similar cases). For every such "Neo-Armenian" who is baptized, however, there are tens of thousands of those who will never be baptized. Yet some of them consider themselves Armenian, and many of them do not consider them as non-Armenian.

Conclusion

The last ten years has witnessed an unprecedented rise of interest and growth of information on the descendants of the Armenian and Jewish genocide survivors in Turkey and Poland. After decades and generations of silence, both communities show signs of re-emergence and slow revival. A lot of public interest and media coverage, however, has focused on the relatively small number of converts who have adopted the ancestral Jewish or Armenian religion. Nevertheless, most of those who discover their (often partial) Armenian or Jewish ancestry in fact remain somewhere in-between the identities. They constitute groups that have neither names nor established criteria of identity. In this article, terms "half-Jews" and "half-Armenians" have been used to refer to those whose identity is broken in a way that does not fit into traditional "either–or" identities. The tragedy of the broken identities is the inability to know the *whole* of the lost traditional life-styles in Shtetls or Armenian villages.

According to the books and interviews published during the last years, it is evident that the Half-Jews in Poland and Half-Armenians in Turkey have experienced existential and identity crises in parallel terms, in spite of the obvious differences in their cultural contexts. In both cases, interviews of the survivors show similar dispositions of problems concerning identity, family heritage and dealing with the absence of culture that once flourished.

51. In a conference on Islamized Armenians, organised in October 2014 by university of Bosphorus in Istanbul, Haykazun Alvrtsyan's estimation was 2.5 million, in addition to half a million in diaspora and 300,000 of these in Germany alone. "2.5 Million Islamized Armenians Estimated in Turkey," *Asbarez* 29 Oct 2014. Next week in Armenian radio, however, Abdul Gafuri from Diyarbakir set the number at 4–6 million. See Aida Avetisyan, "More hidden Armenians reveal their true identity in Turkey," *Public Radio of Armenia* November 5, 2014, http://www.armradio.am/en/2014/11/05/more-hidden-armenians-reveal-their-true-identity-in-turkey/ (accessed 1 July 2015).

The parallelism of the Polish-Jewish and Turkish-Armenian experiences shows something essential of the character of the post-genocide existence. This fact alone has obvious potentiality to contribute ingredients for the philosophical discussions on the ontology of genocide. Post-genocidal trauma is of collective nature and for that reason essentially deeper than "ordinary" private traumas of loss and damage.

Genocide by its deepest essence is an ontological attack in three levels: an aim to annihilate people's past, present and future. Consequently, post-genocide existence is broken, shattered and scattered by nature. This brokenness is reflected in a silent yet dramatic way in the identities and psyches of the remnants of the survivors.

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"ON ARARAT ALONE, NO ARK CAN REST." BEYOND MORGENTHAU: JEWS, SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, AND JEWISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS: ALLIANCES AND SOLIDARITY DURING THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE EPOCH

Adam J. Sacks

Of all the many elements that resound and confound as similar between the overwhelming record of historical oppression endured by the Armenians and the Jews, perhaps the most telling is the echo of silence in the wider world during their hour of greatest need. As is well known, the record of Ambassador Morgenthau is a telling counterpoint to the dismaying lack of voices raised at critical junctures. It is my intention here to profile in brief other cases of Jews, from Bernard Lazare of France to Israel Zangwill of England who voiced solidarity and even sought to forge alliance with Armenians. Particular attention will be paid to the German Social Democrats Eduard Bernstein and Hugo Haase, who seceded from their party during the war years, in part, so that they could speak out with their colleagues against the Armenian Genocide. I argue that what united these figures was their progressive inclination and embrace of a discourse of human rights which often entailed a critique of nationalism, specifically mainstream Zionism. The case of the Independent Social Democrats in Germany in particular forms an overlooked corrective to a historiography of German opposition to the Armenian Genocide that has largely focused on the voices of church activists. Before turning to these case studies that broke a silence all too pervasive on the events of the Caucasian Frontline of World War I, I would like to explore the variations and forms this silence takes.

Variations on a Theme of Silence

Jews and Armenians, as has been noted by numerous astute observers, share a myriad of cultural traits acquired through an anomalous and often tragic historical experience.[1] Claimed poetically as both people of dreams, long with imagination but without territory.[2] Diaspora peoples dispossessed of sovereignty, clinging to a religious tradition distinct from their environment, in the recent era world both emerged as mediators of modernity especially in the economy and the arts and appeared poised to enter even an unprecedented golden age of prosperity before being felled by genocide. Arguably, the one outstanding

1. The inverse is also true as prejudiced outsiders often viewed negatively these shared traits. Though this is largely a study on Jewish solidarity with persecuted Armenians the co-implication of Antiarmenianism with Antisemitism in Germany is an equally vital yet distinct field of research.

2. Peter Balakian, *Black Dog of Fate: A Memoir: An American Son Uncover his Armenian Past (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 133.*

weakness that proved to be their undoing was the lack of a tradition of political thought in recent history, as it could hardly otherwise be for peoples for whom sovereignty is at best a distant historical memory. Due to their aspirational cultural affiliations and their predicament as minorities, what Ernst Bloch called the "hope principle" defined their fragile state to an outsized extent. Such faith in the outside world, one is tempted to retrospectively refer to it as a "hope against hope," was lodged largely and similarly in the Anglo-American democracies for the defense of rights and in the Russian states for sheer physical protection. As these powers at critical moments did not intervene, the unmitigated oppression and deadly attention they received from Turkish and German powers only magnified the silence of the great powers in their hour of greatest need.

The historical record is filled with not only easily accessible media reports but also official pronouncements of western governments condemning the actions that amounted to genocide. Indeed, the propensity and repetition in the pursuit and consumption of media reports throughout the war in the Allied press may even be termed a sort of voyeuristic silence. Such official declarations of sympathy or horror echoed from an early point in time from which concerted intervention may have decisively altered the course of events saving the lives of scores of potential victims. In the case of the Caucasian frontline, the Turkish authorities would impound embassy cables and negatives while imposing an interdiction on photography by anyone related to the Bagdad rail company and in the entire deportation area, i.e. the province of Ottoman Syria. Yet leaders would also boast of crimes ongoing to foreign officials in a manner unknown among the German perpetrators decades later. Such careful management of the image has left a scant photographic record that one may refer to as a kind of visual silence.

As official declarations as a rule did not have action as a consequence one may identify within such speech a kind of cynical silence that echoes through. Additionally, such expressions were rarely conveyed by officials with decision making power, or if they were, were never in the context of a decisive policy change. What one might call the great silence, the failure to act and intervene, continues to be vigorously contested among historians in the case of the Holocaust as a spate of new works about of Franklin D. Roosevelt have made clear. Setting aside rationalizations of logistical complication one may wonder if this kind of silence is a "pretend" silence as in "they know enough but prefer not to know more" which emanates out of a lack of investment in caring or in evaluating the importance of the matter. There is a more sinister variation, namely, that this may be a manipulative silence, a holding pattern designed to let the destruction take its course. Speculatively, one may claim that the Allies recognized the scope, aim and outcome of genocide, and saw it either as collateral damage for a new world order and their ultimate victory or in fact sought to manage the outcome in view of their own role in eventual reconstruction. An eyewitness in the Ottoman Empire, Heinrich Vierbücher, the German pacifist with a Social Democratic background, astutely summarized the careful and cunning reaction of German officials fully aware of the crimes as they unfolded. He referred to the upsetting mixture of "*Empörung und Verständnis"* what one might translated as indignant understanding, the latter modifying the former element as feigned to no small degree.[3]

3. Heinrich Vierbücher, *Armenien 1915: Die Abschlachtung eines Kulturvolkes durch die Turken (Hamburg-Bergedorf: Fackelreiter-Verlag, 1930), 35.*

In his manuscript for a monograph on the Armenian Genocide, the East European Jewish jurist, Raphael Lemkin echoes consistently the theme of the western world as silent bystander. Beginning with earlier massacres, he writes:

> The concert of Europe did nothing. It accepted the situation. The emperor of Germany went farther. He sent a special embassy to present to the sultan a portrait of his family as a token of his esteem.[4]

Lemkin here sounds not only his deep conviction in the crucial silence of the west, but also his belief in a German origin for the crime, a position he supports via citation of several German memoirs, a further factor of complication and debate with the historiography on the Genocide.

About the period of the wartime genocide, he records:

> The war conditions afforded the Turks the opportunity they had long awaited to destroy the Christian Armenians and they believed that once this destruction was an accomplished fact their crime would be condoned, or at least overlooked, as was done in the case of the massacres of 1895-6, when the great powers did not even reprimand the sultan. Allied with Germany, who apparently fully approved of the Turkish plan the leaders felt they had nothing to fear from Europe at the end of the war, which they were convinced would be won by Germany.[5]

The suggestive silence at work here is filled in by the imagination of genocide. It is marked by the absence to create a credible alternative. As not just among perpetrators, but also the western powers and even the victims themselves could all too easily imagine the onset of genocide, this kind of weighty silence only serviced this process of accommodation.

Indeed, events preceding formal orders of deportation and mass killing clearly suggested and created the mental space wherein the next murderous phase could be anticipated. Here I am referring, as Lemkin described the spoliation and expropriations in service of the Caucasian frontline of the Turkish military. He used statement of a German eyewitness in Moush, who writes,

> Every Turk was free to go to an Armenian shop and take out what he needed or thought he would like to have. Only a tenth perhaps was really for the war, the rest was pure robbery, which was carried to the front on the Caucasian frontier…[6]

4. Raphael Lemkin, "Turkish Massacres of Armenians," American Jewish Historical Archives, Center for Jewish History, New York, Raphael Lemkin Collection, box 8, folder 14.

5. Ibid, 19.

6. Lemkin, 57. On this also see, Moush- statement by a German eye-witness of occurrences at Moush; communicated by the American committee for Armenian and Syrian relief in Viscount Bryce and Arnold Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary *of State for Foreign Affairs by Viscount Bryce,* ed. Ara Sarafian (London: Gomidas Institute, 2005, originally 1916), 124-127.

And the image of the victims transporting their own wares to their assassins brings us to the last form of silence I would like to present before examining some critical instances of speech action.

The following is taken from among Lemkin's own notes:

> One day early we heard the procession of those doomed victims. Their misfortune was indescribable. They were in absolute silence–the young and old, even grandfathers advancing under such burdens as even their assess could hardly carry.[7]

This silence of the victims is the silence that echoes in response to the external silences of the bystander here elucidated. One might refer to it as the black hole center around which all other silences orbit. Stunned into this silence by an awareness of the greater silences that enabled their own, one may refer to this silence as both numbing and numbed, as if the victims can no longer bear the deafening silence that has brought them to their fate, as if they are already one stage removed from the sensory perceptions that make up the accepted norm of human experience.

At least some victims of this and later genocides were forced to submit to a regime of silence that rendered their death more total than that arguably reserved by natural law without human interference. For arguably, a person is not truly dead as long as their memory lives on in the psyche of their descendants or at least in the form of personal effects left on among a larger community. The eradication of whole inter-generational life worlds unique to genocide means that at least some of the victims, those without descendants or surviving relatives, or those whose meager possessions were destroyed or dispersed without a pursuable trail, experience a silence in death so total as to almost reverse a natural order instituted by human evolution. Due to the form of death suffered it is as if they never lived, creating a kind of black hole of life that hovers over and shadows the after world. This is what we may refer to as an epic silence, where there is no one left to remember and there are no signs that remark and remind humanity if they had ever existed.

This brings us to the final or meta-silence; the one that cannot respond because no human or other sensory faculties were evolved to adequately account for something so horrific that it overwhelms our capacity to process and relate. Genocide as the black hole of evolution reveals an unforeseen negation of life; the expression of that destruction similarly renders all expressive developed human capacity mute.

This silence after the fact is the one that has emerged in the post-Holocaust discourse that seeks to probe the limits of representation. Saul Friedländer, for instance, has been concerned with the gap between knowledge and comprehension offered as a plausible explanatory framework for the silence of the bystander during the Holocaust, this gap is arguably merely presumed, a heuristic device. By that I mean it reflects a desire to presume such a horror on all sides when confronting events so beyond normal limits, that silence is the only possible reaction, as there are no words that can grasp the transpired. For it is a matter of the historical record that there was greater media attention, public outcry and overall representation of

7. Lemkin, 61.

events in Armenia of the Caucasus Front of the First World War, then in Nazi-Occupied Europe of the Second.[8] This is all the more startling as it occurred at a greater distance in time and geography, during an earlier age of the technology of media development, and impacted overall a smaller number, though not proportion, of people. This incongruity and the overall widely accepted belated recognition of events has forced scholars to consider the silence that emerges at the limits of representation. Though often considered as a phenomenon and concept that emerged as a belated recognition after decades of scholarly neglect, I know of no better formulation of this problem than that from the German pacifist Heinrich Vierbücher, who spent three years of the First World War in the Ottoman Empire as an interpreter for the German general Otto Liman von Sanders. This astute summary of the crisis of representation posed to the eyewitness deserves reproduction in full:

> Es bleibt bei allen Deutungsversuchen, bei Einsetzung der Faktoren Mordlust, Raubgier, Religionshaß, Herrschsucht und Dummheit, noch so viel des Unbegreiflichen übrig, daß uns die Tragödie von 1915 als das blutigste und unheimlichste aller Rätsel der Geschichte erscheinen muß. In aller Ewigkeit bleibt hier der Schulweisheit ein Rest, der unerträglich ist.[9]
>
> [So much remains inconceivable after all the attempts of interpretation, so that the tragedy of 1915 must appear as the most bloody and uncanny of all the riddles of history. An unbearable reside will remain for all times, which conventional wisdom will forever confront.][10]

If genocide is indeed the ultimate riddle of history, then silence is its necessary herald and distinguishing feature while also serving as an indictment.

Jews and Social Democracy Converge: Those that Pierced the Silence

Present throughout these earlier remarks is the rather widely accepted contention of the historical parallel between the Armenians in the First World War and the Jews in the Second. Indeed by the time the configuration of circumstances necessary for the Holocaust existed, say around 1939, for at least informed observers, the link was obvious and active

8. This fact is well elucidated in Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 17 and 282; yet the fact of widespread knowledge does not perforce give rise to sympathy and support as noted at the time by Israel Zangwill. A playright and voracious consumer of all media reports was still at pains to maintain that contrasted with Belgium and even the Jews during the First World War, Armenians were left uniquely alone. "But Belgium had almost all the world for her friends, and the faith in restoration went before her exiles like a pillar of cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night. Even the Jews of the Pale – torn and tossed between the alternate victors – found a helping hand, and begin to behold some faint gleam of Zion upon the political horizon. On Ararat alone no Ark can rest."." See Israel Zangwill, *The Voice of Jerusalem* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 367.

9. Heinrich Vierbücher, *Armenien 1915: Die Abschlachtung eines Kulturvolkes durch die Turken (Hamburg-Bergedorf: Fackelreiter-Verlag, 1930), 60.*

10. Translation into English by the author.

on a variety of levels. The legacy of Ambassador Morgenthau for instance, which I shall briefly revisit was forefront in his son, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau's mind as he sought with difficulty to convince his boss, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in the difficult negotiations that led to the creation of the War Refugee Board in the latter stages of the Holocaust.[11] Such historical echoing as this would soon prove abundantly clear for the victims themselves, as the noted popularity of Werfel's *Forty Days of Musa Dagh* in the ghettos attests. The case of parallelism, in the context of the onset and promulgation of the Holocaust, one may refer to as structural and historical. This needn't have been and cannot assumed to have been, further informed by specific political values or by a conviction of the shared historical experience of Armenians and Jews. Here was an instance of historical haunting, a return of the repressed, of the especially feared heart of darkness of the modern nation state, genocide.

At the historical moment that is our focus beginning in the winter of 1914, the terrible awareness of affinity informed the actions of more than just Ambassador Morgenthau, who after all represented a neutral power, and whose Jewish sensibilities were further divided by concern for the fledgling communities in Ottoman Palestine. Much has been made of the role and involvement of Ambassador Morgenthau, whose personal concern for the plight of the Armenians is beyond question. One should be reminded at the outset, that he was representing a power elite that was self-consciously protestant and had barely begun to allow Jews into the ranks of the elite. Morgenthau also only reluctantly fulfilled because it had developed the distinct character of a "token" appointment for Jews, and that the focus of his efforts was relief and recovery rather than obstruction or intervention.[12] Furthermore he was by many accounts woefully underprepared for the challenge he faced, without prior knowledge or training in the region. While he had at one point proposed an evacuation plan for genocide survivors to California during the war, after his term ended, there is no evidence of further endeavor for US intervention against Turkey to halt the second phase of the genocide.[13] Nevertheless from the start of his ambassadorship, he displayed a unique affinity for Armenians. While he apparently was concerned about the problems surrounding American missionary activities, and Ottoman policies of anti-Semitism in Palestine, the problem that preoccupied him the most was the Armenian Question.[14] It would be the Ambassador's grandson who would bring to the surface the implicit association that animated Morgenthau's sense of mission:

> The Armenian presence in both of these opposing empires (Ottoman and Russian) appeared to have many parallels with the Jewish presence, among the opposing nations of Eastern Europe. As alien minorities, essentially

11. Yair Auron, *The Banality of Indifference: Zionism and the Armenian Genocide* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 8.

12. Regarding his hesitance in taking up the appointment see Henry Morgenthau Sr. *All in a Lifetime*, (Garden City: Doubleday, Paige & Co., 1922), *out of print,* 160, copy archived with the YIVO Institute, Center for Jewish History, New York.

13. Simon Payaslian, *US Policy toward the Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), 2005, 85.

14. Balakian, *Burning Tigris*, 17.

> powerless in themselves, both the Jews and the Armenians were always being accused of traitorous collaboration by the governments that ruled them.[15],

Morgenthau after all was preceded and succeeded in his position, by fellow German Reform Jews who only uneasily and gradually had found themselves wearily welcomed into the halls of power in Washington. Additionally, their cultural and religious sensibilities set them at a distance; one often marked by suspicion from the wider Jewish communities, especially by the newly politicized nationalists, known as Zionists. In the Jewish world as elsewhere, nationalism bred an uncompromising and often myopic outlook, focused on the singularity of their group and threatened by any force of possible conflicting comparison or distraction.

In the cases lesser-known than Morgenthau of Jewish outreach for the Armenian cause this emerges as a consistent theme, the tension between those inclined to nationalism and those to Social Democracy, which ultimately overrides simple Jewish solidarity as well as standard interpretations of how to respond to the political predicament of Jews in the modern world. It is historically significant that the primary nemesis of the founder of modern political Zionism, Theodor Herzl, was an activist on the board of the French journal *Pro Armenia*, Bernard Lazare. Lazare was committed to liberation and self-emancipation, goals though that he could not see appropriately fulfilled or pursued within the context of the Zionist movement. Hannah Arendt saw in Lazare one who consciously accepted pariah status in order to rebel against it, to become a champion of oppressed people as part and parcel of that which all the downtrodden must struggle.[16] Lazare did not seek an exodus from the anti-Semites, but rather comrades-in-arms, among the oppressed groups, and implicit here is that he viewed the Armenians as chief amongst them.[17] Unlike Herzl, he did not view anti-Semitism as peculiar or eternal; but rather symptomatic of the collapse of moral values under imperialism. This was chiefly in evidence by the shameful complicity of the great powers in pogroms against Jews and massacres among Armenians.[18] A self-confessed anarchist, nominally involved with the socialist movement, Lazare found the miserable error, if not a founding stain, of the first Zionist Congress at Basel 1896, the letter of solidarity sent by Herzl to Abdul Hamid, known as the "red sultan."[19] So solidarity with the Armenians rather became the breaking point between Herzl and Lazare, the issue upon which the divergent conceptions of struggle were most manifest. Herzl's shameless, and ultimately fruitless, pandering to the Sultan was symptomatic of a political method that sought to placate or even ally with the leaders of imperialism, and that put little stake in the mobilization of the downtrodden themselves.

15. Ibid, 18; on this see also, Some scholars have claimed Morgenthau to have been more animated by the struggles of Jews in the US, see Simon Payaslian, *US Policy*, 38.

16. Hannah Arendt, *The Jew as Pariah,* ed. Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove Press, 1978), 108.

17. Hannah Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, ed. Jerome Kahn and Ron H. Feldman (New York: Random House, 2009), 340.

18. Ibid

19. Yair Auron, *The Banality of Indifference*, 105.

A further major dissension from Herzl, this time from within the Zionist fold, took the shape of Israel Zangwill and his "Jewish Territorialist Organization." A playwright who had coined the term "melting pot," seceded from the movement over the focus on Palestine a destination he believed would inevitably instigate conditions of civil war. He thus set out in pursuit of fanciful destinations empty of current inhabitants including Cyrenaica, Uganda, and parts of Canada and Australia. Striking though is that this shift away occurred along with Zangwill's anointing upon the Armenians a status he previously reserved for Jews in the wake of the World War I genocide. He dedicated the last pages of *Voice of Jerusalem* to the Armenians who, he wrote, had in the 1915 genocide earned "the crown of thorns" that had previously belonged to the Jews.[20] Such a proclamation emanated from a conviction in the "sisterhood" of Jews and Armenians central to the outlook of this progressive thinker. He viewed the two as the oldest surviving nationalities from the ancient world, who uniquely persisted either without a sovereign territory or outside one.[21]

Written during the War, Zangwill's reflections on the crisis of Armenia stirred him to ever-greater urgency in his pursuit of a refuge for the Jews however far-flung. What he had witnessed even at a great distance had shocked him that in this most modern era the primitive instincts inside the human could return with a vengeance. He wrote of the "diabolism of human nature….that returns to that prehistoric animal nature through which the soul has slowly struggled."[22] He compiled these wartime writings into a book that took an explicitly Jewish theme, entitled *The Voice of Jerusalem*. This renders Zangwill's dedicatory epilogue to Armenia all the more startling. Designed as if to make maximum impact on the reader, after numerous wide-ranging ruminations on the Jews he signs off with an almost monumental, quasi-religious laudation to the Armenians. Departing from the premise of the conjoined fate of Armenians and Jews, Zangwill's rhetoric is that of a mental revision, upon which he brings the reader to experience the process for themselves. He also makes an important reference to the post-war failed attempt to establish an American mandate for Armenia in which many Jews were closely involved, including Morgenthau and Stephen S. Wise.[23] Yet for Zangwill, a progressive dissenter to the Zionist movement, one may interpret this epilogue further as an inoculation against provincialism, and perhaps as a reminder not only to uniquely focus on the plight of the Armenians as a kind of specifically Jewish mandate, but also not to simply focus exclusively on oneself. Unique in their isolation in their suffering, Zangwill's words bear repeating in part:

> …On Ararat alone no Ark can rest. For Armenia alone there is the cry without answer: "Watchman, what of the night?"

20. Meri-Jane Rochelson, *The Jews in the Public Arena: The Career of Israel Zangwill* (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 2008), 210.

21. Israel Zangwill, *Principle of Nationalities. Conway Memorial Lecture, Delivered at South Place Institute, 8 March 1917* (New York: Macmillan, 1917), 42.

22. Israel Zangwill, *Voice of Jerusalem* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 367.

23. Other leading American Jews were also active and prominently placed on the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia represented at the Versailles Peace Talks including Oscar Strauss and Samuel Gompers.

> For Armenia alone there is no "Mandatory " – she cannot find protection even in the lion's den or the eagle's nest. There is neither oil nor gold no aught worth the cost of defending her. The nations, eager to mother more oleaginous or aurate territories, so eager that they will be at one another's throats rather than forgo their loving labour, here vie with one another only in their solicitousness to offer the task to America.
>
> Sister-nations – I have been accustomed to think – the Armenians and the Jews. Both hail from sister-lands of the cradle of civilization, both come trailing clouds of glory from the purpureal days of Persia and Babylon, both have borne the shock of the ancient and medieval empires and of the militant migrations of their races, and both hold to their original faith; for if the one was the first preacher of Jehovah, the other was the first nation to profess Jesus. And sisters, too, in sorrow, I thought: exiled, scattered, persecuted, massacred.
>
> Sisters in sooth, ye not equal in suffering. Hitherto, through the long centuries, the crown of martyrdom has been pre-eminently Israel's. And as, day by day during this war of ours, there came to me by dark letter or whisper the tale of her woes in the central war-zone, I said to myself: "Surely the cup is full: surely no people on earth has such a measure of gall and vinegar to drain."
>
> But I was mistaken. One people is suffering more. That people, whose ancient realm held the legendary Eden, has now for abiding place the pit of Hell. I bow before this higher majesty of sorrow. I take the crown of thorns from Israel's head and I place it upon Armenia's.[24]

German (Jewish) Social Democrats, Russia, Armenia and the Changing Tide of War Support

The retraction of initial support of the First World War by a select inner circle of leading German Social Democrats was perhaps the most dramatic such shift among any belligerent nation in the course of the conflict. Not only was Germany the strongest power opposing the Entente, but her Social Democratic party was also the largest in Europe both the most successful and the most persecuted, having only exited official prohibition a scant two decades earlier. Also significant is that this occurred at a fairly early stage in the war and was motivated by long-standing humanitarian and anti-imperialist concerns prominent amongst which was that of the plight of the Armenians. The figures upon whom I focus never fully embraced the war but kept party solidarity at least until June of 1915 when they began to speak outside the party against the war. By the spring of 1916 a separate anti-war parliamentary faction had been formed which culminated in the formation of a political party of secession in 1917.

It is a matter of continued contention among historians whether the key breaking point in the outbreak of the conflict was the ascension by European Social Democracy,

24. Israel Zangwill, *Voice of Jerusalem,* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), *368*.

arguably the largest organized political force in the continent that could have obstructed war, to nationalist aggression over international solidarity. The betrayal taken as most acute in historiography is indeed that of the German Social Democratic party, the largest and most organized of the many of its kind, as if it alone had the power to stop the fall into catastrophe. I would suggest that one could claim that the early support for the war by the Social Democratic parliamentary faction signaled not assent to imperialism and reconciliation with the German *Machtstaat*, but rather something more akin to a war of humanitarian intervention as it has become known more common in our own time. The empire of the tsars cut a diabolical profile as it was widely seen as the chief enemy of democracy and as a superannuated behemoth whose dogged autocracy and suppression of nationalities and minorities.

In its persecution of Jews, it had also distinguished itself, which of course brought it to the particular attention of leading Jewish Social Democrats. The Jewish issue was not simply one facet of the complex political situation of Tsarist Russia but was rather seen by these German Jewish Social Democrats as its essence and the key to its larger comprehension. In no other matter did the Regime so distance itself from the rest of Europe, as a one Raphael Seligmann formulated it, 'the singularity of the Tsarist regime is reflected in no other social phenomenon in such a clear and incisive manner, than in this unhappy matter.' Seligmann comes to the conclusion that the persecution of the Jews belongs to the essence of Tsarism, the logical lesson to be derived from such an equation in a time of war would have been quite self-evident for his readers.[25] As Eduard Bernstein would later often reflect that from the Jewish perspective when war appeared ineluctable, its main force should be against Tsarist Russia.[26]

Yet with Bernstein, one may observe instead a striking transformation, initial support for party solidarity during the summer crisis of 1914, but as the spring of 1915 followed with the western, imperialist expansion of the conflict and the violation of Belgian neutrality, the war diverted from its Russian focus, and Bernstein and others joined the anti-war camp. Though preceded by exceptional anti-war colleagues such as Karl Liebknecht, within two years as the war still raged, a separatist peace party had coalesced. Though the focus here will not be primarily a narrative of political engagement but rather on political imagination, it may be helpful to keep this historical development in mind. It is further notable

25. Himself an emigrant from the Russian Empire, Seligmann (1875-1943) wrote for Social Democratic publishing in both German and Yiddish.

26. See Ludiger Heid (ed.), *Eduard Bernstein: "Ich bin der letzte, der dazu schweigt" Texte in jüdische Angelegenheiten* (Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2004). Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932), the son of a locomotive driver, a profession, he would later write which secured his family acceptance in a neighborhood in Berlin where no other Jews lived. Bernstein and his family were active members in the Reform congregation on Johannistrasse where services were held on Sunday. A personal protégé of Marx and Engels, Bernstein spent 12 years in exile during the period of prohibition of the Social Democratic party from 1878-1890, first in Switzerland, then in England. Unique perhaps in the entire history of the movement is the extent to which he never forsook his Jewish identity, Jewish concerns or the outreach to alliance with both the Bund in Eastern Europe, the Workmen's Circle in North America and the Poale Zion/Hashomer Hatzair in Palestine. Bernstein would even often publish with the New York Yiddish Communist paper *Tsukunft* or the Poale Zion affiliated Jewish Socialist Union, materials in Yiddish that never saw the light of day in German.

that half of Jewish fraction members seceded to found this anti-war party, one third of which was made up of Jews.

What I seek to demonstrate here is that the plight of the Armenians had been a long-standing concern for German Social Democrats to which they were especially sensitive given Imperial Germany's increasingly close relationship with the Ottoman Empire.[27] Furthermore, the opposition to the war took the form of a principled stance against imperialism, into which opposition to the Armenian Genocide fit in context as a symptom of Turkish expansionist aims on the Caucasian Front. Finally, special attention will be paid to the figures of Eduard Bernstein and Hugo Haase who deserve a special place in the genealogy of progressive Jewish thinkers, after Lazare and Zangwill, who dissenting from mainstream Zionism, crafted a special engagement with the Armenian cause. As with the generation of Herzl and Lazare before him, Bernstein was similarly reproached by the leading Zionist of his day, Chaim Weizmann (later 1st president of Israel) for what one might term as his position as an "Armenianist" rather than as a Zionist.

To Bernstein goes the distinction, among all the individuals mentioned here, that a relatively early date he published a book dedicated entirely to political intervention on behalf of Armenia. As it represented the work of the first German author who related to human rights, instead of a religious language of Christian solidarity on behalf of Armenians, one may also call this intervention "humanitarian." Entitled *Die Leiden des Armenischen Volkes und die Pflichten Europas*, it derived from an admonitory address given at a Social Democratic assembly in Berlin on the 26th of June, 1902.[28] It should also be noted that at the same time Bernstein was contributing to "Droshak", the organ of the political party Armenian Revolutionary Federation in France. Encapsulated here are the principles that will later emerge as central to advocacy on behalf of Armenians during the genocide and as the related basis for opposition to an imperialist war aims.

For Bernstein the persecution of the Armenians was part of a larger system of domination inherent in the European imperial political system and part of the search for a minimum in democratic rights for all that said system had not yet truly fulfilled. He was further inspired to his words by confronting the silence he observed during the already unprecedented massacres of Armenians under the Sultan. Notably characterized as a *stoische Gleichgültigkeit* (stoic indifference) pronounced even in "democratic" circles, he referred to it as *beschämend* (shameful). Dismayed not only by the events themselves, but also the lack up to that point of protest from his own Social Democratic circles.[29] As a decisive counterpoint to this, Bernstein figured this breaking of the silence with such a volume as to echo in the

27. For examples of the large literature on this subject see Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide:* Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). For an earlier publication one may consult Ulrich Trumpener's *Germany and the Armenian Persecutions* (Beirut: Hamaskaine Press, 1968). An important thesis of the same period is Whilhelm van Kampen's "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik in der Zeit Whilhelms II" (PhD diss., Christian-Albrechts-Universität, Kiel, 1968).

28. Eduard Bernstein, *Die Leiden Des armenischen Volkes und die Pflichten Europas*, (Berlin: Dr. John Edelheim Verlag), 1902.

29. „*als ich mich in jenen Tagen darüber entrüstete, daß unsererseits kein Wort des Protestes geäussert wurde,*". *[*As I was incensed that no word of protest was spoken in those days from our side], *29.*

highest halls of the powers responsible.[30]

And even at this early stage, Bernstein was well aware at what confront concerned observes, nothing less than the life and death of a people ("*es handelt sich in der That hier um Leben und Sterben eines Volkes*"). Historical conscious, he declares that such a process does signify a rupture with previous examples regardless of how far back one might probe.[31] He further recognized their vexed state of dependency and hope oriented to the western powers. Against such persecution prophetically seen as genocidal ("*...gegen Verfolgungen, die auf weiter nichts abzielen als das armenische Volk als Nation ganz und gar vom Erdboden verschwinden zu machen")* ("…against persecution, that aims at nothing less than causing the disappearance of the Armenian people as a nation as a whole from the face of the earth)", Bernstein claims they have no other hope than that which could come from Europe ("…*die verfolgten, bedrückten und unterdrückten Armenier haben keine andere Hoffnung als die auf die Hilfe, die ihnen von Europa wird…"* ("…the persecuted, repressed and suppressed Armenians have no hope other than help that comes to them from Europe…")[32] Interesting to note that in this context Bernstein refers to the Europeans as *Vorkämpfern* (pioneering champions), indicating that he views the struggle of Armenians to be part of a chain of emancipation struggles across Europe and across historical epochs in succession, of the Third Estate in France, the serfs in Russia and of course the Jews. [33] As a result Bernstein lays down a principle for intervention given such a humanitarian crisis that overrides any purported sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty. This in turn is due to the assertion that when a government is unable to assure the life and property of any of its citizens, it essentially forfeits its legal claim to both the law and custom attached to such title:

> *was aber ist der erste sittliche Rechtstitel, den eine Regierung überhaupt hat und haben muss? Es ist der, dass sie den Willen und die Fähigkeit hat, die Staatsangehörigen in Bezug auf Leben und Eigentum gegen Gewaltthätigkeiten sicher zu stellen*[34]
> what then is the first moral legal title possessed at all by and required for any

30. *„…erheben wir heute doch unsere Stimme zum flammenden Protest und rufen es so laut, dass diese Stimme gehört wird in Yildiz Kiosk und den möglich stärksten Nachhall findet im deutschen Reichskanzleramt," [*Today we nevertheless raise our voice of flaming protest and shout it so laud, that this voice will be hear in the Yildiz Kiosk and will find the greatest possible reverberation in the German Imperial Chancellery], *40*.

31. "*ein solches Beispiel von Wildheit gegen ein ganzes Volk kennt die Geschichte nicht, soweit wir auch in ihren Annalen zurückblättern mögen*," [History knows no such example of savagery against an entire people, no matter how far we may gaze back in its annals] 28.

32. Eduard Bernstein, *Die Leiden Des armenischen Volk*es, 6.

33. "da jedoch die Herrschenden nicht der Verpflichtung gemäß handeln, so blickt das armenische Volk auf seine Vorkämpfer, die Völker Europas, in der Hoffnung dass diese ihre Stimme erheben und die Regierungen veranlassen werden, endlich doch einzuschreiten und dem Sultan einen energischen Willen zu zeigen…(emphasis mine)" [that their rulers however do not act according to their obligations, so the Armenian people must turn to its champions, the people of Europe, in the hope that they may raise their voices and that governments will finally yet be induced to intervene and to demonstrate an energetic will to the Sultan…], 32.

34. Eduard Bernstein, *Die Leiden Des armenischen Volkes*, 24.

> government? It is that she has the will and capacity to arrange for the security of all nationals with reference to life and property against violent actions.

Put into practice this would mean not only sanctions against Turkey, but also crucially a boycott of those who might boycott such initiatives *("…es braucht nur seine bisherige Opposition gegen alle von anderen Ländern ausgehenden Vorschläge Einwirkung auf die Turkei zu gunsten Armeniens aufzugeben, und der Widerstand des Sultans ist gebrochen.")* ("…this requires forfeiting all previous opposition to recommendations that come from other countries that seek to influence Turkey on behalf of Armenia, which will break the resistance of the Sultan…")

Motivating Bernstein here are the principles of Social Democracy, which he clearly lays out via a fundamental humanistic principle that while it has taken different guises, from the Bible to the French Revolution, remains the same. This idea, that oppression of even one element of society is an act of repressive aggression against society as a whole, and society here conceived of in the international, human sense, was one guarded and proclaimed with unique vigor by that certain set of Social Democrats, those who ultimately felt compelled to secede and establish their own party during wartime.[35,36] Such conviction would seem to naturally predispose Social Democrats to solidarity and engagement with the plight of Armenia. Yet as Bernstein is clear to point out, this would be a case of wishful thinking, as we shall see, only a self-selecting set of Social Democratic dissenters made their mark on the issue. Bernstein was perhaps further aided along, and so far along than most, by the special affinity out of the uncanny structural resemblance between Armenian and Jewish social formation. He was careful to point out the high degree of cultural development that distinguished them from their environment:

> *und zwar eines Volkes, das ehedem seine relativ hohe Culturstufe erlangt hatte und noch heute in seinen dem Druck der türkischen Misswirtschaft weniger ausgesetzten Elementen eine bemerkenswerte geistige Regsamkeit an der Tag legt.*[37]
> *namely a people, which had formerly acquired its relatively high stage of culture and still today displays remarkable mental agility despite in elements less exposed to the pressure of Turkish mismanagement.*

Though excluded from military and higher positions that represent the state due to their non-identity with the religion of state, such exclusion could not quiet their mental energy and activity. That such an outlet would be created and found in the innovation and expand-

35. "…*es ist Unterdrückung gegen den ganzen Gesellschaftskörper wenn auch nur ein einziges seiner Glieder unterdrückt wird…"* […it is repressive against the entire body of society when even only a single of its members is repressed…], *See* Eduard Bernstein, *Die Leiden des armenischen Volkes*, 40.

36. The subject of pre-war Reformist Social Democratic ideology is vast and lies largely outside the purview of this investigation. One may consult Manfred Steger's *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), or for an earlier classic, Peter Gay's *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Max* (New York: Octagon, 1983).

37. Eduard Bernstein, *Die Leiden des armenischen Volkes*, 6.

ing horizon of the free marketplace was for Bernstein, a rule for all such peoples he draws a direct reference to the Quakers in England, looming large is the obvious case of the Jews.[38]

It may seem odd that a Social Democrat grounded in Marxist theory would extol the creative and liberating aspects of the marketplace, but even or especially in his engagement for Armenia, one may discern the "revisionism" with which Bernstein's name will remain forever attached. Bernstein essentially held that an orderly and equitable expansion of capitalism would provide for a developed democracy, which would in turn prove to provide the means for a socialism fully embraced by the bourgeois parliamentary system. The move to socialism in Bernstein is based on the ethical prerogative that emerges out of Kantian subjectivism, rather than the historical necessity of the movement of the world spirit as Marx applied Hegel inverted via materialism.[39] The desire here for universal emancipation was not conflict oriented or even catastrophic (Bernstein himself notably rejected the term "revisionism," and instead preferred "reformism") among the grounds for which Bernstein disavowed the theory of the impoverishment of the proletariat and the pending self-catastrophe of capitalism.[40]

Predicated behind this shift is that Bernstein could see benevolent, innovative aspects of the bourgeoisie, and the risk and potential for the downtrodden to result and resort in the most bestial of behaviors. Fundamental to Bernstein's "reform" of Marx was the conviction in the capacity for self-enlightenment among the bourgeoisie who could be moved to progress to a social democracy out of their own volition. The shadow side to that highly speculative potential development is that certain forms of class conflict, such as that seen by Bernstein among Armenians and Kurds for instance could turn genocidal. Stated otherwise genocide here is an unintended corollary of modern class society, a kind of perversion of class conflict. It was after all Bernstein's predecessor as a leader party theoretician, August Bebel, who famously referred to anti-Semitism, and here he undoubtedly meant the organized, political movement led by educated elites as the "socialism of fools." While it would be an ambitious speculation to link Bernstein's revisionism to his witnessing on behalf of the Armenians, it would be historically challenging to find any other case that would appear to justify his shift in postulates. Additionally, the account and importance laid on "culture" by Bernstein and later Vierbücher during the genocide reflects the shift in emphasis distinctive of reformist social democracy. The distinctive emphasis on culture has not been lost on

38. *"…aehnliches hat sich ja bei fast allen Nationen gezeigt, die geistig rege sind und in ihrer Heimat politisch Staatsangehörige zweiter Classe waren*" […such may also be found among almost all nations that are mentally acute and find themselves second class citizens in their homelands], *"*…..die Gegner der Staatskirche konnten also keinen höheren akademischen Beruf ergreifen, kein Staatsamt annehmen, keine Militairs werden" […opponents of the state church could not take up any higher academic career, join the military or assume any position in the military]."Was blieb ihnen übrig …Volkselemente, die sonst unterdrückt wurden, aber an sich geistig regsam waren, mussten sich irgendwie bethätigen, und da fiel naturgemäß der Handel in ihre Hände…" [what remained left for them, who were otherwise repressed but remained mentally acute and who needed to somehow remain active and there naturally trade fell into their hands..] , see Eduard Bernstein, *Die Leiden des armenischen Volkes*, 20.

39. Ibid, 19.

40. Eduard Bernstein, der Denker und Kämpfer: Zu seinem 75. Geburtstag, in *Vorwärts*, 06 January, 1925. Vol. 42, Nr. 8 (Morning-Issue Nr. A 5), S.1

historians, some of whom, such as Donna Harsch, Andrew Bonnell and Vernon Lidtke have seen German Social Democracy as either an alternate cultural world or even an essentially culturalist enterprise. Endeavoring to create an alternative social sphere for what functioned like a persecuted caste minority, party initiatives focused as much on expanding the cultural franchise for members as for improving work conditions. Banned for twelve years while their myriad of institutions were mercilessly repressed, there is indeed some justification at viewing the Social Democrats as a kind of dispossessed and afflicted minority. Indeed, upon his famous state visit to the Ottoman Empire, the Kaiser Wilhelm II was perceived by critical onlookers to have analogized the Sultans treatment of the Armenians with how he would like to have dealt with the Social Democrats.[41]

Efforts like the *Volksbühnebewegung* (movement for a theater of the people) sought to modernize and broaden the appeal of classical canon of works so as to provide care for the intellectual and even spiritual dimensions of life. Especially the Revisionist tendency identified with Bernstein was specifically invested in upholding the human treasure of accumulated cultural works and never endeavored, unlike later political developments to limit culture to either only the modernist or socialist realist.

This valorization of culture even including embrace of the classical and the religious is highly evident in Heinrich Vierbücher's account of the genocide itself. His application of the specifically German idealist category of *"Kultur"* refracted through a Social Democratic lens structures both his narrative and concerns and serves to underlie his explanatory framework as well. The juxtaposition could not be more stark, the Turks are not a *"kulturvolk,"* as is explained in the middle of the narrative, while the Armenians are presented as such from the outset, as is made clear from the subtitle,

"Abschlachtung eines Kulturvolkes" ("…slaughter of a cultured people.")[42, 43]Absent a precise English equivalent for the German concept of *Kultur*, one may summarize it as the achievement of cultural and intellectual uplift of a community based on the internal growth, ardour and effort of its individual members. Declared essentially "warriors and imitators," who gave rise to the most "warlike state on earth," for Vierbücher, Turks never produced a literature, a high language or science, while their grandest architecture was all taken from the Christians.[44] The contrast was immediately available for the ready and unmistakable; Armenians were unwarlike, distinguished by love of family and children, who produced the best doctors and teachers, and whose development of craft and trade made an ideal bridge to European progress in the region.[45]

41. See Florentine Fritzen quote on Heinrich Vierbücher's *Armenien 1915*. Donat Verlag, 2005. Wilhelm II., heißt es etwa, dieser „Handelsreisende der deutschen Imperialisten", hätte es „seinem Freund" Sultan Abdul Hamid gern nachgetan und seine unliebsamen Höflinge einfach geköpft: „Wie wäre es den Sozialdemokraten ergangen, wenn Wilhelm gekonnt hätte, wie er wollte!" (Cf. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/politik/die-schande-der-gestrigen-1307530.html)

42. Heinrich Vierbücher, *Armenien 1915*, 30.

43. There is indeed evidence to discuss such inflated "culturalism," as itself filled with prejudicial misconceptions, though such a pursuit lies outside of the limitations of the current investigation.

44. Ibid, 31.

45. Ibid, 34.

Though perhaps not as pointed, Bernstein clearly shares the general direction of the conviction of Vierbücher as to the cultural and structural differences between Armenians and Turks. The two had actually worked together at the 1902 Congress of Friends of Armenia, where Bernstein had been elected to represent Germany. Along the lines of the Bernstein's already discussed publication from the same period, the congress worked under the assumption that without practical steps for European intervention, extermination loomed clear on the horizon.[46] It is moreover significant that as a non-Jew, Vierbücher consented to the notion of Armenians not only as a clearly exceptional and distinct people, but also as a force for progress with positive international implications. Just some year earlier, before the Brussels Congress they would both attend, Bernstein engaged in a very public debate with the English Socialist Ernest Bax over precisely the merits of any particular ethno-nationalist group in taking too great a lead in terms of material and cultural progress.

Notably concerned with increasing domination worldwide by Anglo-Saxons, Bax analogized this to the vaguely similar case of Jews in Europe. Without distinguishing between dispossessed and persecuted minorities, Bax in principle objected to the structure of political support accorded Bernstein and other Social Democrats to the Armenians. Arguably informed by a certain degree of anti-Semitism, Bax essentially reduced Bernstein's advocacy on behalf of Armenia to his Jewishness.[47] Such an intra-party dispute nevertheless reveals an important difference about a question of both political theory and strategy. It also helps to further qualify and complicate the Jewish and/or Social Democratic affinity for Armenia. Naturally including but beyond humanitiarian concerns, or the need to reinforce and maintain status quo rule of law and a state's obligation to its citizens, thinkers such as Bernstein and Vierbücher believed that as Armenians were more advanced than the other ethnic groups among which they lived, it would serve progress if they gained the ascendancy in the area they populated.[48]

Bernstein clearly understood that the intrusions of the forces of modernity and progress could severely undermine if not threaten Armenians if their position was not defended. While recognizing, pre-existing violent enmity, surrounding tribes, slowly brought under the spell of the world financial system, have now added a deadly layer of extortionism to their violence.[49] It was this new combination of forces, as analyzed with the philosophical tools of Reform Marxism Bernstein had pioneered, that enabled him to see the contours of genocide from such an early date.

The Years of War and Genocide

In writings produced just before the start of the war, Bernstein keenly observed a set of conditions that could be seen as setting the stage for genocide. In an article from August 1913, he describes the supposed Turkish "reform commission" that while allegedly dedicated to

46. Ibid, 90.

47. Lars Fischer, *The Socialist Response to Antisemitism in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 182.

48. Ibid

49. Lars Fischer, *The Socialist Response,* 183.

improving conditions for Armenians clearly had its own agenda.[50] Instead of promises to defend or arm Armenians, then left defenseless from marauding Kurds, arms would distributed entirely to the Kurds and confiscate weapons obtained via other means. He did take notice of a slight and cynical change from the days of the Sultan where instead of being threatened directly with massacre, defensive protection would be withdrawn. Bernstein also marked a threatening new development with the worst of criminals let out of jail to serve under newly promoted Kurdish tribal chieftains. Befitting, the long-standing and aforementioned Social Democratic mistrust of Russia, (which had slightly different bases than the wider traditional, mainstream German distrust of Russia) Bernstein's suspicions of Russian designs raises the level of tension in his account.[51] He does not hide his intimation that Russia, despite its pleas to the contrary, may simply be interested in the annexation of Armenian land.

In a speech on the floor of the German parliament in April of that year, Bernstein shared similar concerns in a direct political address on the national stage. He took the task the rhetorical position in defense of the integrity of Armenian territory, yet noted as those words rang hollow without any supporting action.[52] With words of outright pleading, Bernstein calls finally for a settlement in the question of Armenia. Turkey, he notes as never fulfilled its obligations in this regard, for after all aspirations of a population that could not be more modest. Neither separation from Turkey, nor even provincial autonomy; rather simply safety and security, with self-representation in administration would be required.[53] Bernstein singles out Russia and Germany for responsibility, but in particular it was Germany that supported Abdul Hamid's resistance to the west during the previous of massacre. For Bernstein therefore Imperial Germany, "loaded onto herself guilt for further massacre."[54] Persecutions produced countless victims over the centuries all in the name of benefit of Turkey. All of this Bernstein argues did no service in anyway to Turkey other than providing for indulgence of the most basic instincts. Fully conscious of the special nature of the friendship of Germany and Turkey, Bernstein remained convinced that Turkey would follow the lead of its Central European ally should it provide such direction.

The sense of urgency in his remarks, reveal an acute awareness of the extreme vulnerability confronting Armenians. This is especially insightful considering the progressive

50. Armenische Wirren, *Vorwärts,* August 1, 1913, as found in Eduard Bernstein Collection, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, See 42.G354.

51. A generation earlier, submissions by Rosa Luxemburg on the massacres under Sultan Abdülhamit II for the *Vorwärts,* had been deflected by Karl Liebknecht's father Wilhelm, on the grounds that they ran the "danger of unintentionally serving the interests of the bulwark of European absolutism," See Margaret Anderson, "'Down in Turkey Far Away': Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany," *The Journal of Modern History, 79,* No. 1, (March 2007): 86.

52. *139 Sitzung*, 14 April, 1913, 4735, (Cf. http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/en_Blatt_k13_bsb00003385_00283.html).

53. "*Ihre Forderungen sind so bescheiden wie nur möglich, und trotzdem sind sie nicht verwirklicht worden"*, [Their demands are as modest as can possibly be and yet they still were notfullfilled/realized], Ibid

54. "*…die Schuld an den weiteren Metzeleien auf sich geladen,"* […having taken upon themselves the guilt for future massacres], Ibid

direction many projected onto the Young Turk regime change, with its initial promises of greater equality and integration. In a revealing article appearing the *Vorwärts* just as the war got underway, a Jewish Social Democratic leader, Paul Singer, broadly sketch the theaters of military activity for the Turkish partner of the Central Powers. Early military losses deprived Austria and Turkey of both a border and a sphere of joint engagement with the Russian Empire. Thus it was entirely obvious which territory would bear the brunt of the fighting: Armenia.[55] After a detailed climatic and topographic profile, with a population characterized naturally as predominantly Christian Armenian, referred to as *"lange unterdrückt und mißhandelt*." ("long suppressed and mistreated")[56] Mention is made of the great diversity of the surrounding area, but Armenians are again held out to distinct in that they are both a *"körperlich, physisch und sprachlich ein in sich geschlossenes Volk*," ("bodily, physically and linguistically a people closed in themselves") but also, very possibly, the remnants of the aboriginal population of Asia Minor.[57] Mostly town-dwellers and traders they are contrasted with the Kurds, who bring to bear an enmity against the Armenians so severe, it is characterized as a *grimmigen Hass* (ferocious hatred). They are further described as beholden to antiquated customs, a war-like nature, and apparently a social context where the most developed handicraft was thievery. While it was perfectly clear that Armenia would be chief theater of war between Turkey and Russia, this should not suggest that there was a clear strategy in the sense of obvious war aims. In fact, the author, after noting the complications of the topography and demography, notes that the area is distinguished by the lack of clear military necessities or objectives. In the context of prior awareness of the persecution of Armenians, the genocide of 1915 simply could not be linked to any military context or strategic exigency, its character rather took the new form of political murder based on ultra-nationalist, quasi-racial designs for population engineering.

Just months later, these predictions for the placement of the Russian-Turkish front line were fulfilled. By just the third month of the war, historic Armenia was in a more severely deadly, though not necessarily historically new position of being torn in two by much larger powers. In a "Vorwärts" article entitled *Armenien im Weltkrieg*, the anonymous author describes the outbreak of hostilities on the border of the Caucausus inside Turkish-Armenia. The early gains of Turkish troops allowed them to push the front line to the southwest territory of the Trans-Caucasus, described as Russian-Armenia. This article serves to provide the reader with a synopsis of over a century of events that have impacted Armenia as a corollary to the Russian-Turkish rivalry. Reform prescriptions designed to safe guard Armenia are described as being "left on the paper," while England and Russia are called "indifferent bystanders" (*gleichgültige Zuschauer)* to what is referred to as a *Vernichtungsfeldzug gegen ein ganzes Volk* ("campaign of extermination against an entire people").[58] This is accompanied by a campaign of expropriation designed to enrich their Kurdish neighbors and plunge the 2.5 million Armenians of Turkey into a state of economic

55. Singer H., "Der Türkisch-Russische Kriegsschauplatz," in *Vorwärts*, Nr. 221, 4 November 1914, 7.
56. Ibid
57. Ibid
58. "Armenien im Weltkrieg," *Vorwärts,* November 20, 1914, Vol. 31. Nr. 317, 1.

immiseration and pauperization. The periodic massacres with victims in the hundreds of thousands are described at having no echo in "Christian," Europe worth the name (*ohne im "christlichen" Europa einen nennenswerten Widerhall zu wecken)*. Yet consistent with German Social Democratic sensibilities is a pronounced suspicion of Russia's attempt to self-stylize as a "liberator" for the Armenians, the author noting that Russia had in the past persecuted its own Armenian population. The article ends on with an ominous tone noting that the prior sense of balance between English and Russian interests that had kept stability for decades had eroded. Partially due to new advances in British imperialism, notably in Cyprus and Egypt, the intervention of what is referred to as German *Hochfinanz mit ihrer Bahnpolitik (*High finance with its railway politics), threatened to entirely change the outlook of the world powers on this region. Recognizing the imperial aspirations of their own government, even if limited at first to economic weapons with political motives, implies that Turkey was now on the receiving end of a level of endorsement and sponsorship as never before from a European power via the new German alliance.

In an article appearing less than a month later attempted to draw out the consequences of a Turkish intervention in all its aspects. Written by an unaccredited London correspondent of the *Vorwärts*, the author begins that though such intervention hasn't had a demonstrable influence it is beyond doubt that it signifies a massive expansion of the foundation for the liquidation ushered in by a world war.[59] Prescient that such an unprecedented conflict would inevitably lead to rupture and upheaval in the world order, it is especially notable that such insight is coupled with the expansion of the war brought about by Turkey. While not directly linked to perceiving the contours of genocide, it does provide glimpse into a political imagination attuned to such a potential. The author goes on to trace six different military theaters directly implicated in a Turkish intervention. Given prior documented concern regarding Armenians, it is no surprise that Armenia and Asia Minor are naturally the subject of a distinct section. Providing a corrective to the instinct to see Russia as an aggressive power, the author states distinctly that Russia is not interested in any war of conquest, but merely wants to keep Turkish troops engaged there. This is significant in that it clarifies that Turkey is in no sense facing an existential threat in this crucial territory and concludes with a claim that the Allies perceive the conflict with Turkey to be a "defensive war," against an opponent trying to rapidly achieve the decisive in Asia Minor. To summarize coverage of the region in the *Vorwärts,* the attentive reader would have formed a picture of the Armenian Highland as one without decisive strategic value, would have inevitably formed the main theater of conflict between Turkey and the Allies and where no evidence would have suggested the cessation of the exterminatory process already long known of the Turkish state against the Armenian minority.

The issue of the alleged "defensive" nature of the war would prove to be the basis for a split in the German Social Democratic party, and ultimately the formation of an entirely new, "independent" Social Democratic Party, decisively anti-war and deeply concerned

59. "*Die Türkei und die Entente-Mächte*," in Vorwärts, December 3, 1914, Vol. 31, Nr. 330, 3. See, "*…abgesehen davon, daß er die nach dem Kriege stattzufindende Liquidation auf eine ganz gewaltig erweitertete Grundlage stellen muss."* [….leaving aside that the liquidation which will follow the war must be placed on a wholly formidably extended foundation].

about the plight of the Armenians. Fittingly appearing on the 1st of January 1915, Eduard Bernstein sought to reassess the logic that had led to Social Democratic consent to the war. Though predating the actual split by several months, it is clear for Bernstein that whatever logic had led to war was heavily flawed. The distinction between aggressive and defensive war had been adopted as a sort of "road map," by European Social Democratic parties in their deliberations on consent for war. With the clarity of hindsight, Bernstein implies that we should have listened to the warnings that in praxis deciphering this difference is enormously challenging. After all, powers on all sides claimed to be fighting in defense. That this distinction proved spurious precipitated what was perhaps the chief calamity and perhaps first social casualty of the war, the collapse of moral values. Bernstein claimed that left in the lurch, was the capacity for the most simple of humans to judge their neighbor.[60] The faulty logic at work in the rush to war was then followed by a general phenomenon of the abdication of responsibility and the continual shifting of the blame. In response, Bernstein offered a clarion call to conscience, "*das Gefühl für eine hohe Verantwortung darf uns gerade bei so folgenschweren Ereignissen nie verlassen"*("that the feeling for a highresponsibility should never leave us, especially in the face of such momentous events"). It was indeed such a sense of increased responsibility, which would lead Bernstein and his colleagues, Liebknecht, Lebedour, Haase and others to turn against their own government and the war it launched and to speak out on behalf of Armenians.

The principled stance of a few, self-selecting German Social Democrats out of leadership circles should not suggest that anti-Armenian propaganda did not find its way into the organs of the party. In fact one may claim that it is precisely because of such distortions and silences that aggravated their secession from the party line.[61] Indeed, the first major coverage devoted to the deportation of the Armenians in late July is framed not as a direct reportage of events but rather as a counter to reports surfacing in the media of opposing and neutral countries. The silence enforced by both the German and Turkish governments on the genocidal events beginning already in February of that year may rightly be called the silence of the graveyard. It is crucial to note though that even such distorted coverage did attest to proof of the presence of a long prepared and agreed upon plan to take unprecedented action against the Armenian population.[62] Also clear from the citations within this report is that the principles sources of information were only official reports from either the German or the Turkish military command.

The reality and severity of censorship applied to Social Democratic party outlets is attested to in the fact that within the first full year of the war that coincided with the prin-

60. Vorwärts, "Grundsätze der Social Demokratie und der Weltkrieg" Jan. 1, 1915. Vol.32, Nr. 1, p. 5.

61. Widespread, mainstream party positions on the Armenians is extremely difficult, aggravated by the fact that the question of whether or not Armenians counted as a "Geschichtsnation," (historical nation) (though they were clearly counted in the ranks of a Kulturnation) was left rather open. This would further require investigation of the long-standing ideological problematic of nationalism within Marxist theory, cf. K. Marx: Manuskripte über die polnische Frage (1863-1864), Hrsg. U. iengel. Von W. Conze und D. Hertz-Eichenrode. S'Gravenhage 1961.

62. "…das Vorhandensein eines seit langem vorbereiteten und beschlossenen Planes..," […the presence of a plan that had been long before prepared and agreed upon…] Vorwärts, July 17, 1915, Vol. 32, Nr. 195., S. 3 "Die Armenier gegen die Türkei."

cipal starting events of the Armenian Genocide, the main party newspaper, *Vorwärts* was forced to cease publication on three separate occasions. Whenever news coverage did surface about events behind and around the Caucasian Front they arrived in Berlin via a most circuitous route. For instance, a report on the 5th of October with a by-line out of Paris cites information arriving from the "*Agence Havas"* press bureau out of New York. This notice further betrays some uncertainty as to whether or not the American President Wilson had tried via German authorities to put a stop to the killings, as well as to raise the attention of other nations to this issue. Quoted as certainty is the attempt of the American Ambassador in Constantinople, not mentioned by name, to generate a fund that would enable the transport of fleeing Armenians to America.[63] A follow-up notice of the 8th of October, once again from a neutral city, Den Haag, and a foreign press bureau, Reuters, refers to uncertainty in the English House of Lords about the precise number of Armenian victims. Though confirming that in certain districts the population was completely annihilated the number of victims, by that point, 800,000 is supported by some Lords apparently, more than others.[64] Even such a brief notice is not without a rather forced attempt to deflect guilt away from Germany. It should be noted that this was the first full parliamentary revelation of the ongoing genocide in any nation party to the war.[65]

The accumulation of such notices did lead the *Vorwärts* to issue a kind of editorial message to clarify an official position for Social Democracy. Appearing on the 10th of October, the piece begins with a kind of surrender to the power of the censor, "*der uns gesetzten Schranken bewußt nehmen wir selbst zu der Sache nicht Stellung." ("*conscious of the restrictions set upon us, we do not take an position on the matter.")[66] It is possible to imagine that based on the publication record, any direct opposition to the Armenian Genocide would have meant further shutdown of the newspaper. It may be helpful to note that the most complete and effective campaign against the genocide by a German, that undertaken by Johannes Lepsius, president of the German-Armenian society, resulted in his politically charged displacement from the country to Holland accompanied by an interdiction of travel.[67] At least what the record of the *Vorwärts* for the remainder of the war does reveal is that those party members who did openly speak out were no longer welcome to do so in the *Vorwärts*. Bernstein, in particular, who during some weeks had an article almost every week in the publication, disappears entirely from its pages. The editorial board did attempt though to take some issue with the principle of non-intervention espoused by the German government. This piece is devoted largely to a critique of the positions put forward in both mainstream liberal and conservative nationalist newspapers. A significant portion of German society and politics that, did also speak out on the Armenian Genocide, namely Christian activists, especially those represented the evangelical missionary movement.[68]

63. "Amerika und die Armenier," *Vorwärts* , October 6, 1915. Vol. 32, Nr. 276, p. 3.

64. Armenierdebatte im englischen Oberhause, October 8, 1915. Vol. 32, Nr. 278, p. 3.

65. Christopher Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (London: Croon Helm, 1980), 183.

66. "Grundsatz der Nichteinmischung", *Vorwärts*, October 10, 1915. Vol. 32, Nr. 280, p. 3.

67. Ibid, 236.

68. Less known to the historical record, there was some vital Catholic opposition as well, especially from the Archbishop of Cologne and the Catholic Zentrum Reichstag parlimentaria Matthias Erzberger who

With disapproval the article cites the caustic and insulting remarks reserved for such activists referred to as "*sittliche Verzweiflung professoraler Armenierseelenfreunde"* ("the moral desperation of professorial soul mates of Armenians").[69] The article concludes on relying on the old fall-back of German Social Democracy that allowed their accession to war to begin with, the Russophobic position that many maintained throughout the war. The writers applied the simplistic formula that Western powers, specifically France should intervene and condemn the atrocities of Russian forces on the European Eastern Front.

Clearly burdened by a newly aggravated nationalism, official Social Democracy could publicize and follow unfolding news of the genocide based on an incontestably, premeditated plan, but reprehensibly also sought ways to deflect German guilt. It is with justifiable consternation that from their own official pronouncements the one act they could not tolerate were German political voices that sought to justify Turkish actions. For those that would soon leave the party, naturally, this did not go nearly far enough. And for any vocal protest against the Genocide to again appear in the pages of the Social Democracy party paper, it would have to come as a result of objective reporting from without and from a purportedly neutral political context. Therefore as we shall see, these efforts of dissenting socialists mostly occurred from the floor of the German parliament.

Karl Liebknecht, though seen later as the spiritual father of the German Communist party, was for most of his life a Social Democrat. Famously, he was the first member of Parliament to vote against war credits. What is less known is that he was also the first to speak out against the Armenian Genocide, at a time when the division of the party appeared all but inevitable. On the 11th of January 1916, Liebknecht posed a question to the Chancellor (using the parliamentary conceit of a *Kleine Anfrage*, which compelled the executive to respond to critical questions) inquiring into his awareness of the massacres perpetrated by Germany's ally. Even at this early date, he presciently saw this as what he described as a sin now placed upon Germany.[70] His accompanying question concerned whatever direct actions to take to prevent repetition and restore human rights to the Armenian population in Turkey. In what appeared to be an interruption the response was clearly a pre-packaged government response that parroted Turkish propaganda about Armenian demonstrations that minimized the extent of the deportations while also refusing to objectively characterize this by now well-known Turkish campaign. Referencing, Dr. Lepsius, Liebknecht than referred to the "extermination of Turkish Armenians," and that Germany was already seen as responsible by much of the Christian population in Turkey.[71] As Liebknecht clearly attempted to complete his intervention with an accurate representation of events, he was

even travelled repeatedly to Constantinople on behalf of the Armenian cause.

69 "Der Grundsatz der Nichteinmischung," *Vorwärts*, October 10, 1915. Vol. 32, Nr. 280, p. 3.

70 As discussed in Viscount Bryce and Arnold Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by Viscount Bryce,* ed. Ara Sarafian (London: Gomidas Institute, 2005, originally 1916), p. xxvii.

71. Comprehensive explanation of this reference would demand a more extensive explanation of German press and censorship policies: Lepsius' speech at the German Press Association ("Deutsche Pressevereinigung") of 5 October 1915 which resulted in stricter censorship against the coverage of Armenian issues, despite the fact that the speech was merely a semi-public event.

this time not only interrupted, but literally shouted down through loud calls of "stop." Continuing over the disruptive noises, Liebknecht affirms he had not originally completed his entire statement and that the President of the Parliament was simply succumbing to the shouts of the house in what was clearly an attempt to silence Liebknecht's valiant efforts. The Reichstag President than refuses to tolerate any attempts to critique his leadership, while Liebknecht than characterizes this president's handling of parliamentary procedure as the equivalent of a "rape." Liebknecht made mention in his questioning of politically motivated mail seizures, though at the time, he could not have known that much worse, such as imprisonment, was in store. For his prescience, principle and bravery, Liebknecht would soon be arrested and sentenced to four years in prison.

Fourteen Social Democratic parliamentary fraction members had already voted against the war credits by the time of the first months of 1915 that also coincided with the start of the Armenian Genocide. The rest of their colleagues had continued to opt for the so-called *Burgfrieden,* or political truce announced by the Kaiser at the start of the conflict. As positions hardened they further endorsed the so-called *Durchhalten* strategy of staying the course precisely as it appeared clear the war would have no speedy outcome. As a result cooperation steadily diminished within the parliamentary working group as the anti-war faction had risen to 44 by December of 1915. A formal split had in fact already been a foregone conclusion by the 21st of December as the group declared itself no longer content to be represented by the vote of the fraction and wanted the multiple reasons for their anti-war position to receive a hearing in Parliament denied them by the majority of their party. In fact, especially the 20 directly elected members of Parliament from the anti-war fraction were subject to increasingly frontal and denunciatory attacks by the colleagues in party fora. As they were required to adhere to party discipline they had no access to the press and certainly not to the larger public due to reigning censorship enforced by the government. Perhaps paradoxically as they had no other outlet upon which to develop their position or make an accounting with the reproaches received from fellow party members, the parliament tribune itself remained the only place where at least temporarily free speech could be provided for.[72]

Clearly no other choice remained but to secede from the party. And when the split did come, it was not the subject of prior discussion, but rather was presented as a *fait accompli* on the day of its announcement by anti-war leader, Hugo Haase, a German Jew who had been the only practicing lawyer to adhere to Social Democracy in all of the territory of East Prussia. When the group, who anointed themselves the "independent" Social Democrats released a statement for the reasoning, they rebuffed the reproach of disloyalty and declared it was they and not the rest of the party that was acting in the true spirit of the Social Democratic party.

Yet by the time the split was effectuated the primary phase of the Armenian Genocide had already taken its course. It was though with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that they would make a heroic stand on behalf of Armenia, one strikingly overlooked in the historical literature on the subject, as the relevant primary sources and archival documents have remained

72. "Eine eigene Fraktion der Sozialdemokratischen Minderheit," *Vorwärts,* March 26, 1916, Nr. 84, Vol. 33 p. 1.

overlooked. Capitulation of the Russian side not only allowed for a renewed Caucasus campaign in the east, but provided for the secession of Russian protected territories of Turkish Armenia to the Turkish state and thereby exposing populations hitherto sheltered from the genocidal program of the CUP. Not only were these territories of Ardahan, Kars and Batum now explicitly barred from any Russian interference including protection, but they were forced to enter into negotiations with Turkish authorities. Haase's primary colleague in the leadership of the "independent" Social Democrats, Georg Ledebour, a post-Christian staunch German secularist was even more pointed in his criticism of his former colleagues when he finally had the chance to bring criticism to bear on what he referred to as the "Armenian Question."[73] Referring to their continued war support, he stated:

> Wie Sozialisten in irgend einer Form einer solchen Regierung noch Unterstützung angedeihen lassen können, ist mir allerdings vollkommen unerklärlich[74]
>
> It is entirely inexplicable to me how socialists could bestow support in any form to such a government.75

Ledebour declares himself most stupefied by the provisions regarding Armenia, where according to the "meaning" of the Brest Litovsk treaty it is essentially allowing Turkey to devour remaining Armenia. Clarifying the ethnographic make-up of the area, Ledebour asserts Turkey has no right to such areas and that furthermore any historically based claims are also to be considered invalid. Worst of all declares Ledebour:

> Aber, meine Herren, das allerschlimmste ist folgendes. Die armenische und georgische Bevölkerung dieser Gebiete sieht der Gefahr der Ausrottung entgegen, wenn die Türken einmarschieren.[76]
>
> But gentlemen, the very worst is the following. The Armenian and Georgian population of these areas face the danger of extermination if the Turks march in.

Cries of "very true" erupted in the plenary hall from the ranks of the "independent" Social Democrats. Ledebour then reminds his listeners that in Anatolia the Armenian population has already been exterminated by Turkish troops, and, he emphasizes, German allies. Recognizing that Armenians have called upon certain Christian political parties already, and though he somewhat mocks their pride in their Christianity and doubts their commitment, he delivers a clarion call for intervention and seeks out conjoined action with such Christian parties. Given the Jewish identity of many of his party colleagues and their roles as Social Democratic leaders, including their leader Haase, one can hardly imagine them taking the same verbal liberties afforded to Ledebour.

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73. Ledebour was perhaps using the term in the context of its origin in the Berlin Treaty (1878) and the project of administrative autonomy in the "Armenian Provinces" of the Ottoman Empire.

74. Reichstag, 143 Sitzung, March 19, 1918, 4483.

75. Author's note: the support in question is that of the German government for the Ottoman government.

76. Ibid

> Ich erwartete, meine Herren, daß Sie von der deutschen Regierung verlangen würden, sie solle einschreiten, damit unter keinen Umständen die Möglichkeit für solche Metzeleien, wie sie im eigentlichen türkischen Armenien stattgefunden haben, jetzt auch in diesen russisch-armenisch-georgischen Gebieten geschaffen wird. Aber keiner von Ihnen hat einen Ton darüber gesagt.[77]
>
> I expect gentleman that you would demand that the German government intervene and that therefore under no conditions would the possibilities be created for massacres in the Russian-Armenian-Georgian territories as have occurred in actual Armenia within Turkish territory. But none of you has ever uttered a word about this.

Speaking for his colleagues, Ledebour literally states they are raising their voice against any continued massacres of Armenians made possible through the shared guilt of the Germans. To buttress his claim of the mendacity of Turkish authorities Ledebour cites the early support of the Young Turks in the Turkish Revolution by Armenian parties, and the Young Turks themselves that vocally recognized this before turning on them with unimaginable brutality. Ledebour's specific policy recommendation, beyond that of the absolute exigency to deny Turkish invasion is the use of soldiers from neutral nations to protect these civilian populations. Furthermore he believes that these territories should be aided in their apparent desire to join the then recently developing Caucasian Democratic Federal Republic announced in Tiflis under the leadership of the Social Democrat Nikolos Chkheidze.

Some days later in summation of the views of his party on the treaty, Ledebour introduces what is perhaps the strongest term available in German, *Schande*, which can suggest something more than shame or disgrace. Aware of its strength, and therefore introduced rhetorically it is precisely the article that effects Armenia that makes the treaty a *Schande* for Germany.[78] Immediately unleashing disturbance in the plenary hall, the Vice-President Dr. Paasche, responds that such a claim cannot be tolerated, and calls for censure. In a response that can be seen as an encapsulation of the vocal efforts of these Social Democratic war dissenters and activists for Armenia, Ledebour replies, that it is precisely because this article could very well lead to the extermination of the Christian population, and therefore, "it is our conviction that there is no word strong enough, to condemn such an action."[79]

Haase in his address some days later calls Turkish claims on Batum, Kars and Ardahan as one of the direst elements of this treaty. They are further in clear violation of the principle of self-determination by the inhabitants who are threatened by outright conquest. Haase states that it was obvious that none of the peoples in question, including those other than Armenians would consent to renewed Turkish rule. This treaty element is even more tragic, adds Haase, when one considers how much of historic Armenia has already been lost to Turkey. Haase then reminds the audience of the "cry of help," that came via specifically

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77. Ibid

78. 145 Sitzung, Friday, March22, 1918, 4561.

79. Ibid, translation my own.

German voices, not from neutral countries and he references Dr. Lepsius and Dr. Niepage.[80] Haase actually reads a lengthy passage into the parliamentary record of Lepsius where he is continually cheered on by supporting cries from his party. He even cites liberal voices in Turkey to the effect that there is support to finally topple this regime and he ends his remarks with a powerful summarizing question:

> *Und da sollen wir es verantworten, daß man den Türken Gebiete mit armenischer Bevölkerung in die Hände spielt? Nie und nimmer werden wir die Verantwortung für einen solchen Schritt übernehmen.*[81]
> And we should be responsible that one delivers over Turkish territories with Armenian population? Never but never would we take responsibility for such a step.

Some months later during a parliamentary dispute with conservative colleagues who claimed Turkey was awarded the territories in question, Haase formulated what he called the "Caucasian question," as whether or not the Armenians would be relinquished entirely over to extermination.[82] Haase reminds his listeners of the documentation they were presented about the genocide, and the "cry for help" that anyone who had heard could not forget for the rest of their lives.[83] He refers to the 300,000 survivors who have escaped to the Caucasus to find shelter among the remainders of their people. He lists 200,000 under direct Turkish threat and recounts how Kurds lead by Aga Abdulla in the direction of Ardahan have already reached some and continued the killings. Listing the thousands already killed there, Haase states that no Armenian can count on any sort of protection if found under the power of the Turks.[84] If Christian solidarity did not suffice to prevent the award of these territories to the Turks then Haase calls upon the principle of humanity and for a complete Turkish withdrawal, accompanied by cries of support from his party fraction colleagues.

It is important to note that these "independent" German Social Democratic voices for humanitarian assistance for refugees and opposition to genocide emerged out of extremely well-known individuals in the highest leadership echelons. Bernstein, a protégé of Engels, helped start the party newspaper and as its leading innovative theoretician was perhaps the only German Social Democrat of international renown. Hugo Haase, similarly, was elected party co-chairman in 1913 after the death of August Bebel, along with later Weimar Chancellor Friedrich Ebert. After the anti-war secession he also became the leader of the new party, and continued his leadership role until his assassination in 1919. Their principled insurrection was a stance on behalf of humanity without great precedence or repetition in similar contexts. Entirely against expedience and arguably their own political career

80. Martin Niepage worked as a teacher in a German school at Aleppo etc. He was interrogated by German authorities on the English war edition of Niepage's report, the author explained that he had acted under the influence of J. Lepsius – putting the blame on the known Armenophile.

81. 145 Sitzung, March 22, 1918, 4543.

82. 180 Sitzung, June 25, 1918, 5664.

83. This note of documentation may refer tothe publication of "Germany and Armenia" (1919) released by the publishing house – Tempelverlag – of J. Lepsius.

84. Ibid.

interests against the apex of terror in the First World War, I would frame these overlooked efforts within a genealogy of leading Jewish figures with progressive tendencies, including Lazare and Zangwill, who beyond the well-known example of Morgenthau, placed principle over ethnic and religious solidarity and made the plight of the Armenian people their own.

Jews and Germans became primary witnesses to the Armenian Genocide in ways unlike few others. Though this is well known in regard to certain figures, such as Morgenthau or Lepsius, the extent of this fact remains underappreciated. Yet even these significant voices are overwhelmed by a larger silence, a meditation on which this article begins. I then established a genealogy of Jewish witness that goes "beyond Morgenthau", with figures such as Zangwill and Lazare who were also united by a critique of mainstream Zionism. To finally achieve emancipation and Jewish liberation, these voices sought a horizontal alliance with those similarly downtrodden, those lightning rods for the failures and fissures of the modern world-system, like the Armenians, rather than a vertical alliance with the powers of Imperialism.

This Jewish genealogy of witness converges with a German history of witness and at times is one and the same, which is to say, German-Jewish. German voices against the Genocide have been disproportionately construed as emanating out of the liberal, missionizing wing of Protestant activists, I demonstrate the significant role played by leading German Social Democrats, many of whom Jews, in piercing the silence and complicity around the Genocide. These Independent Social Democrats, such as Haase and Bernstein, also maintained Jewish concern but fused it with a critique of nationalism, remaining conscious of unique German responsibility and Jewish responsibility for the unprecedented crimes befalling an exceptional minority like the Armenians. What ultimately emerges out of the record of these overlooked voices of human rights centered advocacy from Jewish and German sources are the fledging stages of a new discourse of human rights and a new ethic of political culpability along with a horizontal perspective on world affairs that places priority on a counter-hegemonic alliance of the marginal and oppressed.

BOOK REVIEWS

Stefan Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* **(Cambridge, Belknap Press/ Harvard University Press, 2014), 320 pages.**

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This book is undoubtedly an important, enlightening and original contribution to our understanding of the post-WWI transformations in Germany as well as in Turkey. It brings into a picture hitherto unknown facts, perceptions and assertions about admirations that the German right wing political parties, especially Nazis, and key politicians had for Turkey. It is an eye-opening account, which deserves further contextualization within the history of both countries of Turkey and Germany of the inter-war period. Although the book "*is a history of perceptions and discourses about Turkey*" (p. 7), it does bring interesting insights about the reasons for the Nazi engagement with the Kemalist Turkey. Although the book is about Germany and its post WWI transformations, it also provides important hints about many developments in Turkey especially in the 1930s. It also implies that the book is an important contribution in studying the German dimensions and perspectives in examining the history of Turkey also.

The author cautions about two important assumptions at the beginning of the book hoping that his clarifications will clear out any ambiguity that the book may trigger. The author arguably claims that he does not intend to discuss "*whether the Nazis were right that the Kemalists displayed fascist tendencies*" and secondly, he "*cannot delve too deeply into the difficult topic*" of the Armenian Genocide. Although he immediately refers to the period under discussion (1919-1923 and 1933-1938) as a reason for not including it, his next argument comes a little off the context of the book. By citing key studies in the field of the Armenian Genocide, he implicitly questions them as he claims that the Armenian Genocide "*still needs to be studied extensively before we can make more definite statements about it*" (p. 7). Although later in the book he dedicated an entire subsection to the Armenian Genocide, the caveat of his raises some questions for the reader. As for his first claim, that he leaves the discussion of the existence of the fascist tendencies of the Kemalists to others (p. 7), he admittedly points at one of the major gaps of the book. The Nazi's admiration of the Turkish transformation is presented as a one-way process, underestimating the German experience of feeding pro-German sentiments in Turkey since the late 19th century, and overestimating the Turkish model of transformation.

The book mainly examines the German nationalist excitement and obsession with Turkey through analysis of a range of conservative to far-right newspapers, oftentimes turning to broader media trends. He mainly concentrated on the following newspapers: *Neue Preussische Zeitung* (also called Kreuzzeitung)*, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Vossische Zeitung, Heimatland*, *Völkischer Beobachter (VB), Der Reichwart* etc. The author claims "*the*

whole spectrum of newspapers, from the nationalist center to the fringe far-right, developed an almost monolithic discourse on Turkey". (p. 15) The German newspapers recognized Turkey as a role model for the Germans urging "*certain Turkish strategies to replicate in Germany in some way*". (p. 15) The process of "role modeling" became more accentuated with the rise into prominence of Mustafa Kemal in 1919. In the following years, the German press covered extensively the major achievements and steps of Mustafa Kemal. The image around Mustafa Kemal was consistently built in a way as to construct a nationalist backbone and martial spirit that might appeal many readers (p. 49). The German Press not only "*became champions of and spokespeople of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk*" but also "*something akin to a large European Kemalist PR agency*" (pp. 23, 150-151). The German press even reprinted Kemalist demands during the Lausanne negotiations as lists on page 1, (p. 43), thereby expressing their apparent support to the Kemalist cause. With the advent of Mustafa Kemal and the attention given to him in the German press, the author argues that "*there has never been another period with a huge number of articles in the German press devoted to Turkey, not even during the high points of the recent EU-Turkey debate*". (p. 23)

The main feature of the right wing German press of the Weimer Republic was to seek commonalities and parallelism (anti-Western, anti-Entente, anti-Greek etc.) between Turkey and Germany and potential lessons that Germany could draw from the Turkish tactics. (p. 49) In addition, the nationalist German press was full of overexcitement, fascination, admiration and praise for the Turkish success, "Turkish methods", "Turkish solutions", for Mustafa Kemal and, even for Ismet Inönü. Interestingly, the history textbooks of the late Weimer years mentioned the Turkish War of Independence as a "*marvelous example of national devotion*" (p. 113). The main conclusion that German nationalist circles drew from the Turkish experience and tried to disseminate through the press was the following belief: "*national unity, a strong leader, a preemptive and total military action were advanced as crucial policy prerequisites and political means*". (p. 66)

The second chapter starts with a rather strong claim, which challenges established views in the historiography. Ihrig argues that Hitler's attempted seizure of power in 1923 "*was inspired much more by Mustafa Kemal and the events in Anatolia than by the example of Mussolini's "March of Rome*"". (p. 68) He further argues that the "Nazis "grew up" with Turkey as it was the case for the "völkisch" press to which continually proposed to learn from Turkey. (p. 70) He approached this case through the official Nazi papers, *Völkischer Beobachter (VB)*, and a weekly, *Heimatland*.

Both papers closely followed the major development in Turkey. The VB explicitly called to resort to "Turkish methods" (p. 71), the Heimatland in turn was quite encouraged by the Kemalist experience of countering the Entente. That paper also looks at the case of Turkey with a sense of inspiration: "*the governing in Anatolia has managed, after the downfall of their Fatherland, to get a lot of trumps into their hands by intelligently waiting, the iron nerves and skillful maneuvering*". (p. 74) By relying the claims of the Nazi papers, the author argues that, inspired by the Turkish model of counterpoising Constantinople with Ankara, the Nazis tried to follow suit and change the center of gravity from Berlin to Munich. Thus, what was happening in Turkey had captivated the imagination of the Nazis in a very detailed way. They sought models and inspirations not only from general trends which

were unveiling in Turkey, but also in certain steps and tactics that Mustafa Kemal and his "Ankara government" took to cope with the Entente and the power-holders in Constantinople. (p. 91) References to Turkey, Mustafa Kemal and Ankara government popped up regularly in testimonies and during the trial of the organizers of the failed Munich coup détat in November 1923. Ihrig also argues that many names, which played an important role during Hitler's time in power, had a previous experience both in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. They were also either actively involved in the Armenian Genocide or served in the Ottoman Empire as German officials carrying out different missions (military, diplomatic), which made them to build and develop significant connections with Turkey and its key politicians. Holistically referred as "German Ottomans", the author brings the following names - Lossow, Hans von Seeckt, Hans Humann, Franz von Papen, Konstantin von Neurath (Foreign Minister) and General Bronsart von Schellendorf, Otto von Feldman (a leading politician in the DNVP and the All-deutscher Verband), Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter (Hitler's political advisor, who was the German vice- chancellor in Eastern Regions of Turkey and witnessed the Armenian Genocide, he is believed to be the main person that Hitler learnt about the Armenian Genocide), Rudolf Hoess (future commander of Auschwitz), (p. 104), Josef Thorak, a Nazi sculptor, who had erected many monuments of central importance in Turkey (p. 130).

Ihrig clearly displays that Hitler knew very well about Turkish domestic politics (minority questions, domestic reforms etc.) and major turning points in the foreign policy of the past 20 decades at least. Hitler's admiration with Turkey and particularly with Mustafa Kemal did not fade away even when he came to power. In 1933, he Turkish *Milliyet* interviewed him, which later on was reprinted and summarized in a variety of German papers. In that interview, Hitler spared no words to share his excitement and admiration of Turkey and its leader. He famously pointed at that Turkey and Germany were united not only by mere good relations, but also by "something more" sympathy and understanding based on the shared pursuit of similar goals". He named Turkey "a shining star for him" and called Mustafa Kemal "the greatest man of the century". (p. 115) The same logic of words were later used by Hitler when he was sending congratulatory telegrams to Mustafa Kemal. Hitler famously admitted *"... Atatürk was a teacher, Mussolini was his first and I his second student.*" (p. 116) Ihrig quotes Heinrich Hoffman, Hitler's personal photographer and a close friend, who reported in his memoirs that Hitler's admired Ataturk so much that one of the many busts of Ataturk by the famous Nazi sculptor Josef Thorak, became Hitler's cherished possession. (p. 129) The Nazi press also presented Atatürk and his deeds to ascertain the righteousness of "Men make history" claim. The latter was widely circulated to affirm that only great men, the Führer, can regenerate the nation and to refute the anticipations both from the masses and democracy. (p. 149)

Hitler also repeatedly mentioned that Turkey had been a role model for him (p. 116), which was used along with a famous metaphor when referring to Turkey "*star in the darkness*" (pp. 114-117). Later, in the midst of the war against Poland, he told Turkish ambassador that he "*was coping Atatürk.*" (p. 116)

Particularly interesting were the statements made on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1933. In one of those statements, Kemalism, Nazism and

Fascism were seen as emanations of the same thing that emerged from the same source of great ideological breakthrough. The three were also seen "*as the first great eruptions, which will cover the antiquated intellectual crust with a new, smoldering and fiery layer, with a new ideology and [a new] cultural layer*." (p. 119)

Already in power, Hitler and the Nazi press continued to share their admiration with Turkey and Mustafa Kemal. Between 1933 and 1938, *Volkischer Beobachter,* the flagship of the Nazi Press, kept publishing hundreds of articles about Turkey. (pp. 134-136) Atatürk featured prominently in books on contemporary Führers and the new world order. In those depictions, Atatürk was put on equal footing with Hitler himself as well as with Mussolini. Moreover, Ihrig claims that, nowhere in the world, except Turkey, were as many books on Atatürk and the New Turkey published as in interwar Germany. (p. 151) In its glorified descriptions of Atatürk and his achievements the Nazi press created an aura which "*elevated him to messianistic levels*", he was presented as "the imminent savior" or as "a transcendental savior", and oftentimes "savior and Führer" in some texts. (p. 155) Understandably, Atatürk was highlighted along those lines in order to strengthen his image among Germans and boost the confidence towards the German Führer. The Nazi press also presented "actual, coincidental and manufactured parallels" between Atatürk and Hitler (both came from periphery, had humble backgrounds and were soldiers). (p. 157)

When Atatürk passed away on November 10, 1938, the Nazi leadership and the entire propaganda machine did their best to convey to Turkey "German's people's painful sympathy". Hitler also made sure to underline that point in his condolences telegram. (pp. 138-143). For the next days and weeks Atatürk's death turn into a major Nazi media event as both national and provincial papers carried announcements and essays on Atatürk, his life, deeds, his successor Ismet Inonu and the New Turkey that he created. (p. 138)

The fifth chapter of the book stands out for a number of reasons. Most prominently, one of its sections discusses the Armenian Genocide, albeit briefly, through the eyes of the Nazi Germany1. At the outset, he argues that in the eyes of Nazis "*the murder of the Ottoman Armenians was one of the main foundations*" of the new national (völkisch) state. (p. 175) Ihrig questions Hitler's alleged exclamation "*Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians*" and his reference to the "*extermination of the Armenians*". Ihrig does not seem to trust the reliability of the sources which discuss those quotes. (p. 176) Without providing his own explanations why the sources are not reliable, Ihrig argues that there is no need in "*either of them to show that the Nazis were influenced by the Armenian Genocide*". He goes on to argue: "*Because as much as the Nazis grew up with Turkey and the Turkish War of independence, they also grew up with the Armenian Genocide*" (p. 175). Ihrig takes the argument even further by claiming that in the process of constructing anti-Armenianism Germans borrowed heavily from the late 19-th century anti-Semitism. He once again shares the widely known fact that in the German anti-Armenian discourse the Armenians were presented as the "Jews of the Orient" (p. 177). Ihrig claims that in the Nazi Press Armenians were presented as "parasites", a "plague" and as early as in the beginning of the 1920s, it

1. He apparently promises to cover it in detail in his forthcoming book "Justifying Genocide: Germany, the Armenian Genocide, the long road to Auschwitz", Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

was replete with warnings that "*what happened to the Armenians might very well happen to the Jews in a future Germany*" (p. 179). Ihrig also argues that Hitler was very well informed about the intricacies of the Armenian Genocide. One of the possible sources of him being informed was that the former German vice-consul in Eastern Turkey during WWI, Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, was Hitler's close friend. Thus, Ihrig believes that the former vice-consul would not have failed to discuss Turkey and the Armenians with Hitler. (p. 179) During the 1920s, Hitler sought the opportunity to present the Armenians as an example of a "lesser race" on par with the Jews. (p. 181) The Third Reich continued its previously built foundation of anti-Armenianism. Its key ideologues came to believe that "the destruction of the Armenians" as a "compelling necessity". (p. 182) The Third Reich press kept using different negative stereotypes about Armenians as well as Greeks. (pp. 183-184) Based on the discourse of the time, the concluding parts of that chapter carries three central arguments: a) the Armenian Genocide was nothing distant to interwar Germany, b) furthermore, the Armenian Genocide served as a tempting precedent as it helped the New Turkey with its national rebirth and a blissful völkisch existence, c) the process of constructing the "pure Turkish nation" through the extermination of the Armenians did not entail any "negative" repercussions for the Turks, such as a Great Power intervention to punish them for the committed crime. (pp. 206-207) This part of the book is certainly interesting and it would tremendously interesting to examine Ihrig's forthcoming book, the title of which is quite telling and promising.

Overall the book leaves only positive impressions, however, from time to time, it takes some efforts to grasp the chronology jumps and thematic discussions. The other minor issue is that many topics and assertions in the book surface repeatedly in different chapter. Quite logically, the book also raises some questions. For instance, while dealing with Turkey why the question of "race", an important part of the Nazi discourse, was not discussed deeper enough in the Nazi press of the 1920s and 1930s (the book discusses it albeit very briefly)? Why Hitler continued to use the image of Atatürk and his New Turkey even after coming to power?

Even though the author mentions a few times that certain sentiments of right wing press were shared by other papers, it would have been helpful if the author could discuss a few left wing papers in order to see whether there was any discussion at all about New Turkey in the German press, which could have been slightly different than that of the far right press. That would also be helpful to put some of the claims and perceptions in the book into a larger perspective.

It would also be helpful to understand how big the audience was and an approximate number of subscriptions of the Nazi press in the 1920s and during the later decades. That would undoubtedly help us enormously to understand the size of readers and the potential impact that the Nazi press was having on the German society.

The Sixth chapter on Turkish-German relations during WWII ends with questions rather than definite arguments, which is done to signify that Turkish-German relations during WWII remain understudied. That chapter, the shortest in the book, does not even have a conclusion. However, that chapter reiterates a set of questions that a reader would think about while reading the book – Why did Hitler care about German-Turkish friendship

after WWI? In order to answer to that and many other questions Ihrig rightly proposes to analyze the other side of the coin – the image of National Socialism in 1930s Turkey. He conditions that option with the claim that it would not be possible to have a complete answer to that until "the Turkish Foreign Office archives are opened" (p. 221).

BOOK REVIEWS

Fuat Dündar, *Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878–1918)* (New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): Transaction Publishers, 2010), xiv, 238 pages.

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Questions about the number of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire on the threshold of the Armenian Genocide and the death toll during the Armenian Genocide have special place among falsifications by those scholars, who deny the historical fact of the Armenian Genocide. Upon visiting the webpage of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one can come across the title "The Armenian Allegation of Genocide: The issue and the facts", where the following information is provided under Fact 1: "Demographic studies prove that prior to World War I, fewer than 1.5 million Armenians lived in the entire Ottoman Empire. Thus, allegations that more than 1.5 million Armenians from eastern Anatolia died must be false."[1] There are a number of scholars, like Esat Uras[2], Stanford Shaw[3], Kamuran Gürün[4], Kemal Karpat[5], Justin McCarthy[6] and others engaged in putting this "fact" on scientific grounds. Unconditional and uncritical acceptance of statistical data, provided by the Ottoman government regarding the number of the Ottoman Armenians living in the empire during 1878-1914 and the denial of statistics originating from mainly Armenian sources (according to Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople, about two million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire in 1914)[7], which is discrepant to the

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1. *"The Armenian Allegation of Genocide: The issue and the facts"* (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-armenian-allegation-of-genocide-the-issue-and-the-facts.en.mfa, taken on 07.10.2015).

2. Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1950), English translation: Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question* (Ankara: Documentary Publications, 1988).

3. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol.2 (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Stanford J. Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914", *International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)*, № 9 (1978): 325-338.

4. Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed* (Nicosia and London: K. Rustem and Brother and Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985).

5. Karpat Kemal H., *Ottoman population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

6. McCarthy Justin, *Muslims and Minorities. The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 1983).

7. According to memorandum presented by the Armenian delegation at Paris Peace Conference in 1919, 2.026.000 Armenians lived in the Ottoman Empire by 1914, out of which 1.403.000 inhabited in the territory of Ottoman Armenia (including Trebizond province and Cilicia), 440.000 in other regions of Asian Turkey, and 183.000 in Constantinople and European Turkey: See: *The Armenian Question*

Ottoman data, is peculiar to the scholars showing denialist approach.

On the other hand, more recently a number of Turkish scholars are showing more distinctive, impartial and balanced approach to the issue. One of such scholars is Fuat Dündar with his book "*Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878–1918)"*, published in 2010 in English[8].

In the introduction (pp. 1-10) the author states that the main argument of the study is to substantiate the important role statistics played in the emergence of the Armenian question both on the international landscape and in its "definitive solution."

In the first chapter titled "*Diplomacy and Statistics, Emergence of the Armenian Question (1878-1913)*" (pp. 11-65) the author presents the role of statistics of the Western Armenian population in the framework of diplomacy around the Armenian Question for the above-given period. In this regard the author addresses the issue of credibility of the statistical data provided to the Powers by two bodies, the Ottoman Government and the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople, in frames of the Armenian Question. As Dündar fairly mentions, "contrary to what scholars such as Kemal Karpat and Justin McCarthy have argued, Ottoman statistical data concerning the Armenian population was not entirely reliable." The author argues that the Ottoman authorities conducted census to determine not only the number of recruits and/or the tax sum, as stated by K. Karpat and J. McCarthy, but also for determining the share of Muslim and non-Muslim representatives in local self-governing units. For this reason the Ottoman authorities sought to have control over statistical data in places, where non-Muslim population (Armenians) formed a majority, though they were considered a minority in the empire. The author attaches importance to the fact that, unlike persistence of K. Karpat and J. McCarthy, the Ottoman authorities counted and recorded Muslims, i. e. Turks, Kurds, Circassians and others, according to their ethnic origin features as well. The above-mentioned allows the researcher to conclude that the Ottoman authorities meddled in both data collection and classification system, imposing their political interests (p. 3).

At the same time Dündar makes an attempt to question the credibility of statistical data provided by the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople stating that "the data provided by the Armenians was also at times inconsistent" (p. 2) and "exaggerated." Precisely, the author finds the statistics by Grigor Zohrap (published in 1913) and data provided by the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople to be contradictory[9]. Dündar mentions that though Zohrap insisted the data was provided by the Armenian Patriarchate, it is exaggerated. The author substantiates his opinion by failing to find any other document proving the trustworthiness of Zohrab's data (p. 3). As a matter of fact, Grigor Zohrap only featured the table

Before the Peace Conference. A memorandum presented officially by the representatives of Armenia to the Peace Conference at Versailles, on February 26th, 1919 (New York: Press Bureau, The Armenian National Union of America, 1919), 34.

8. See Fuat Dündar, *Crime of Numbers. The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question* (New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): Transactions Publishers, 2010), xiv + 238 pp.

9. The data can be found in book "The Armenian Question in the light of documents" which Zohrap-published under pseudonym Marcel Leart in French in 1913. See Marcel Leart, *La Question Arménienne à la lumière des documents* (Paris: Challamel, 1913).

with statistical data collected in 1912 by the Security Committee authorized by the Armenian Patriarchate, in his 1913 book. In early 1913 Ottoman Armenians presented this table attached to the Armenian reform proposal to ambassadors of the European powers as at that time the Armenian Question returned to the active agenda of international diplomacy.

Generally, Dündar has a vague idea about censuses conducted during 1878-1914 by the Armenian Patriarchate and statistical data collected as a result. He falsely considers that data appearing in Zohrap's book and the statistics provided by the Armenian researcher Raymond Kevorkian in 1992 are both the two variants of the statistical data collected by the Armenian Patriarchate in 1912, and finds this to be contradictory (p. 145). While statistics provided by Raymond Kevorkian is based on the summarized tables of census conducted during 1913-1914 by the Armenian Patriarchate[10].

The Armenian deportations and massacres are presented in the second chapter *"War, Massacre and Statistics (1914-1918); Final Outcome of the Armenian Question"* (pp. 67-140). Dündar does not deny the events (1911-1917) that took place were systematic, but he views them as "demographic operations", which was part of the Young Turks' ethnic engineering. According to the researcher, the goal of the CUP party was to decrease the number of the Armenian population in the entire population of the empire and not the extermination of the Ottoman Armenians as an entity. The author evades using the term "genocide"[11] and calls what was happened "the massacres of 1915-1917."

Dündar thinks that the goal of the Young Turks was to completely displace the Armenian population from the territory (six Vilayets of Western Armenia and Vilayet of Trebizond) under the concern of 1914 Russo-Turkish reform agreement, to decrease the Armenian population in Anatolian (the Asia Minor) provinces by 5%, in Aleppo Vilayet by 2% and down to 10% in other territories (p. 2). According to the author, "the CUP policy of the definitive solution of the Armenian Question evolved through three phases: 1) destruction of both "causes" and the "spirit" of rebellion of the Armenian revolutionaries; 2) Elimination of Armenian people's all possible means of representation both personal and institutional, and finally, 3) deportation of the Armenian population to semi-desert area and there, reducing it to a level where not be a threat from a statistical point of view" (p. 68).

The fact that the organizers of the Armenian Genocide had to be guided by another, i. e. more serious considerations, rather than by the decrease of the number of the Armenian population down to 10%, 5% or even to 2.5%, can be obviously seen from the Ottoman statistical data of 1914. According to that official data, which were to form that basis of statistic estimates of the Young Turks, the number of the Armenian population in some Asia

10. Our research, the results of which can be found in the work *"The Question of Western Armenian Population Number in 1878-1914"* (Yerevan: AGMI, 2015) showed that five censuses were conducted and records made in the entire territory of Western Armenia by Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople during 1878-1914: 1-2) During 1878-1880 and 1880-1881, by Patriarch Nersses Varzhapetyan, 3) in 1902, under the patriarchate of Maghakia Ormanyan, 4) in 1912 on the occasion of re-emergence of the Armenian Question, and 5) during 1913-1914, parallel to developments on Armenian Reforms Draft. Special importance is paid to statistical table compiled by Stepan Papasyan, a member of Armenian delegation, and attached to Western Armenian Reforms Draft, presented at Berlin Congress in 1878. This table with his own calculations was based on different Ottoman statistical sources.

11. This term is used only once, in a footnote (Dündar, *Crime of Numbers,* 7).

Minor vilayets was already insignificant and did not outnumber 5% before deportations (see table 1). This fact, however, did not hamper the Young Turks from deporting and massacring the Armenian population of the territories under concern.

Table 1 [12]

Administrative Unit	Armenians[13]	Overall Population	Share of Armenian Population, %
Edirne (Adrianople)	19,773	631,094	3,1
Ankara	51,576	953,817	5,4
Kastamonu	8,959	767,227	1,1
Konya	12,971	789,308	1,6
Eskişehir	8,592	152,726	5,6
Nigde	4,935	291,117	1,7
Biğa (Kale-i Sultanye)	2,474	165,815	1,5

Of course, it cannot be denied that the Young Turks were attaching much importance to statistical data in organizing extermination of the Ottoman Armenian population. But statistics was just a medium, namely a tool to handle the process of genocide and not a goal, as presented by Fuat Dündar. Besides, it is not possible to explain and justify neither the extermination of the Western Armenian socio-political and cultural elite, nor the annihilation of the Armenian servicemen, proceeding only from "a statistical point of view" and the logics of "demographic engineering" policy. Those two are part of the genocidal process.

The third chapter *("Crime in Numbers, Counting Armenian Death Toll"*, pp. 141-157) of Dündar's research focuses on the number of the Ottoman Armenian population on the threshold of WWI and counting victim population of the Armenian Genocide. The researcher does not make any calculations of his own to determine the number of the Armenian population before deportation, but adopts a number, found in a recently published report, prepared for Talaat Pasha in 1917 and kept in his archives. The so called "Talaat Pasha's Record Book" includes information about the number of the Armenian population according to administrative units of the Ottoman Empire, before (in 1914) and after (1917) the Armenian Genocide. Commenting on the data of the Ottoman statistics (according to it the number of the Western Armenian population in 1914 was 1.251.785 including both Apostolic and Catholic Armenians), the Turkish official mentions this number to be lower than the actual figures because not all Armenians were registered, and the actual number should be around 1.500.000. This data is considered by Dündar as a number that "puts an end to arguments about the Armenian population" (p. 149). As a ground to this statement the researcher brings two reasons: 1. data was provided by a political organization that wanted to

12. Ottoman statistical data of 1914 are taken from Kemal Karpat's book "Ottoman Population During 1830-1914; Demographic and Social Characteristics" (Karpat, *Ottoman Population During 1830-1914*, 188-189).

13. Both Gregorian and Catholic Armenians.

find a final solution for the Armenian Question and for that reason it made every effort to determine the exact number of the Armenian population, and 2) data was not prepared with the intention of publication, but rather for internal circulation (ibid).

Even if we consider the deemed link between the final outcome of the Armenian Question and the exact number of the Armenian population, which is not logical, it is still unclear how the figure 1.5 million is supposed to be "exact". Conversely, the logic suggests that if the author of the 1917 report set a goal to find out the precise number of the Armenian population, he would not have to limit his study to presenting round numbers in footnotes, but would try to present more reasonable and accurate calculations, particularly, as it was already mentioned, when the number of the Ottoman Armenians, according to the Ottoman statistical data of 1914, was very specific: 1.251.785.

Therefore, there were no grounds for the researcher to suppose that the calculations appearing in Talaat Pasha's Record Book put an end to the allegations by the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople that about 2 million Armenians lived in the Ottoman Empire on the threshold of the Armenian Genocide. Actually the data in Talaat's report proves another thing: Ottoman officials themselves didn't believe in trustworthiness of the Ottoman official statistics on the number of the Western Armenian population, and thought these data should be corrected. At the same time approximately 20% addition to the report aimed at the correction of the Ottoman data should be considered as insufficient; counting the Gregorian and Catholic Armenian population to 1.500.000 before deportation and massacres is also incomplete, and this number is lower than the actual figure[14].

After "finding out" that the number of the Ottoman Armenians was 1.5 million on the threshold of WWI, the researcher passes on to his next goal: to determine the number of victims of the Armenian Genocide. Dündar mentions that this can be achieved by applying the following method: subtract the number of survivors by 1918 from that of the Ottoman Armenian population on the threshold of WWI. In order to find out the number of survivors he classifies them into three groups: the Armenians "allowed to stay in Anatolia", the deported Armenians and the Armenian refugees, who found shelter in other countries. According to the author, there are 281.000 Armenians in the first group, including Armenians from Constantinople, Smyrna (Aydin), Adrianople (Edirne) and Konya, as well as families of Catholic and Protestant Armenians, craftsman and servicemen (about 75.000), and about 50.000 Islamized Armenians, mainly women and children. The second group consists of about 300.000 Armenians, who survived the Genocide in Syria and Mesopotamia refugee camps. The third group consists of the Armenian refugees counting to 255.000. After subtracting the number of survivors (836.000 by 1918) from the above-stated 1.5 million, the author concludes that 664.000 Armenians fell victim of the Armenian Genocide (p. 151).

14. It should be mentioned that Taner Akçam also referred to Talaat Pasha's data on Western Armenian population. Prominent Turkish historian states that he has no end to argue on the question of number of Armenian population and victims of the Genocide, but instead says he uses these Ottoman data to cover the link between Young Turk demographic policy and the Genocide (Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in The Ottoman Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2012), 255).

It is clear by itself that this number has nothing to do with actual figures, because the number of the Armenian population on the threshold of WWI (1.5 million) is significant underestimate. Besides, author's approach reveals serious fallacy of his methodology based on taking out different sets of data out of their context and trying to artificially combine and reconcile them. For example he assumes Ottoman data as a basis for determining the number of the Armenian population on the threshold of WWI, but makes a wide use of the Armenian and Western sources to calculate the number of survivors of the Genocide. The number of the Armenian refugees sheltered in the Caucasus is close to the actual one, but perhaps Dündar is unaware of the wide-acknowledged fact that the Armenians, who had migrated from Van province, were more than half of that number (about 150.000) [15]. This documental number proves once again that the official Ottoman statistics had nothing to do with reality, because, according to the Ottoman data, the Armenian population of Van province in 1914 was 67.792[16].

The summarizing chapter titled *"A Few Observations"* (pp. 157-172) actually serves as an afterword. Dündar finishes his studies with the following lines: "*Even today statistics inevitably occupy a central position within every discussion of the Armenian Genocide, and in all aspects of the Armenian Question*" (p. 171). Author's persistence that data from Talaat Pasha's Record Book put an end to disputes about the number of the Western Armenian population is undoubtedly groundless, and there are other disputable issues as well. However, this is perhaps the value of Dündar's book "*Crime of Numbers*", as a work that gathers readers at the discussion table, can promote the research of the difficult and entangled issues of accurately determining the number of the Western Armenian population on the threshold

15. See J. S. Kirakossyan, *The First World War and the Western Armenians* (in Armenian) (Yerevan: Hayastan publishing, 1967), 43. According to data provided by Alexander Sharafyan, the authorized agent of Armenian Benevolent Association of the Caucasus, by January 1916 the number of Western Armenians refugees sheltered in the Russian Empire was 229.293, including inhabitants of Bassen (18.910), Bitlis, Mush, Bayazet provinces and Van Vilayet (about 170.000), inhabitants of eastern region of Van Vilayet and Western region of Persia (18.055), as well as refugees from Van Vilayet sheltered in Persia (about 10.000) and 3500 orphans. The same source mentions that in July 1915 about 20.000 Armenians died during the migration of Van and Vaspurakan population (see article "Armenian Refugees, January 1916" in *Hambavaber* weekly (*Hambavaber social and literary weekly, official gazette of Armenian Benevolent Association of the Caucasus* (issue 2, January 3, 1916) (in Armenian)).

In the memorandum presented by Armenian delegation at Paris Peace Conference in 1919 it is mentioned that the number of Armenians, who migrated from Van Vilayet and found shelter in Russia, was over 220.000 (see *The Armenian Question before the Peace Conference*, 21).

Armenian researcher G. Badalyan, assuming the data retrieved from refugee registration during July-September, 1917 as a basis (according to that register the number of Armenian families leaving Van Vilayet was equal to 24.127, while the average rate showing the largeness of Van Armenian family was 8.8), considers that 210.000-212.000 Armenians lived in Van Vilayet in 1914 (see G. M. Badalyan, "Some Demographic Principles to Determine Western Armenian Population (on the example of Erzeroum and Van Vilayets)" in *Modern Status of Armenology and Development Perspectives, report provisions of International Armenological Conference (Yerevan, September 15-20, 2003)* (Yerevan: 2003), 140). See also R. A. Tatoyan, "Statistical Data on Number of Armenian Population in Van Vilayet during 1878-1914 (attempt to compare and analyze sources)," *The Issues of the History and Historiography of the Armenian Genocide*, 7 (2003): 65-79.

16. Even if we consider the rate used by Dündar (20%) to clarify the Ottoman statistical data, the result for Van province Armenians (81.600) is considerable underestimate.

of WWI and the number of victims of the Genocide, as well as the publication of new works directed at covering the anti-Armenian policy (with its statistical and administrative-demographic expressions) of the Ottoman state, adopted after Berlin Congress.

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